

PRISM

VOL. 2, NO. 2 ♦ 03/2011

CCO
CENTER FOR
COMPLEX OPERATIONS
DIPLOMACY • DEFENSE • DEVELOPMENT

A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS

PRISM

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Human Security in Complex Operations

BY MARY KALDOR

Complex operations take place in zones of insecurity. In these zones, ordinary people face a range of everyday risks and dangers. They risk being killed, tortured, kidnapped, robbed, raped, or displaced from their homes. They risk dying from hunger, lack of shelter, disease, or lack of access to health care. They are vulnerable to man-made and natural disasters—hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, or fires. These risks and dangers feed on each other. They are very difficult to eliminate; hence, the current preoccupation with “persistent conflict” or “forever wars.” These have a tendency to spread both to neighboring regions—growing zones of insecurity in places such as East Africa, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, or the Balkans—and, indeed, to the inner cities of the industrialized West.

Yet our security forces, largely based on conventional military forces designed to meet a foreign attack, are unsuited to address these risks and dangers; indeed, the application of conventional military force can often make things worse—as we have learned painfully in Iraq and Afghanistan. Already, a range of private actors, security contractors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), militia, warlords, and criminal gangs have rushed to fill the vacuum created by the failure of public institutions to provide security, contributing both to security and, more often than not, to greater insecurity.

Human security is a concept that can facilitate both the way we understand complex operations and how we design the toolkit for addressing these risks and dangers. It offers a narrative that is quite different from the war on terror and it implies a set of principles for using both

Mary Kaldor is Professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, where she is also the Director of its Centre for the Study of Global Governance. This article draws on her recent book, coauthored with Lieutenant Colonel Shannon D. Beebe, USA, *The Ultimate Weapon Is No Weapon: Human Security and the New Rules of War and Peace* (PublicAffairs, 2010).

military and civil capabilities combined. In this essay, I first define human security and then elaborate the principles of human security. I briefly suggest the differences between a human security approach and contemporary counterinsurgency doctrines. Finally, I deal with the criticisms that have been leveled at the concept.

human security offers a narrative that is quite different from the war on terror

The version of human security presented in this article was developed in a human security study group that I convene, and which reported to Javier Solana, the European Union's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, and now to his successor, Cathy Ashton. The study group included military and civilian practitioners as well as academics from all over Europe. Our initial brief was to produce a report on the kind of security capabilities Europe needs. We concluded that instead of traditional armed forces, Europe needs a combination of military and civilian capabilities designed to address complex operations. We decided to call the new doctrine human security.¹

Defining Human Security


There are three elements to our definition of *human security*. First, human security is about the everyday security of individuals and the communities in which they live rather than the security of states and borders; it is about the security of Afghans and Americans and Europeans, not just the security of the United States or Europe.

Second, it is about different sorts of security, not only protection from the threat of

foreign enemies. It is about addressing the variety of risks and dangers experienced in those places where complex operations are conducted. It is about both freedom from fear and freedom from want. This is perhaps the most contested aspect of the definition of human security. The so-called broad definition of human security was first put forward in the 1994 *Human Development Report* published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The report argued that the concept of security has “for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people.”² The report identified seven core elements, which together made up the concept of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. At that time, the main concern was to make sure that the peace dividend expected from the end of the Cold War would be devoted to development. The aim of the 1994 *Human Development Report* was to use the concept of security to emphasize the urgency of development. This broad definition of human security was adopted by the Japanese government and taken up by the report of the United Nations (UN) High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change titled *In Larger Freedom*, and in the Secretary-General's response to that report.³

A narrower definition of the concept of human security, developed by the Canadian government, is closely associated with the concept of Responsibility to Protect—the idea that the international community has a responsibility to protect people threatened by genocide,

Girls wait for school supplies handed out by Afghan National Civil Order Police



U.S. Army (G.A. Volb)

ethnic cleansing, and other massive violations of human rights when their governments fail to act. This definition is reflected in the *Human Security Report*, published in 2005, and the subsequent Human Security Briefs, documents that provide valuable information about political violence—particularly violent conflicts.⁴

My definition of human security emphasizes what the UNDP calls personal security—the security of human beings in violent upheavals. This broad definition tends to neglect security as conventionally defined and to assume that if we solve the problems of material deprivation, the rest will follow. While violence cannot be disentangled from all the other dimensions of insecurity, it is also the case that a functioning economy or effective protection against disasters depends on security in the way it is conventionally defined (that is, physical safety). And how we address the problems of violence in zones of insecurity is still not well understood.

The third element of the definition of human security is about the interrelatedness of security in different places. Violence and resentment, poverty and illness, in places such as Africa, Central Asia, or the Middle East travel across the world through terrorism, transnational crime, or pandemics. Instead of allowing insecurity to travel, we need to send security in the opposite direction. The kind of security that Americans and Europeans expect to enjoy at home has to spread to the rest of the world. We cannot any longer keep our parts of the world safe while ignoring other places. The world is interconnected through social media, transportation, and basic human sympathy. In other words, human security is about the blurring of the domestic and the international—it is about a global form of the kind of law-based security that is typical of

well-ordered societies, a law paradigm rather than a war paradigm.

The Principles of Human Security

It follows that implementing human security is more like law enforcement rather than classic warfighting operations. We need something like domestic emergency services at a global level. These services would include both civilian and military capabilities (police, humanitarian services, engineers and firefighters, legal experts, and the military). They would operate under principles that are quite different from conventional military operations.

The principles have to cover both ends and means. There has been a lot of recent discussion about the “responsibility to protect” and the conditions under which it is right to use military force. But there is much less discussion about how military forces should be used in such a role, yet this is critical for effective protection. There are also discussions about which civilian elements of crisis management are to be used, with an emphasis on helping to establish a rule of law, but much less about how and when these elements should work together with the military. Thus, the principles apply to both *how* and *why*, both *ends* and *means*.

human security is more like law enforcement rather than classic warfighting operations

The principles do not only apply to hot conflict situations. A distinction is often drawn between the “prevention” of crises and post-conflict reconstruction. But it is often difficult to distinguish among different phases of

complex operations precisely because there are no clear beginnings or endings and because the conditions that cause conflict and crisis—fear and hatred, a criminalized economy that profits from violent methods of controlling assets, weak illegitimate states, or the existence of warlords and paramilitary groups—are often exacerbated during and after periods of violence. As Rupert Smith argues, “In the world of industrial war the premise is of the sequence peace-crisis-war-resolution, which will result in peace again, with the war, the military action, being the deciding factor. In contrast, the new paradigm of war amongst the people is based on the concept of a continuous criss-crossing between confrontation and conflicts.”⁵ The principles for a human security policy should therefore apply to a continuum of phases of varying degrees of violence that always involves elements of both prevention and reconstruction.

In the European Union study group, we developed six principles:

Principle 1: The Primacy of Human Rights. The primacy of human rights is what distinguishes the human security approach from traditional state-based approaches. Although the principle seems obvious, there are deeply held and entrenched institutional and cultural obstacles that have to be overcome if it is to be realized in practice. Human rights include economic and social rights as well as political and civil rights. This means that human rights such as the right to life, right to housing, or right to freedom of opinion are to be respected and protected even in the midst of conflict.

What this principle means is that unless it is absolutely necessary and legal, killing is to be avoided. For the military it means the primary goal is protecting civilians rather than

defeating an adversary. Of course, sometimes it is necessary to try to capture or even defeat insurgents, but it has yet to be seen as a means to an end—civilian protection—rather than the other way around. Torturing suspects who have been arrested is also illegitimate and illegal. Causing greater human suffering as a result of an intervention would seem questionable. So-called collateral damage is unacceptable. At the same time, the application of this principle to saving life directly under threat from other parties might involve the frequent use of force and a much more robust interventionist policy. Interventions would aim to prevent a repeat of future Srebrenicas or Rwandas.

The primacy of human rights also implies that those who commit gross human rights violations are treated as individual criminals rather than collective enemies; the aim is to arrest and bring them to justice rather than kill them.

Principle 2: Legitimate Political Authority.

Human security depends on the existence of legitimate institutions that gain the trust of the population and have some enforcement capacity. Legitimate political authority does not necessarily need to mean a state; it could consist of local government or regional or international political arrangements such as protectorates or transitional administrations. Since state failure is often the primary cause of conflict, the reasons for state failure have to be taken into account in reconstructing legitimate political authority. Measures such as justice and security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; extension of authority; and public service reform are critical for the establishment of legitimate political authority.⁶

This principle explicitly recognizes limitations on the use of military force. The aim

of any intervention is to stabilize the situation so that a space can be created for a peaceful political process rather than to win through military means alone. In the end, a legitimate political authority has to be established through debates involving the people. The most that can be achieved through the use of military force is stabilization. Again, this is a difficult cognitive shift for the military since they tend to see their roles in terms of defeating an enemy. This principle explicitly recognizes the impossibility of victory but aims instead to establish safe zones where political solutions can be sought. The military's job is enabling rather than winning. Thus, techniques such as creating safe havens, humanitarian corridors, or no-fly zones are typical of a human security approach.

legitimate political authority has to be established through debates involving the people

Principle 3: Multilateralism. A human security approach has to be global. Hence, it can only be implemented through multilateral action. Multilateralism means more than simply “acting with a group of states.” In that narrow sense nearly all international initiatives might be considered multilateral. Multilateralism is closely related to legitimacy and is what distinguishes a human security approach from neocolonialism.

First, multilateralism means a commitment to work with international institutions and through the procedures of international institutions. This means, first and foremost, working within the UN framework, but it also entails working with or sharing-out tasks among other

regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the African Union, Southern African Development Community, and Economic Community of West African States in Africa; or the Organization of American States.

Second, multilateralism entails a commitment to creating common rules and norms, solving problems through rules and cooperation, and enforcing the rules. Nowadays, legitimate political authority has to be situated within a multilateral framework. Indeed, state failure is partly explained in terms of the failure of traditionally unilateralist states to adapt to multilateral ways of working.

people who live in zones of insecurity are the only ones who can actually build long-term security

Third, multilateralism has to include coordination rather than duplication or rivalry. An effective human security approach requires coordination among intelligence, foreign policy, trade policy, development policy, and security policy initiatives of individual states and other multilateral actors, including the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and regional institutions, as well as private actors such as NGOs. Institutional coordination is always difficult to achieve since it usually means adding yet another layer of bureaucracy. Human security offers an alternative narrative that can provide conceptual coherence as well.

Principle 4: The Bottom-up Approach. Notions of “partnership,” “local ownership,” and “participation” are already key concepts

in development policy. These concepts should also apply to security policies. Decisions about the kind of security and development policies to be adopted, whether to intervene with military forces or through various forms of conditionality and how, must take account of the most basic needs identified by the people who are affected by violence and insecurity. This is not just a moral issue; it is also a matter of effectiveness. People who live in zones of insecurity are the best source of intelligence and, indeed, are the only ones who can actually build long-term security. Thus, communication, consultation, and dialogue are essential tools not simply to win hearts and minds but to gain knowledge and understanding and to lay the basis for the construction of appropriate institutions. This principle seems obvious, but there is often a built-in tendency to think “we know best.” After all, bottom-up includes criminals, the mafia, and warlords. The solution is to talk to everyone, and it should not be so difficult to identify people of conscience and integrity who could act as local guides.

Particularly important in this respect is the role of women’s groups. The importance of gender equality for development, especially the education of girls, has long been recognized. The same may be true when managing complex operations. Women play a critical role in contemporary conflicts, both in dealing with the everyday consequences of the conflict and in overcoming divisions in society. Involvement and partnership with women’s groups should be a key component of a human security approach.

Principle 5: Regional Focus. Twenty-first century risks and dangers have no clear boundaries. They tend to spread through refugees and displaced persons, through minorities

who live in different states, through criminal and extremist networks, and through the ripple effect caused by natural disasters. Indeed, most situations of severe insecurity are located in regional clusters. The tendency to focus attention on areas defined in terms of statehood has often meant that relatively simple ways of preventing the spread of violence are neglected. Time and again, foreign policy analysts have been taken by surprise when, after considerable attention had been given to one conflict, another conflict would seemingly spring up out of the blue in a neighboring state. The war in Sierra Leone could not be solved without addressing the cause of conflict in Liberia, for example. Today's war in Afghanistan can only be contained if neighboring states, especially Pakistan and Iran, are involved.

Principle 6: Clear Transparent Civilian Command. In complex operations it is critical to have a single local commander who understands the local situation and can communicate with centers of political power in the international arena. That person should be a civilian, a UN Special Representative, for example. It is extremely difficult to achieve military-civil coordination and the trust of multilateral agencies if the person in charge is military. Civilians fear that they will become targets in a shooting war or will be used to identify enemies rather than to meet needs.

These six principles imply a much more effective means of achieving security. It is precisely because the spread of terrorist techniques, used by fundamentalists of various stripes, is becoming a serious threat that we need a different approach; the use of conventional military force in a warfighting mode actually increases insecurity and enhances conditions favorable to terrorist recruitment. In practical terms,

application of the principles would transform the way we assess insecurity (in terms of indicators such as casualties, human rights violations, or disease instead of measuring foreign military capabilities) and the nature of our security capabilities. For example, communication would mean a two-way dialogue instead of strategic messaging; intelligence would be human and bottom-up intelligence instead of technical and top-down; and technological requirements would involve communication and transport capabilities and less expensive and sophisticated weaponry.

conventional military force in a warfighting mode actually increases insecurity and enhances conditions favorable to terrorist recruitment

Counterinsurgency versus Human Security

The U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) manual, published in December 2006, turned out to be a powerful critique of the use of conventional warfighting tactics applied in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it used some language associated with a human security approach.⁷ It emphasized the key objective of legitimacy and establishing a government that can guarantee a rule of law. It put protection of civilians at the heart of the doctrine. It argued for an “appropriate level of force,” suggesting “[s]ometimes the more force you use the less effective it is”; “[s]ome of the best weapons for Counterinsurgency do not shoot”; and “[s]ometimes the more you protect your force the less secure you will be.”⁸ It also called for the integration of military and civilian activities.

Farah Wholesale Market, a joint Afghan government and USAID project, accommodates up to 80 traders and facilitates sale of fruits and vegetables

U.S. Air Force (Rylan K. Albright)



The doctrine was applied successfully during the surge in Iraq and has been adapted for Afghanistan. General Stanley McChrystal, then-commander in Afghanistan, produced a comprehensive report in August 2009 proposing an integrated military-civilian campaign. The plan went even further than General David Petraeus's COIN strategy for Iraq. It emphasizes protecting civilians rather than defeating enemies and even uses the term *human security*. It covers such issues as sustainable jobs, access to justice, governance, and communication, and the importance of the Afghan role in these endeavors. It deals with “irreconcilables” through isolation rather than direct attack.⁹

But counterinsurgency is different from human security. At a tactical level, counterinsurgency is, first and foremost, a military doctrine as seen through a military prism. In particular, rules of engagement are determined by the “laws of war” (*jus in bello*) rather than by civil law, which offers guidelines for policemen. Thus, a judgment about whether hitting a military target justifies civilian casualties must be made differently from the same judgment in a domestic or civil context. The war-minded way of thinking is integrated into military units, however much they are drilled in the importance of population security. As long as population security is a tactic rather than a goal or a strategy, the starting point for soldiers will be how to identify targets or disrupt networks rather than the needs of the people; this means they risk deploying force that will escalate the conflict. There may indeed be times when military action has to be used against terrorists or insurgents, putting civilian lives at risk. But this is never the priority under a human security approach. Moreover, the starting point for a judgment about when to use lethal force is different; for a human security approach, the starting point is self-defense or

the defense of a third party. The balance of judgment is, therefore, more likely to be on the side of saving lives.

At a strategic level, COIN and, indeed, “long war” remain situated within a framework of “us” and “them.” It is about the conflict between the West and the global network of Islamic extremists even if it is no longer framed as the war on terror. A human security approach is about how to make everyone safe; it dispenses with easy dualisms. Human security is about a common global effort to make people safe. Of course, interstate war is perhaps the biggest threat to human security, but the threat lies in the threat of war itself, not a foreign attack; it is a threat to all human beings, not just to Americans and Europeans. Traditional warthinking will always find an echo among competing powers or in notions of jihad. It provides an argument for Russian militarists, Chinese traditionalists, and, of course, angry young Muslim men.

Despite the McChrystal report there remains a huge tension between the efforts to defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda and the efforts to achieve population security—a tension perhaps epitomized in Operation *Enduring Freedom* and the International Security Assistance Force, even though General Petraeus is commander of both. The tension is reflected in continuing collateral damage, albeit much less than before. It is reflected in Afghan perceptions; many Afghans believe that they are pawns in a wider power game and therefore do not know which side to support. And of course it is reflected in the military nature of the operation. Even though McChrystal’s report goes a long way in the direction of human security, its implementation has been hampered both by the fact that it was *his* report

and *not* the report of civilian leaders such as the late Richard Holbrooke, President Barack Obama’s Special Representative to the area, or Kai Eide, former UN Special Representative in Afghanistan, and by the fact that this thinking has not yet penetrated the culture of individual military units.

Criticisms

Two contradictory sets of criticisms have been raised in relation to the concept of human security. The first set of criticisms is about the concept of human security and can be found within the wider public debate. There are those who oppose all military interventions, especially those on the left who argue that human security is a cover for neoimperialism—a way to justify military interventions. And there are those, especially on the right, who favor military intervention and who argue that the concept is too soft and lacks teeth. The second set of criticisms comes from practitioners who are in the field and responsible for complex operations. One argument is “We’re doing human security; we just don’t call it that.” And the other opposite argument is “Human Security is too lofty and ambitious; it is not practical or realistic.”

many Afghans believe that they are pawns in a wider power game and do not know which side to support

The criticism of human security as neoimperialism is about the use of humanitarianism to justify the use of conventional military force. Critics such as Noam Chomsky talk about the new “military humanitarianism” and argue that the war in Kosovo provided a precedent for the

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁰ In this line of argument, the term human security is merely a convenient cover for self-interest and for fighting wars. The criticism of human security as too soft, on the other hand, is just the opposite. It is about the way the development community has seized the security bandwagon as a way of promoting development efforts.

My answer is that human security is a hard concept. It is about protecting individuals and communities, and sometimes this involves the use of military force and can be even more risky than conventional warfighting. On the other hand, military force is used in a way that

human security is a hard concept and sometimes can be even more risky than conventional warfighting

is quite different from the way it is used either for warfighting or peacekeeping. A humanitarian intervention, however, is different from a classic military intervention. It is different from imperialist interventions because it takes place within an international mandate, that is, within the framework of international law. And it is different in the way it is carried out since it is aimed at protecting people rather than fighting an enemy; indeed, conventional warfighting is in itself a humanitarian catastrophe. Actually, so-called hard security is often soft. Advanced systems are intended not for use but for communication—that is the point of deterrence.

As for the practical arguments, it is true that human security encompasses many of the concepts currently used in complex operations, especially by the UN and European Union—for example, crisis management, military-civil cooperation, or conflict prevention. Indeed, the last two decades have involved a dramatic

learning process for security practitioners—the military, humanitarian agencies, as well as politicians. The statistics provided in the human security reports show that there has been a decline both in the number of wars and in the number of people killed in wars, and I believe this can be attributed to that learning process. Of course, if it were not for the fact that human security is already implicit in much of the work of practitioners in complex operations it would not be practicable.

The concept of human security does, however, take existing practice further. It offers a shared narrative that can explain what people are trying to do and a sense of global public service. It draws on the debates generated by these concepts as well as other terms used more broadly in the current global discourse such as “responsibility to protect,” “effective multilateralism,” and “human development” and, together with the principles, offers an easy-to-understand holistic framework that can serve as a coherent guiding doctrine. For example, the problem of using military and civilian capabilities together is not just a problem of coordination or integration. In classic wars, civilians always insisted on their autonomy from the military. Their ability to operate depended on “humanitarian space”—their neutrality and impartiality was important to allow them to help noncombatants, prisoners of war, and the wounded on all sides. Many humanitarian and development agencies fear that association with the military will undermine their ability to work, and indeed this has happened in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the international institutions are perceived to be on the side of coalition forces. But in contemporary wars, where civilians are targets, humanitarian space is disappearing. In a human security operation, the job of the

military is to protect and preserve that space rather than to fight an enemy. Thus, human security is not just about developing a culture of coordination and civil-military cooperation; it is about an entirely new way of functioning in crises that is best described by a new language of human security. Coordination is not about organizational arrangements, although they are important; it is about coherent goals and methods and how they are defined.

So is it utopian to suggest that human security offers a new language for addressing contemporary risks and dangers? The challenge is cognitive rather than practical. Human security does require a transformation in ways of thinking. Traditional concepts of security are deeply embedded in armed forces, defense corporations, military laboratories, ministries of foreign affairs and defense, and career structures. This is why any alternative appears utopian. It may be that current financial pressures may provide a reason to cut back some of the expensive toolkit associated with traditional warfighting, and that this does present an opportunity.

But human security is utopian in another sense. The basis for human security is the assumption that all human beings are equal. While this is easy to accept in theory, in practice, national ways of thinking about security mean that European and American lives do receive priority over Iraqi, Afghan, or Congolese lives. Accepting that all human lives are equal in practice would mean, for example, putting civilian protection before force protection. This is a big challenge for those schooled in national frameworks of thinking. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ See the reports of the Human Security Study Group: *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on European Security Capabilities*, September 15, 2007, available at <www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityDoctrine.pdf>; *A European Way of Security: The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group*, November 8, 2007, available at <www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/PDFs/Madrid%20Report%20Final%20for%20distribution.pdf>; and *Helsinki Plus: A Human Security Architecture for Europe*, May 2010, available at <www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/PDFs/Helsinki%20Plus%20Human%20Security%20ArchitectureLR.pdf>.

² United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

³ United Nations, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, report of the Secretary-General, 2005, available at <www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm>.

⁴ Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia, *Human Security Report: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, December 2001.

⁵ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 16–17.

⁶ See Herbert Wulf, “The Challenges of Re-Establishing a Public Monopoly of Violence,” in *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Project; Principles; Practicalities*, ed. Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (Oxford: Routledge, 2005).

⁷ U.S. Army Field Manual 3–24 and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3–33.5, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army/Headquarters Department of the Navy, 2006).

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1–27.

⁹ “United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan,” August 10, 2009.

¹⁰ Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo* (London: Pluto, 1999).

Enhancing U.S. Support for UN Peacekeeping

BY NANCY SODERBERG

As the United States establishes its strategic priorities to enhance national security, support for peacekeeping is increasingly important. Particularly following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Pentagon has viewed failed states (also referred to as “undergoverned” or “ungoverned spaces”) as a threat to U.S. national security. President Barack Obama’s restoration of the Cabinet status of his Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), Susan Rice, reflects the administration’s recognition of the overall importance of the UN, including its key role in peacekeeping.

Over the last 4 years, the Center for Technology and National Security Policy and, since 2008, the Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense University have hosted a unique series of offsite informal discussions designed to facilitate open and frank discussions of what more the United States might do to support burgeoning UN peacekeeping activities. In five sessions, these off-the-record, informal discussions occurred between the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and Department of Defense (DOD).¹ The Department of Field Support (DFS) was added following its creation in 2007, and the State Department began participating at a senior level in 2009. This series was conceived by Hans Binnendijk, director of the Institute for National Security Studies at the National Defense University, and led by Dr. Binnendijk and me. Ambassador James Dobbins, director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, has served as session moderator.

The goal of these informal discussions was to seek common ground on how to strengthen the UN–U.S. partnership and galvanize support from other nations. The forum allows for a candid and frank assessment of the challenges that UN peacekeeping is currently facing and how the United States is willing to assist in that challenge. It is important to recognize that the State Department has

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the lead responsibility for assisting the United Nations. However, given the vast needs of the United Nations and the limited resources of the State Department, these discussions have focused primarily on ways the Pentagon can provide assistance in its areas of expertise and where resources are available.

The Pentagon has identified peacekeeping as an essential and high priority area for needed investment. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review highlights peacekeeping capabilities through a commitment to assist “partners in developing and acquiring the capabilities and systems required to improve their security capacity . . . [and enhancing] U.S. capabilities to train, advise, and assist partner-nation security forces and contribute to coalition and peacekeeping operations.”²

The United Nations has made impressive progress in implementing reforms and managing the expansion of peacekeeping operations over the last decade. Ten years after the Brahimi report on UN peace operations,³ the United Nations has implemented many of the recommendations. The report put in motion major

given the extraordinary growth of UN peacekeeping the ready stocks and funds to deploy missions have not been sufficiently adjusted

reforms to make peacekeeping faster, more capable, and more effective. Those reforms focused on improving five key areas: personnel, doctrine, partnerships, resources, and organization. The UN also set up a “Peacekeeping Best Practices Section,” which has helped synchronize effective information management practices, strengthen the development of policy and doctrine, and institutionalize learning

systems for peacekeeping. It has further worked to establish predictable frameworks for cooperation with regional organizations, including common peacekeeping standards and modalities for cooperation and transition, and to conduct, where possible, joint training exercises.⁴

The United Nations has also instituted reforms to help it adapt to a five-fold increase in peacekeeping over the last decade, from 20,000 peacekeepers in the field in 2000 to a present capacity of 100,000. The complexity of peacekeeping has grown as well. Since 2003, UN peacekeepers have deployed to no fewer than eight complex operations, often operating simultaneously.

Yet, gaps in personnel and other resources remain. Some of the Brahimi reforms have been partially implemented, such as a global logistics strategy and effective integrated planning mechanisms. Given the extraordinary growth of UN peacekeeping, and no reduction in need on the horizon, the ready stocks and funds to deploy missions have not been sufficiently adjusted. Member states have failed to provide necessary additional capacity to reinforce missions during crises.⁵

In July 2009, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support released *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for United Nations Peacekeeping* (New Horizon report).⁶ The document set forth a plan to address the complex and evolving nature of demands placed on UN peacekeeping and its diverse military, police, and other civilian elements and the steps required to strengthen peacekeeping to meet emerging challenges. Key proposals outlined in the document helped “build common ground among those who participate in peacekeeping operations: those who contribute to peacekeeping with personnel, equipment, and financial resources; those who plan, manage, and execute



UN (Martine Ferret)

Police from Pakistan, one of the top five nations providing troops to UN peacekeeping missions, collaborate with UN police in Timor-Leste

operations; and those who partner with UN peacekeeping operations to deliver on the ground.”⁷ Areas where progress is needed include the strengthening of linkages to peacebuilding and mediation and improvement in the policy, financial, administrative, and logistics support required to successfully deploy the full range of international instruments addressing postconflict situations.

One area that has taken on greater importance in uniformed capacities is the role of policing in the wide range of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. The United Nations seeks to develop baseline capability standards and to build on recent successful innovative experience with the Formed Police Unit. It continues to develop a comprehensive police doctrine to help define the roles, responsibilities, and appropriate tasks—as well as expectations—of policing within a peacekeeping context.⁸ The goal of the UN is making its own peacekeeping “a flexible and responsive instrument and ensuring that the investment in peacekeeping yields a sustainable peace.”⁹

Although the United Nations and the United States clearly recognize the important role of strengthening capacities for training regional and international security organizations, the UN still lacks sufficient capability to manage the massive peacekeeping tasks handed to it by the UN Security Council. Today, there are more than 120,000 UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding personnel (including 100,000 uniformed personnel) serving in 16 peace operations on four continents directly impacting the lives of hundreds of millions of people. The budget has increased to nearly \$7.8 billion a year.¹⁰ Only 900 staff members in UNDPKO/DFS headquarters manage this massive operation.

But again, the Security Council authorizes mandates with insufficient resources and numbers of skilled and experienced personnel to fulfill them. Peacekeepers provided by member states often lack

sufficient training or equipment. Interoperability and standardizing doctrine present challenges. Member states fail to fill the gaps in civilian and military requests by the United Nations for these missions. In addition, the UN faces deployments in areas where the peace processes lack a viable ceasefire, the political process is fragile, and hostilities continue in parallel to deployment of peacekeepers. The scale and complexity of many of the operations remain a challenge.

Strengthening U.S. Support and the Interagency Process

One of the key problems hindering better cooperation is the entrenched bureaucratic structure that responds to specific requests of support for UN peacekeeping operations and headquarters. High-profile situations are handled at senior levels, and often the United States provides generous assistance to the United Nations, such as for the Haiti earthquake involving nearly 26,000 total U.S. forces on the ground and on ships nearby. In Darfur,

the UN faces deployments in areas where hostilities continue in parallel to deployment of peacekeepers

the United States has provided training and equipment for infantry battalions deploying to the United Nations–African Union Mission (UNAMID), in collaboration with troops from Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Ethiopia. It also provided airlift for oversized equipment from Rwanda bound for Darfur. Additionally, the United States has strongly supported the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since 2005, NATO

has coordinated the airlift of over 31,500 AMIS troops and personnel.

The problem, however, arises in the less high-profile cases. To solicit member-state support of its ongoing operations, the United Nations regularly issues a report on its civilian and military capabilities gaps, which it then transmits to all missions. Typically, the staff of the U.S. Military Advisor at the UN Mission conveys the request to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs in the Department of State and the Office of Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations in DOD.¹¹ State and Defense explore options, including providing direct support or leveraging the support from allies. Following this review, State officials draft a cable to “answer” the request.

The United States also engages the United Nations regularly at the deputy assistant secretary level and below to understand “what the UN faces even if the [U.S. Government] doesn’t itself provide all the capacities needed.”¹² U.S. officials respond to the UN’s need in ways beyond the gaps lists as well, including ongoing sharing of information with the military advisors at the U.S. mission, staff officers placed in UN headquarters, and participating in training conducted by DOD.

The requests are generally reviewed at the deputy assistant secretary level at State and Defense, or below, although the Deputy Secretary of Defense signs off on the deployment of any military personnel to the UN. The National Security Council (NSC) at the White House tends not to be engaged in these specific requests. DOD and State officials reviewing the requests often face fierce opposition from Congress to providing U.S. support to the UN, and the senior-level officials in a position to drive a positive response are often not engaged. Thus, even if officials reviewing the requests

are inclined to support the request, they often lack the bureaucratic power to push a request through the bureaucracy.

In short, the difficulty of responding to UN requests is complicated by several factors. First, the demands of the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan monopolize commitments of U.S. units and aviation assets; second, especially given those demands, U.S. officials believe that other nations could provide support; third, they cite the difficulties of getting the necessary resources to fill various gaps, especially as Congress is generally reluctant to fund UN peacekeeping support. And fourth, they point to the difficulties of getting the attention of the senior-level officials necessary to secure a positive response to some of these requests.¹³

Officials commented on the need for a realignment of current roles at the National Security Council staff either to provide for a new deputy-level position for complex operations or at least a shift of the complex operations from the Multilateral Affairs Directorate to the Directorate for Global Development, Stabilization, and Humanitarian Assistance. Under the current system, the senior NSC staff has too many other demands on its hands. Also, officials at State dealing with peacekeeping have the full range of multilateral issues in their portfolios. Given the demands of UN peacekeeping, however, responsibility for that role should be separated out. Such a step would enable senior officials to focus better on meeting the demands of peacekeeping.¹⁴

On the UN side, officials explain that they are seeking to make a more explicit case for the urgency of these requirements, identifying tactical versus ideal needs and clearly explaining the implications for the implementation of the mandate. As the UN makes do with what equipment and personnel it has, it often leaves the

false impression that the requests are not absolutely essential and thus the requests languish.¹⁵ The lack of senior-level attention can lead to UN requests languishing for months, or simply being turned down. For example, one particularly

basic civilian and military resource gaps hinder the ability of the United Nations to carry out its mandate from the Security Council

significant request that has languished for years has been for 18 military utility helicopters for UNAMID in Sudan.¹⁶ It was not until November 2010 that State responded to the UN's gap list requests pending since December 2009.

These basic civilian and military resource gaps hinder the ability of the United Nations to carry out its mandate from the Security Council. U.S. officials understand that it must play its part in supporting UN peacekeeping, particularly given its role on the Security Council authorizing mandates. As one participant in the discussions put it, "We don't want to be like the very wealthy guy who claims he can't afford to kick in for the pizza." DOD officials stressed that "'hard' is not 'impossible.'"¹⁷ While the United States is not in a position to provide all UN requests itself, a better and higher level process is needed to ensure these civilian and military gaps are appropriately addressed and provided—either by the United States when it is able or by other nations with the necessary capabilities. High-level direct requests by the United States—especially when made by senior Pentagon officials—can often galvanize other nations to meet UN needs.

Areas in which the United States might be able to do more include providing support for intelligence, command and control, training,

equipping, and lift. With demands on U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, U.S. resources will continue to be strained, most acutely for the next year at minimum. During that period, it will be hard to provide enablers, helicopters, engineers, and logistics. For now, DOD is able to contribute to the development of UN doctrine, standards, rules of engagement, and training, especially military-to-military and “training the trainers.” For instance, DOD is looking at its own areas of particular expertise and specific, high-impact areas (such as Ethiopia’s deployment of helicopters).¹⁸ It trained a light infantry battalion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹⁹

While contributing large numbers of troops and other support to UN peacekeeping missions is difficult in the short term, DOD remains prepared to provide personnel in targeted areas and is open to larger contributions over the longer term. Today, DOD remains open to further critical support, enablers, rotary wing, corrections

today, the United States provides only 85 individuals to UN peacekeeping operations

centers, Formed Police Units, a diplomatic push (with State in lead), and police training centers.²⁰ The United States stresses the importance of specificity in UN requests; the more detailed the requests, the easier it is for the Pentagon to respond.

Increasing U.S. Deployment

Despite the recognition by the United States of the importance of UN peacekeeping operations, there are relatively few U.S. personnel serving in these operations. The

last significant deployment of U.S. troops to a UN mission was the contribution of 362 individuals to the UN Preventive Deployment Force Mission in Macedonia. The Chinese vetoed that mission in 1999 when the new Macedonian government recognized Taiwan. Today, the United States provides only 85 individuals to UN peacekeeping operations, including 54 police, 27 staff officers, and 4 military observers.²¹ The vast majority of these are in Haiti and Liberia. One of the priorities of the United Nations is to close the increasing supply and demand gap by enlarging the base of troop contributors beyond its current top five: Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria, and Rwanda. It is important to note that the United States does still contribute 810 troops to the NATO mission in the Kosovo Force.²²

Overall, the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) do not contribute their fair share, making up only 4,492 of the 100,000 UN deployed troops, police, and military experts—less than 4.5 percent.²³ The United States recognizes the need to avoid “burden-dumping” as opposed to burden-sharing, and understands the calls for greater P-5 involvement.²⁴ Translating that understanding into broader troop contributions by the P-5, however, has been difficult.

UN officials stress the galvanizing capacity of the United States for identifying sources to provide airlift, training, and equipment. They also emphasized the challenges of command, communications, and intelligence. One key issue is to ensure the correct balance between the political and military roles, as Formed Police Units can lower the military deployment and achieve better interaction with the civilian community.

Another area of importance is deploying personnel to the UN headquarters. The United

States currently provides five officers seconded to the UNDPKO headquarters' Office of Military Advisor.²⁵ The Pentagon has demonstrated a consistent willingness to deploy U.S. personnel to the headquarters so long as the position is a senior one in which a U.S. officer will be placed. The United Nations readily accepts this point, but emphasizes that there are certain sensitivities that must be recognized. As one UNDPKO official cautioned, DOD support is welcome, but it "needs to be carefully managed and balanced with our need to reflect the balance of the UN membership and in particular the perspectives of the Troop Contributing Countries. . . . This is particularly so in light of the sensitivities of a perceived effort to link U.S. counter-terrorism strategies and UN peacekeeping."²⁶ U.S. officials understand that point, but emphasize that the United Nations cannot have U.S. support both ways, wanting more support but only if it is not visible.²⁷

While the United States focuses mostly on staffing the Office of Military Advisor at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, additional positions have been filled by U.S. personnel in UN headquarters. For instance, by 2009, DOD had responded to the UN request regarding headquarters posts by providing U.S. officers to fill the posts of Chief of the Military Planning Service (MPS), a planning officer in the MPS, and another as a desk officer in the Current Military Operations Service (CMOS). Today, the United States does not have any personnel in CMOS but has personnel serving as the chief of MPS, a planning officer in MPS, and an officer in the Assessments Service in the Office of Military Advisor. The UN welcomes the provision of staff officers for key mission headquarters and UN headquarters posts. The United Nations is looking for more officers as it

seeks to strengthen its Office of Military Affairs (an increase in general officers and restructuring into functional services).


Since 2006, UNDPKO has sought to strengthen its police division. This step reflects the growing challenges in peacekeeping operations that face threats from a variety of elements in the wide range of peacekeeping and

despite the strains on the U.S. military, the provision of such personnel greatly magnifies UN effectiveness

peacebuilding efforts. The United Nations will require the enhanced assistance of member states as it seeks to develop baseline capability standards and strengthen the Formed Police Units. While the United States is limited in the number of military personnel it can make available to the UN, providing additional police may be an area for growth. On the broad level, there is agreement between DOD and the UN to continue to identify high value positions for which U.S. personnel can provide unique capabilities. The UN emphasizes the need for prior multinational experience. Given the number of operations in Africa, as well as Haiti, the UN emphasizes the need for personnel with French language skills.

The United Nations can greatly benefit from direct support from the Pentagon in the key areas and the United States can benefit as well. Despite the strains on the U.S. military, the provision of such personnel greatly magnifies UN effectiveness. As Ambassador James Dobbins puts it, "Stability operations are now a core mission of the U.S. military and the UN is the largest, most experienced and most successful provider of such missions. What better

Nigerian officer on UNAMID patrol looks over notebook with young resident of Abu Shouk Internally Displaced Persons Camp, North Darfur, Sudan



UN (Albert Gonzalez Farran)

way of preparing for future U.S.-led operations than to participate in those the UN is running from time to time?”²⁸

More U.S. personnel in UN headquarters and peacekeeping operations in the field would provide much needed expertise, offer key links back to the Pentagon, and encourage other troop-contributing nations to participate as well. Such steps would also make it easier for the United States to push other nations to offer up capable troops to UN missions and headquarters. Currently, the promotion system in the Services does not favor deployments to the UN. The Pentagon should ensure that service in such positions enhances the promotion chances of Soldiers.

Improving Training Coordination

With the second largest deployed military in the world, the United Nations often struggles to find capable troops, much less ones with interoperable capabilities. With troops from 115 different countries, developing common doctrine, standards, and practices is a challenge. Recognizing this, the UN has sought to bolster the effectiveness of its peacekeeping and to reinforce the partnership among its many supporters. The New Horizon report sets forth a plan to forge more common ground among those who mandate peacekeeping operations; those who contribute to peacekeeping with personnel, equipment, and financial resources; those who plan, manage, and execute operations; and those who partner with UN peacekeeping operations to deliver on the ground.²⁹

Effective UN peacekeeping operations are now recognized as central to U.S. national security interests. President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy includes a commitment to “strengthen

the U.N.'s leadership and operational capacity in peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, post-disaster recovery, development assistance, and the promotion of human rights.”³⁰ Since taking office, the Obama administration has paid off peacekeeping arrears accumulated over the previous 4 years, including approximately \$2 billion for the UN's peacekeeping budget in 2009 and almost \$3 billion in humanitarian and development assistance for the eight countries that host multidimensional UN peacekeeping missions. In 2009, the United States also provided more than \$600 million dollars of training, equipment, and logistics assistance to 55 nations to help bolster their capacity to contribute troops and police for peacekeeping operations.

In another strong show of political support for UN peacekeeping, in September of 2009, President Obama hosted a meeting of the leaders of top troop- and police-contributing countries to UN peace operations. At that meeting, he expressed gratitude for these nations' contributions and sacrifice, and exchanged views on how to make current and future operations more effective.³¹

The State Department's 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review is expected to be out by the end of the year, recognizing the importance of new partners to address new threats and the diffusion of power to nonstate actors. Today, the United States faces 36 active conflicts and 55 fragile states, as well as acute natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies. The United States, too, recognizes the importance of training, with extensive bilateral efforts through its Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) program initiated in 2004 to address major gaps in international peace operations support.³² The Department of State has the lead responsibility for training peacekeeping forces through GPOI.

GPOI is now active in 58 selected countries around the world, especially in Africa and South America. Over 120,500 peacekeeper trainees and peacekeeper trainers have been trained as of November 30, 2010. GPOI has facilitated the deployment of over 110,500 personnel from 29 countries to 19 operations around the world. In addition, GPOI has directly or indirectly supported the training of 3,546 police trainers from 49 countries at the Italian-run Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, in Vicenza, Italy.³³ The program's focus from fiscal years 2010–2014 is to shift from direct training to building the capacity of foreign nations to develop their own peacekeeping infrastructure and capabilities.

In addition to training peacekeepers, GPOI supports a variety of institutions specializing in or contributing to peacekeeping operations. These include 28 peace operations training centers around the world, as well as the African Union and Economic Community of West African States. GPOI also provides funds for the Transportation Logistics Support Arrangement, which has supported troops deploying to several peacekeeping missions, and other GPOI deployment equipment funding has supported troops deploying to some of these and other missions.³⁴

These training efforts are making a critical difference and are strongly linked to the United Nations and its needs as articulated in the UN internal non-paper entitled “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping” and the annual C34 reports. As the UN seeks to significantly enhance levels of interoperability among its peacekeeper contributing countries in about a decade, more efforts will be needed to achieve interoperability among/between military peacekeepers, police, and Formed Police Units. In particular, DOD could better integrate the training of potential

UN troop contributors into its training efforts, perhaps through the combatant commands.

There is a clear need to establish a UN Clearing House to track capabilities and needs to better coordinate efforts by donors. There is a need too for an initiative to work with international partners to respond to peacekeeping requests in a systematic way and strengthen an

U.S. training does not include interoperability among nations or train in UN doctrine and standards

international peacekeeping coordination and support mechanism. Such a worldwide, coordinated system of training potential troop contributors could help identify countries with the capacity and would contribute to U.S. peacekeeping, which could deliver the best bang for the buck.³⁵ Further discussion is warranted on what role the United States could play in promoting such a global system, as well as how regional organizations might complement it.

Regionally based centers of training, with standard training and equipping doctrine, could be useful in strengthening support for the United Nations. Regional partnering with African nations to train and equip troops would greatly enhance capacity and advance the goal of self-sufficient African troops. There are other efforts already under way to improve U.S.–UN cooperation, such as the creation of international peacekeeping training centers, development of cooperation and capability of regional actors in missions, and encouragement of UN member states to contribute more for future peacekeeping operations. While these efforts strengthen the capacity of the UN peacekeeping missions, much of U.S. training does not

include interoperability among nations or train in UN doctrine and standards.

Since 2005, NATO has been cooperating closely with the African Union (AU), providing critical assistance. For instance, at the request of the AU, NATO supported AMIS and is currently assisting the AU Mission in Somalia in terms of air- and sea-lift, but also planning support. NATO is also providing training opportunities and capacity-building support to AU long-term peacekeeping capabilities, in particular the African Standby Force. This reflects the shared objective of bringing security and stability to Africa.³⁶

It is important as well to consider alternatives to UN peacekeeping, such as regional organizations and stronger conflict prevention mechanisms. Various partnership opportunities to address the gaps might include logistical support, rapid reaction, nongovernmental organization (NGO) support, lift, and training. The United States must look at ways to strengthen support. For example, the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has a mandate to strengthen civil capacity. Extensive consultation with Congress will be necessary. In working toward better-integrated missions, it was suggested that perhaps the S/CRS could work more closely with the United Nations. The State Department is seeking to create a new position, shifting the current Under Secretary of Global Affairs to a broader office renamed the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. Such an office should help the United States respond more quickly and positively to requests from the UN.

One area that remains controversial is whether to establish a UN crisis response reserve force. Particularly as crises unfold, it is critical that the United Nations has a capacity

to move quickly to stem a growing crisis—and such a force would vastly reduce the time required for an appropriate response. However, many countries do not want to pay for a reserve force not in use, and overall the political will does not yet exist. The UN does have some over-the-horizon reserve, and a fund has been established up to \$50 million per mission (up to a maximum of 3 missions). This does not create a standby or reserve capacity but rather enhances rapid deployment. Given the caps on the number of UN peacekeepers who can be in a given country, consideration should be given to basing some support efforts out of country. Another option is to have one mission help another, but such arrangements are often complicated by financial issues. The UN continues to need this capacity and hopes to reopen the dialogue in the context of the global force posture. One option is something between a full reserve and training from scratch.

The U.S.–UN efforts in Haiti highlighted the importance of prior personal relationships among the leadership. The prior friendship between Lieutenant General P.K. (Ken) Keen, USA, and the UN Force commander, Major General Floriano Peixoto, was critical to the operation’s success. Such relationships will always depend on the nature of the individuals involved, but opportunities to institutionalize expanding opportunities for developing professional relationships among civilians and military, and across country allies, can help lay the foundation for cooperation and coordination.

Matching Capabilities to Mandate

Far too often, the UN Security Council authorizes mandates that far outmatch resource capacity. As the New Horizon Initiative recognizes, overambitious mandates or deploying troops that lack sufficient capabilities and

resources can doom a mission to failure, and in some cases it may strengthen the spoilers. Security Council members need to be realistic in the mandates that they authorize and all member states must ensure that peacekeeping missions have the resources necessary to fulfill their mandates. The United Nations has emphasized the need for a phased approach to establishing new missions or a commitment to authorizing advance planning capacities for missions.³⁷

In 2009, the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement emphasizing the importance of mobilizing and maintaining the political and operational support of all stakeholders

far too often, the UN Security Council authorizes mandates that far outmatch resource capacity

throughout the lifecycle of a mission. It recognized the need to develop a consensus on how to implement protection of civilian mandates and the robust approach to peacekeeping.³⁸

While this has long been recognized as an issue, UN missions still struggle to deliver on their mandates and lack sufficiently capable troops. For example, UN officials point out that the missions in Chad, Darfur, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have all struggled to deliver on their mandates, especially with respect to the protection of civilians and response to threats from spoilers. Security Council mandates are often an uneasy compromise among member states, and the United Nations must often guess which is the appropriate strategy. Some missions lack adequate capabilities and support structures to enable effective mandate implementation.³⁹

While beyond the scope of this article, UN officials are confronting obstacles in transitioning to longer term peace consolidation and development. Difficulties in many African peacekeeping missions have made clear that peacekeepers are often not well prepared to take on the role of peacebuilders early in such transitions, particularly in areas such as security, elections, and economic development.⁴⁰

The United Nations emphasizes the need for practical guidance on critical roles for peacekeepers, developing a stronger field support strategy, and ensuring better planning and oversight. Building sufficient capabilities is critical to the success of peacekeeping missions.

Learning Lessons from Haiti

The U.S.–UN efforts in Haiti following the January 2010 earthquake highlighted the importance of better planning for and coordination with the NGO community. The humanitarian response effort included a unique partnership between the U.S. military and United Nations, and the NGO community. Joint Task Force (JTF) Haiti, led by General Keen, operated in a chaotic environment that included the government of Haiti, the United Nations, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and hundreds of NGOs. General Keen considers one key success of the JTF to have been “the ability to coordinate and collaborate with all the organizations and agencies to foster a unity of effort.” The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell facilitated this coordination and collaboration, interfacing with every facet of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment to ensure synchronization.⁴¹ Internally displaced persons proved a particular challenge and must be addressed early in the crisis, with better planning before the crisis for their handling.

The relief effort in Haiti underscores the need for the United Nations and the United States to develop better ways to operate in an unclassified and open manner. Many lives in Haiti would have been lost had the NGOs not had access to DOD information. As General Keen described it, Operation *Unified Response* was unclassified from the beginning and available to all partners, including NGOs. Information on security issues could be shared among NGOs, the United Nations, and other security forces to determine an appropriate response. The government’s classified networks were supplanted by open Internet sources because of the large number of non–U.S. Government actors involved in the relief operations. Officials used online social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, to disseminate information and correct misinformation quickly in Haiti.

U.S. and UN officials emphasize, however, that the experience in Haiti was largely a distinct set of circumstances, where lessons may be difficult to transfer to future disasters. The shared scope of the disaster makes it an unusual case study. That said, collaboration from the beginning among all actors—civilian, military, international, the Haitian government—is a critical lesson. Without that cooperation, the operation would not have succeeded.

Conclusion

Certainly, the Obama administration recognizes the need to support the United Nations as a critical part of maintaining international peace and stability. Nearly a decade of war in Afghanistan and 8 years of war in Iraq have prevented the United States from providing more significant levels of support to UN peacekeeping operations. The support that the United States has been able to provide, especially in

terms of deployments of personnel to key posts at UN headquarters and the field, as well as training and equipment, has made a real difference in both the performance of UN missions and in galvanizing others to provide support.

Much goodwill exists at the senior level of both the United Nations and the United States to strengthen the capacities of the UN and its troop-contributing nations. Translating that into stronger cooperation, however, requires continued senior-level leadership. As the United States seeks ways to reduce its deficit, it must resist the temptation to cut back on support to these critical operations. A stronger UN in the long term will save the United States resources that it might otherwise need to deploy. Higher level attention will facilitate stronger support and cooperation and can help overcome some of the political obstacles to U.S.–UN cooperation. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Meetings in this series were held in March 2007, November 2007, May 2008, June 2009, and June 2010. For the purposes of this article, the Department of Defense (DOD) includes the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: DOD, February 2010), 13, available at <www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf>.

³ United Nations (UN) General Assembly Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, August 21, 2000, available at <www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/>.

⁴ *Peace Operations 2010: Report of the UN Secretary-General*, February 24, 2006.

⁵ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support (UNDPKO), *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* (New York: UNDPKO, July 2009), 3–6, available at <www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf>.

⁶ UNDPKO, *A New Partnership Agenda*.

⁷ UNDPKO, *New Horizon Initiative, Progress Report No.1*, October 2010, 2.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 7–8.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹¹ The Office is in the Bureau of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations under the Obama administration. Prior, it was housed in Global Security Affairs.

¹² Author email exchange with senior State Department official, November 5, 2010.

¹³ State Department officials point out that none of these reasons applies to police or military observers. Furthermore, police support and training is a completely separate budget item within the State Department, and it relies on contractors (who are not in short supply).

¹⁴ Comments of a senior U.S. official, December 7, 2010.

¹⁵ Comments of a senior UN official, June 14, 2010, and email from a UN official November 21, 2010.

¹⁶ *Current Military Capability Gaps in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, September 2010, 1.

¹⁷ Comment of a senior U.S. military official, June 22, 2009.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Email from U.S.–UN Military Staff Committee (MSC), November 1, 2010.

²⁰ Comments of senior U.S. military officials, June 14, 2010.

²¹ Updated figures from DOD emails on November 1, 2010 and December 6, 2010. DOD counts the 27 as follows: 9 in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, 2 in the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 4 in the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, 9 in the UN Mission in Liberia, and 3 in the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). UN terminology for contributions is changing to *Police, Military Experts on Mission, and Troops*, but is not yet widely used. The more common terminology is used here. The UN counts the UNTSO staff as military observers, while DOD counts them as staff officers.

²² Email from DOD official, November 1, 2010.

²³ Ibid. China provides 1,995 troops; France, 1,771; Russia, 362; United Kingdom, 281; and the United States provides 82.

²⁴ Comments of a senior U.S. military officer, June 22, 2009.

²⁵ Email from U.S.–UN MSC, November 1, 2010.

²⁶ Author email exchange with a UNDPKO official, February 27, 2007.

²⁷ Comments of a senior U.S. military officer, March 2, 2007.

²⁸ Email exchange, November 19, 2010.

²⁹ UNDPKO, *A New Partnership Agenda*, 2.

³⁰ *2010 National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), available at <www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf>.

³¹ Statement by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, on Peacekeeping at the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, UN Headquarters, February 22, 2010, available at <<http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2010/137112.htm>>. While the United States maintains that it has met its financial obligations in full, the UN continues to press for so-called contested arrears that have been the subject of difference for decades and are unlikely ever to be paid by the United States.

³² The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) built on the Clinton administration's African Crisis Response Initiative and its successor, the Bush administration's African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. (The term ACOTA is now used to refer to GPOI training program in Africa.) The program provides U.S. training and equipment and assists foreign troops in the key enablers of deployment, troop sustainment, air traffic control, electricians, and so forth.

³³ The Department of State has paid for most of these 3,546 police trainers "directly or indirectly," but some of them are self-funded. State indirectly supports the self-funded police through the operating budget of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units.

³⁴ Figures updated by State Department official in an email, November 29, 2010. See also *The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 19, 2009), available at <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32773.pdf>.

³⁵ Comments of U.S. and UN officials, June 22, 2009.

³⁶ See "African Union Discusses Practical Cooperation with NATO," February 18–19, 2010, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_61534.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

³⁷ UNDPKO, *New Horizon Initiative*, 13.

³⁸ Statement of the President of the Security Council, August 5, 2009.

³⁹ UNDPKO, *New Horizon Initiative*, 7.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ P.K. Keen, "Observations from Operation Unified Response (OUR)," unpublished paper, 2010, 7–8.

Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts

Putting the *Inter* into the Interagency

BY ERIC A. JORGENSEN

Interagency is a made-up word that is reasonable as an adjective but only a fairy tale as a noun. That will not change until the executive branch of the Federal Government is dramatically reorganized in order to put the *inter* into the interagency.

This reorganization must be done *horizontally* (to align worldwide departmental and agency regional areas of interest and to integrate regional responsibilities under true interagency leadership within regional interagency directorates) and *vertically* (to allow the President's senior leadership team to administer regional interagency directorates as true interagency efforts). Only then will executive branch departments and agencies move beyond merely coordinating individual disparate efforts, as they do in their current incarnation at best, to being greater than the sum of their parts, and intending and achieving truly integrated effects, with the kinds of dominant and persistent results necessary to advance U.S. interests in this volatile, interconnected 21st-century world.

Persistent, broad-ranging conflict is a fact of life that impacts and threatens U.S. interests around the globe daily, whether directly or indirectly—and even apparently benign global connectivity comes with risk and can lead to catastrophic loss of American treasure, lives, or both. Tactical and operational successes are far from enough in this kind of world. To advance its interests in the long term, the United States must efficiently achieve strategic successes, based upon well-coordinated, effective intent—intent which first develops well-crafted strategic policy and then faithfully executes that policy. Unfortunately, the executive branch as it currently exists cannot make this happen, despite the fact that in recent years the notion of “Interagency” has come into vogue as a proper noun, as if executive branch departments and agencies represent anything like a coherent organizational construct. The sad reality is that, collectively, these departments and agencies

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represent merely a hodgepodge of enterprises that function mostly autonomously—or at least with little shared strategic direction.

The executive branch functions this way because it is designed to do so, with Cabinet-level secretarial and departmental independence at its core. As long as that design remains unchanged, the Interagency, by definition, does not—and cannot—exist.

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Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, describes the current state of affairs as follows:

*The ability of the United States to achieve its national strategic objectives is dependent on the effectiveness of the U.S. Government in employing the instruments of national power. These instruments of national power . . . are normally coordinated by the appropriate governmental officials, often with National Security Council (NSC) direction.*¹

The first sentence seems like an assertion of obvious fact, the second like plaintive recognition of a reality that is much less than ideal.

This less-than-ideal reality is unacceptable. Since, as JP 1 asserts, the ability of the United States to achieve its national strategic objectives is at stake, the instruments of national power should not merely *normally*, but *always*, be coordinated by the appropriate governmental officials, with direction from the President's senior leadership team not merely *often*, but *in every case*.

This new reality will come to fruition only if the executive branch is transformed by statutory structural, operational, and human adjustments that produce coordinated and concerted efforts from every functional area. To this end, many observers have called for an “Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act,” along the lines of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This kind of legislative action is precisely what is needed, and this article fleshes out the changes that must be part of that legislation, with emphasis on how those changes will address U.S. security concerns, both foreign and domestic.

Making the necessary changes will require immense political will and intense cooperation between the legislative and executive branches of government, but executive branch actions must be synthesized far beyond what exists today, with directive statutory leadership enabled and provided from the top down, and organizational inefficiencies eliminated throughout the enterprise. Rather than excusing American leadership for not taking such drastic steps, current and expected resource limitations make the imperative only more pronounced. We can no longer afford for the executive branch of government to be ineffective and inefficient in dealing with the menacing security challenges of our times—or with the promising security opportunities.

Not Just Unity of Effort, But Unity of Effect

Unity of command remains one of the nine recognized Principles of War considered key to achieving dominant and persistent military results.² The term has nevertheless been displaced among military officers of late by the term *unity of effort*, as a concession to the complications that come with multiagency and

multinational operations. Unity of effort has in turn become a bedrock concept in the parlance of the so-called Interagency.

JP 1 explains the relationship of the two terms like this:

*Unity of command means all forces operate under a single [commander] with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. During multinational operations and interagency coordination, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount.*³

Field Manual (FM) 3–0, *Operations*, makes the point more bluntly:

*To compensate for limited unity of command, commanders concentrate on achieving unity of effort. Consensus building, rather than direct command authority, is often the key element of successful . . . operations.*⁴

This kind of compensation is a concession to less-than-ideal organizational structures that would otherwise limit, delay, or even render impossible the success of multinational and multiagency operations. But this concentration on unity of effort entails wasted effort and diluted effects. It is a concession that may be necessary in a multinational setting for political reasons, but it should not be necessary in a U.S. Government multiagency setting.

The executive branch should be concentrating not on establishing unity of effort, but rather on producing unity of effect, a concept that derives neither from military doctrine nor anywhere else conventionally apropos, but from

Edgar Allan Poe, a highly unlikely but nevertheless helpful source.

When speaking of unity of effect, Poe insists writers should first decide what effect they want to create in their readers, and then apply all their creative powers toward achieving that effect.⁵ The emphasis is on the desired end results defined in advance. But Poe is addressing writers with both the responsibility and the authority to achieve the desired effects. When speaking of unity of effort, JP 1 is addressing military commanders who lack that kind of responsibility and authority—and is simultaneously implicitly acknowledging that no one is any better equipped to lead multiagency operations. This must change.

That change starts with aligning how executive branch departments and agencies look at the world and continues with having them look at the world together, as fielded forces who belong to the same authority structures. Interagency unity of effect requires both unity of focus achieved via horizontal reorganization, and unity of authority achieved via vertical reorganization.

Horizontal Reorganization: Regional Alignment

Statutory horizontal reorganization is necessary to align worldwide departmental and agency regional areas of interest and to integrate regional responsibilities under true interagency leadership. This requires the birthing of regional interagency directorates, described in detail below, but begins with building a common global operating picture for the entire executive branch from the White House down. Current disparate individual departmental and agency regional orientations owe their existence to generally logical and helpful bureaucratic biases and to deeply entrenched tradition, but aligning how executive branch departments and

agencies look at the world regionally is picking low-hanging fruit, and is long overdue.

Presidential Policy Directive 1 of the Obama administration, dated February 13, 2009, indicated that “an early meeting” of the NSC Deputies Committee would establish the new administration’s Interagency Policy Committees (formerly known as Policy Coordination Committees) and their mandates, regional and otherwise.⁶ No additional Presidential Policy Directives have been publicly released to confirm the regional orientation within the current Executive Office of the President, but a 2009 briefing described the proposed committee framework⁷ (see table 1), in comparison with the committee frameworks of April 2007 and April 2008.

The May 2009 list represents a consolidation of NSC committees, which should provide improved strategic perspective. It also represents a further movement toward alignment with Department of Defense (DOD) regional combatant commands, and away from alignment with State Department regional bureaus. Table 2 shows how State and Defense regional areas compare to the May 2009 proposal for NSC regional areas. The misalignment among the three is not great, but begs the question: Why not eliminate the misalignment altogether?

“The world today can be much better understood if you think of it from the perspective of regions and not states”

The most glaring disconnects among the disparate systems include the following: State puts Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India together in what it calls South Asia, while DOD has Afghanistan and Pakistan assigned to U.S.

Central Command (USCENTCOM), but India assigned to U.S. Pacific Command; State combines Israel and the Arab countries surrounding it in its Near East Bureau, while DOD assigns Israel to U.S. European Command, but the rest of the Middle East falls under USCENTCOM, along with Afghanistan and Pakistan; and U.S. Africa Command is now responsible for the entire continent of Africa, with the exception of Egypt, which is assigned to USCENTCOM, while State separates all of North Africa from sub-Saharan Africa.

In February 2009, President Obama’s national security advisor, Jim Jones, stated, “The world today can be much better understood if you think of it from the perspective of regions and not states.”⁸ This is a natural outgrowth of the increasing interconnectivity around the world, and highlights why the executive branch’s plethora of regional orientations—to include permutations not discussed above, in the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and beyond—represents a problem. Jones addressed that problem in an interview with Karen DeYoung of the *Washington Post*, also in February 2009, by indicating that executive branch organizational maps would soon be “redrawn to ensure that all departments and agencies take the same regional approach to the world.”⁹ It is a logical adjustment to make—but it has not happened as of the publishing date of this article.

Regional Interagency Directorates

Regional alignment allows the creation of regional interagency directorates, led by regional interagency directors with true operational authority over all assigned personnel.

When laying out what it calls the simplest option to produce such operational authority

Table 1. Development of Regional NSC Committees

April 2007	April 2008	May 2009 (proposed)
Western Hemisphere	Western Hemisphere	Western Hemisphere
	Mexico/Central America	
Europe and Eurasia	Europe and Eurasia	Europe, Russia, and Central Asia
	Russia	
East Asia (and the Pacific)	East Asia (and the Pacific)	Asia (and the Pacific)
South (and Central) Asia	South and Central Asia	Central Region ❖ South Asia ❖ Middle East ❖ Persian Gulf
Near East and North Africa	Iraq	
	Afghanistan	
	Iran	
	Syria-Lebanon	
(Sub-Saharan) Africa	Africa	Africa

Note: Parentheses show clarifications to the official committee names.

for an integrated civil-military chain of command in a surge environment, the Project on National Security Reform suggests *operational direction*,¹⁰ a term used throughout joint publications. Although not defined in JP 1–02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, the term *operational direction* has been defined in other military publications to mean a commander’s operational authority over forces not administratively assigned to that commander. It includes “the authority to assign tasks, designate objectives, synchronize and integrate actions, and give authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.”¹¹ But operational direction is not enough, and integrated civil-military chains of command must be established as day-to-day reality, rather than merely in response to surge requirements.

The Air Force applies operational direction to its unit associations, wherein Reserve and Active component members are functionally integrated, but retain separate organizational structures and chains of command.¹² In an associate organizational structure, “component commanders . . . issue orders to their subordinates to follow the operational direction of the agreed upon specified/designated and typically senior members of the other component for the purpose of accomplishing their associated unit’s mission.”¹³

This kind of authority is similar to the kind of authority combatant commanders had over their forces prior to Goldwater-Nichols, and much like an Ambassador’s over non-State Department Country Team members—and it is not strong enough to empower effective and efficient interagency operations.

Table 2. State, DOD, and Proposed NSC Regional Areas

State	DOD	NSC
Western Hemisphere	U.S. Northern Command	Western Hemisphere
	U.S. Southern Command	
Europe and Eurasia	U.S. European Command	Europe, Russia, and Central Asia
East Asia and the Pacific	U.S. Pacific Command	Asia (and the Pacific)
South and Central Asia		
Near East (and North Africa)	U.S. Central Command	Central Region <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ South Asia ❖ Middle East ❖ Persian Gulf
(Sub-Saharan) Africa	U.S. Africa Command	Africa

Note: Parentheses show clarifications to the official committee names.

Formally known as Chiefs of Mission, Ambassadors are the traditional representatives overseas, where each country with which the United States maintains direct diplomatic relations has within its borders an American Embassy led by an Ambassador, who is appointed by the President and who is said to speak on the President’s behalf. On paper, the position of Ambassador is prestigious. As explained in the Department of State *Foreign Affairs Handbook*, the President directly gives each Chief of Mission

*full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Government executive branch employees within the host country or in the relevant Mission to an international organization, except those personnel under the command of a U.S. geographic area military commander or on the staff of an international organization.*¹⁴

This responsibility is administered by the Chief of Mission with the help of the Country Team, a concept established in a 1951 memorandum written by General Lucius Clay while he was serving as military governor in postwar Germany: “To insure the full coordination of the U.S. effort, U.S. representatives at the country level shall constitute a team under the leadership of the Ambassador.”¹⁵

The Country Team is the combination of State Department personnel with the representatives of other agencies assigned to work under the Chief of Mission mandate established by the President. Individual Country Teams are configured differently, depending on country size, Embassy size, and the specific nature of American national interests in a particular country; but the largest

Country Teams can include representatives from more than 40 agencies, including DOD.¹⁶ The Presidential mandate is significant and the assigned responsibility is broad. With that said, and even though some may argue that Country Teams are the best example of interagency success, we must ask whether Country Teams are up to the task.

Ambassador Robert Oakley insists they are, with urgent motivation. “Without an effective Country Team,” he states, “there can be no prospect of success in achieving national security objectives.”¹⁷ It is a bold claim. But Oakley himself acknowledges deleterious structural problems in Country Teams akin to those which hamstrung joint military operations prior to Goldwater-Nichols. First, Ambassadors lack the means to exert their Presidentially assigned authority, including input to the performance assessments of non-State Department personnel; second, Embassy staff structure encourages all personnel to pursue the parochial interests of their own organizations at the expense of integrated efforts because integrated efforts are too difficult to coordinate, even when personnel would like to do so; third, Ambassadors do not control the financial resources assigned to each organization’s Embassy personnel; and fourth, personnel numbers and training—even for Ambassadors themselves—are often inadequate, giving Ambassadors insufficient ability to pursue broad but specific outcomes.¹⁸

These structural problems should be fixed in every American Embassy. But with over 190 independent states in the world ranging in size and consequence from China to Nauru, Country Teams, while important, are clearly not the appropriate linchpin in achievement of U.S. national security objectives.

Ambassador Oakley’s prescription for strengthening Country Teams includes

providing “more authority and operational autonomy” to Ambassadors and their teams to enable them to pursue integrated national objectives. But, as Oakley himself admits, establishing “integrated policies and priorities for *regions* and individual countries” is the beginning of the equation¹⁹—which takes us back to General Jones’s assertion that the “world today can be much better understood if you think of it from the perspective of regions and not states.”²⁰

Country Ambassadors have limited resources and limited perspectives, and they are embedded in a weak line of authority, despite their titular claims to direct lines to the President. In reality, those direct lines exist

even though some may argue that Country Teams are the best example of interagency success, we must ask whether Country Teams are up to the task

only in times of crisis—but not always even then, depending on the countries in question, the crisis in question, and events in the rest of the affected region and around the world at the time. Ambassadors, in fact, instead coordinate most routinely with the assistant secretaries responsible for State Department regional bureaus, and those assistant secretaries answer to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. That under secretary is the fourth-ranking State Department official, after the Secretary of State and two deputies, is only one of six under secretaries, and is the only one whose responsibilities are regionally rather than functionally oriented.²¹

The preponderance of State Department effort at the highest levels therefore goes

to functional rather than regional concerns, and State Department structure buries Ambassadors several layers down from the top, with their immediate supervisors all stationed in Washington, DC, despite being responsible for coordinating global diplomatic efforts with scores of distant Embassies. Those supervisors—the regional assistant secretaries—do not serve as diplomats themselves, conceivably because this would infringe upon the mandates of the Ambassadors for whom they provide coordination, as well as upon the mandate of the Secretary of State, who serves as our nation’s chief diplomat and principal overseas emissary. This complicated hierarchy hardly seems like a recipe for integrated worldwide action.

In his campaign for retooling Country Teams in order to provide for that kind of integrated action, Ambassador Oakley makes the following case for new cross-functional, locale-oriented authority for each country Ambassador:

Given the evolving security environment and challenges confronting our nation, it is time to revalidate the Country Team’s critical role in achieving U.S. national security objectives and to rethink the concept of the Country Team as a committee working for a lead agency. Instead, the Country Team of the future must be reconfigured as a cross functional team with an empowered national leader. The Country Team’s makeover must be done holistically—to include new strategy and planning approaches, decisionmaking procedures, personnel training and incentives, and resource allocation flexibility.²²

This is a reasonable case to make, but it is a case being made at the wrong level, where this authority would be dispersed among more than 180 Ambassadors.

Are regional Ambassadors the answer? Should the regional assistant secretaries be “forward deployed” out of Washington and remade as regional Ambassadors with the cross-functional, locale-oriented authority Oakley proposes for country Ambassadors? Despite Oakley’s own objections,²³ the creation of regional Ambassadors parallel to regional combatant commanders is definitely long overdue, but regional Ambassadors are not an adequate interagency solution any more than country Ambassadors, because regional Ambassadors will face the same kinds of structural problems present in today’s individual Embassies, as delineated above.

Oakley argues for bolstering the preeminence of each Ambassador around the world in order to facilitate integration of the instruments of national power. The pressing issue, however, is not the potency of the authority of Ambassadors, but the need for an entirely different kind of authority altogether. Despite his mistake in emphasis, Oakley eloquently addresses this fact himself:

The critical challenges to our nation’s interests demand a new Country Team concept and a more effective structure capable of tackling the challenges of the 21st century. The signal mark of success for the new Country Team will be changing the way other members of the Country Team perceive the Ambassador. Instead of a Department of State representative, the future Ambassador must be, and be seen as, a national representative empowered to make tradeoffs among instruments of power and to develop clear strategies to advance U.S. national interests. Simply reasserting the Ambassador’s national authority is inadequate. Instead, the Ambassador

*must be empowered as a team leader with authority to generate national security team outcomes and must be selected, trained, and rewarded accordingly.*²⁴

Country Teams should be stronger, as Oakley suggests, but they are too narrowly focused to facilitate cohesive foreign policy themselves. Regional Ambassadors should be established, but their role should be conducting regional diplomacy by coordinating among their assigned country Ambassadors, rather than integrating the instruments of national power. Whether they are at the country or regional levels, Ambassadors will always be State Department representatives first, rather than the “national representatives” Oakley proposes. He is on the right track, but his argument needs to be taken to the next level in two ways.

First, Congress must establish regional teams with true cross-functional character. Refine the last quotation from Oakley by replacing *Country Team* with *regional interagency directorate*. Second, these regional teams must be led by “national representatives” not tied to a particular department or agency, leaders who have true operational authority over all assigned personnel. Further refine Oakley’s passage by replacing *Ambassador* with *regional interagency director* and give these directors not only *operational direction* over their organizational membership but also *operational control*. Only in this way do we get the effective structure Oakley correctly prescribes, with leadership that can be “empowered to make tradeoffs among instruments of power and to develop clear strategies to advance U.S. national interests.”

Operational control is the kind of authority exercised by post–Goldwater-Nichols combatant commanders. It “does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or

matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training,” but it goes beyond operational direction by providing “full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.”²⁵


regional teams must be led by “national representatives” who have true operational authority over all assigned personnel

The exclusion of logistics, administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training is significant. Authority over these aspects of command properly remains with the military departments to which individual members and units subordinate to joint commands belong. But operational control does include authority both to organize commands and forces, and to direct all aspects of operations and joint training. This takes it to the level needed for interagency leadership, wherein lines of authority over all directorate members must be fused together to run up to the regional interagency director, just as the military chains of command in combatant commands are fused together to run up to the combatant commander.

Overseas regional interagency directorates establish the primary foreign policy relationships depicted in figure 1, with additional embedded input from all other appropriate Federal authorities. The regional interagency director has operational control over all the forces represented.

Domestic regional interagency directorates establish homeland security relationships that

Figure 1. Overseas Regional Interagency Directorate Leadership



coordinate the efforts of all appropriate Federal, state, and local municipal authorities, including Federal and state military forces.


Jurisdictional issues make homeland security relationships more complicated than foreign policy relationships, and, as a result, domestic directorates do not lend themselves to a clean permanent wiring diagram like overseas directorates do. Homeland security must instead be operationalized on a case-by-case basis via task forces. The horizontal reorganization described here, including regional alignment and nested authority, is nevertheless just as essential domestically as it is overseas in order to enable cohesive global policy implementation by operationalizing integrated cross-functional efforts around the world, including within the United States.

All the recent ad hoc interagency coordination cells and working groups—as well as the State Department’s Interagency Management System and even the DOD integrated combatant command model in U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern Command—have been designed short of providing true operational interagency authority in order to avoid offending or threatening any portion of the executive branch bureaucracy. Creating regional interagency directors with operational control over their forces establishes that missing authority. That authority must, however, come down to those directors from the President via a reorganized interagency Cabinet, just as the authority of combatant commanders now comes down to them from the President via only the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, the lines of authority must remain the same whether or not military forces are engaged in combat in order to eliminate confusion and to increase effectiveness.

Vertical Reorganization: The Cabinet Reinvented

Statutory vertical reorganization is necessary to allow the President’s senior leadership team to administer regional interagency directorates as true interagency efforts, in place of the ad hoc

Figure 2. The President's Security Council




multiagency efforts over which Cabinet members currently preside, with less-than-ideal coordination of effort and much less-than-ideal success. This requires reinvention of the Cabinet, which establishes new lines of authority that connect regional interagency directors to the President, with appropriate but minimal separation. These changes enable cohesive policy development and activation, and empower the integrated cross-functional implementation efforts of the government's new regional directorates.

The reinvented Cabinet must consist, first of all, of a new senior leadership team called the President's Security Council, designed to address only the highest levels of logically integrated policy. Statutory council members include the President and Vice President, a new Senior Secretary of Foreign Policy, the current Secretary of Homeland Security (renamed the Senior Secretary of Homeland Security), and a new Senior Secretary of Domestic Policy. These Presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed individuals provide the core of a new Senior Cabinet, with the White House Chief of Staff and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget added as Senior Cabinet-level officials. Staff assistance in the Executive Office of the President is coordinated by the current Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (renamed the Assistant to the President for Foreign Policy), the current Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counter-Terrorism, and a new Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy (see figure 2).

The Senior Secretary of Homeland Security presides over the Department of Homeland Security configured as it is now, but elevated in prominence due to the critical nature of its concerns and the challenging nature of the coordination required to address those concerns. The Senior Secretary of Foreign Policy presides over a new Department of Foreign Policy, which includes the Departments of Defense and State, plus a new Department of International Development built upon the U.S. Agency for International Development. Additional Department of Foreign Policy elements include the U.S. trade representative, the permanent representative to the United Nations, and the Intelligence Community under the direction of the Director of National Intelligence.

Figure 3. The Departments of Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy



Finally, the new Senior Secretary of Domestic Policy presides over those Cabinet positions not in the Departments of Homeland Security and Foreign Policy, collected into a new Department of Domestic Policy (see figure 3).

With each new senior secretary exercising the same power of integration conceptually, if not yet actually, exercised by the current Secretary of Homeland Security, the President’s Security Council is thereby empowered to develop broad integrated national policy and to direct its implementation in all the subdepartments for which the senior secretaries are responsible. Only then does the executive branch finally become an actual Interagency—working like the proper noun that has come into common, if so far inaccurate, use.

The leadership of the new Department of Foreign Policy takes the place of the National Security Council, with the responsibility and authority to effect foreign policy rather than merely to advise the President. The leadership of the Department of Homeland Security takes the place

of the Homeland Security Council, with the responsibility and authority to effect homeland security policy. And the leadership of the new Department of Domestic Policy takes the places of both the Domestic Policy Council and National Economic Council, with the responsibility and authority to effect domestic/economic policy. All told, the combined responsibility and authority in these three departments allow their leaders to provide broad policy guidance to the entire executive branch and to direct all the instruments of national power.

In place of the current nonstatutory interagency advisors and large staffs attached to the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, Domestic Policy Council, and National Economic Council, the three senior secretaries become senior statutory interagency leaders, and those staffs become departmental staffs directly serving those leaders. The senior secretaries themselves in turn directly serve the President—whose senior-most secretary-level advisors number 3, rather than 14, as they now do, and whose senior-most Cabinet members number 6, rather than 21.

Executive Office of the President Reinvented

Whereas the Assistants to the President for National Security and Homeland Security now chair their corresponding Principals Committees, following the Cabinet changes described above, the senior secretaries instead chair and lead their own Principals Committees, tied to their own departmental Deputies Committees and Interagency Policy Committees. The assistants to the President in turn become Presidential advisors who have the freedom to study policy options in their focus areas and to advise the President, without the necessity to coordinate among disparate

departments and agencies. Since the senior secretaries have staffs of their own, the new National Security Staff now “supporting all White House policymaking activities related to international, transnational and homeland security matters, and under the direction of the National Security Advisor”²⁶ can be reduced in size, but simultaneously given increased purview to include domestic policy. This new staff is renamed the President’s Security Council Staff, and falls under the direction of the Assistant to the President for Foreign Policy, dual-hatted as the President’s Security Advisor. The Assistants to the President for Homeland Security and Counter-Terrorism and for Domestic Policy are dual-hatted as Deputy President’s Security Advisors.

the primary problem with the current Cabinet structure is the built-in independence of Cabinet-level leadership and organizations

This new Executive Office of the President staff construct allows White House senior policy staff to function much more like it did in the early Nixon administration than it did in the later Nixon administration. Henry Kissinger initially guided that staff in studying a wide array of interrelated issues and then presented the President with the pros and cons of all realistic policy options. Later, Kissinger began to dominate major international negotiations himself, rather than coordinating careful study of the issues.²⁷

The primary problem with the current Cabinet structure is the built-in independence of Cabinet-level leadership and organizations, which widely disperses responsibilities,

authorities, and resources, while the level of oversight provided by the National Security Advisor in the President's place is dependent upon the relative strength of his or her personality and the personalities of individual Cabinet members. Structural change to fix that often wayward Cabinet-level independence is long overdue, as is downgrading the nonstatutory power given by the President to the National Security Advisor out of necessity born from that independence.

Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler underscore exactly why the power afforded national security advisors since President Kennedy must be reduced, in favor of statutory authority and responsibility for senior secretaries:

National security advisers have a tough job. They must serve the president yet balance this primary allegiance with a commitment to managing an effective and efficient policy process. They must be forceful in driving that process forward to decisions yet represent other agencies' views fully and faithfully. They must be simultaneously strong and collegial, able to enforce discipline across the government while engaging senior officials and their agencies rather than excluding them. They must provide confidential advice to the president yet establish a reputation as an honest broker between the conflicting officials and interests across the government. They must be indispensable to the process and the president yet operate in the shadows as much as possible. They must do the heavy lifting yet allow others to receive the glory. Above all, they must ensure that the president and his senior advisers give thorough and careful consideration to the handful of critical issues that will make or break the

*administration. And they must handle all issues, large and small, in a manner that establishes and retains the trust of their senior administration colleagues.*²⁸


Daalder and Destler point out that U.S. law makes no provision for the National Security Advisor position, but they nevertheless call the role “an institutional fact,” one which “by all odds . . . will remain so.”²⁹ Rather than justifying the position, however, their explanation of the position's challenges instead justifies statutory creation of senior secretaries who have the responsibility and authority to represent the views of their own broadly integrated departments and to enforce discipline within those departments, without having to worry about offending their colleagues, as national security advisors must. The National Security Advisor should not be put in a position responsible for striking a balance “between being assertive and not intruding on the roles of others,”³⁰ and should certainly not be what Daalder and Destler name, “aside from the president himself . . . potentially the most important person in government today.”³¹ Congress must fix this with statutory change by empowering true interagency leadership in the form of senior secretaries.

Interagency Lines of Authority

Reinvention of the Cabinet provides a policy apparatus in which regional interagency directors reside within lines of effective authority made clear by reinvention of the Executive Office of the President, which removes the President's nonstatutory advisors from those lines.

Overseas regional interagency directors answer to the Senior Secretary of Foreign Policy, since overseas directorates address primarily the 3Ds of foreign policy (defense, diplomacy, and development), although they must

Figure 4. Lines of Authority for Overseas and Domestic Regional Interagency Directorates



necessarily incorporate all the other instruments of national power as well. The line of authority in this case runs from the President to the directors through the Senior Secretary of Foreign Policy (see figure 4).

Domestic regional interagency directors answer to the Senior Secretary of Homeland Security, since domestic directorates enable effective and efficient interagency responses to homeland terrorism and natural disasters, already the purview of the Department of Homeland Security. The line of authority in this case runs from the President to the directors through the Senior Secretary of Homeland Security (see figure 4).

Placed at the top of regional interagency directorates, regional directors are thereby clearly designated the parties responsible for interagency policy implementation, while being given authority that integrates the necessary instruments of national power. Regional directors are the President's representatives in the field, with both the responsibility and the authority to get the job done. This is how the Interagency will finally be born as a proper noun.

Building a True Interagency

With the executive branch redesigned as described, the Interagency finally truly exists as a proper noun capable of moving U.S. Government efforts beyond merely reacting to domestic and foreign circumstances, to shaping the global environment in favor of freedom and opportunity both at home and abroad, even amid the challenges of the 21st century. That strategic-level success becomes possible because horizontal and vertical reorganization enables both integrated policy implementation in the

field and integrated policymaking at the top, and because it ties them together.

A somewhat dated article from the Winter 1998 issue of *Parameters* contains a short-sighted sentiment still prevalent today: “If an interagency coordinating body is to have any hope of succeeding in the complicated and ever-changing game of intervention operations, then it must dedicate itself to getting beyond organizations as they exist on paper.”³²

Willpower workarounds such as this are not good enough. If executive branch organizations are not effective as they exist on paper, then they must be changed on paper, because only then will the executive branch achieve strategic success in our complicated and ever-changing world.

Taking the goals of Goldwater-Nichols as a model, Congress’s goals in passing an Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act should be to:

- ❖ strengthen civilian authority over the Interagency
- ❖ improve the Interagency advice provided to senior civilian leadership
- ❖ increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning
- ❖ provide for more efficient use of Interagency resources
- ❖ improve Interagency personnel development and management
- ❖ enhance the general effectiveness of Interagency operations and improve management
- ❖ place clear responsibility on regional interagency directors for accomplishment of the missions assigned to their directorates
- ❖ ensure that regional interagency director authority is fully commensurate

with regional interagency director responsibility.

The Executive Branch Organizational Imperative

The United States has incredible potential and opportunity to advance its interests and values around the world, and the American military instrument of power is extremely adept at rapid dominance on the battlefield. But that is far from enough. Instead, with consistent top-down direction, the executive branch should be producing dominant and persistent positive security effects both on the battlefield and off, from the efficient combination of every instrument of national power. In this regard, the executive branch fails miserably. Our early results in Iraq and Afghanistan are merely the most salient, recent colossal proof.

The executive branch must be transformed by statutory structural, operational, and human adjustments to produce coordinated and concerted efforts from every department and agency, in a synthesized approach guided by directive leadership provided from the top. Enabling that kind of leadership necessitates reinventing the Cabinet and inventing regional interagency directorates to allow the President’s senior leadership team to direct a true Interagency that deserves to be described as a proper noun.

The problem is not, as some have suggested in a rather simplistic way, that regional combatant commands have become obsolete and represent impediments to coherent policy,³³ but rather that the disparate perspectives and stovepiped organizational structures and authority throughout the executive branch make such coherency impossible.

The United States needs a more effective and more efficient executive branch of government not to dominate the world, but to continue to secure the lives and futures of its citizens. As we do so, our national interests will continue to feed freedom around the world, as they have done throughout our nation's history. If we fail to do so, that feeding will stop. Meeting this challenge requires not bigger government but integrated government. It requires an Interagency worthy of the name.

In his December 1, 2009, address at the United States Military Academy at West Point, President Obama stated, "As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests."³⁴ Reinventing executive branch structure, as described here, enhances U.S. Government means, to bring them in line with American responsibility and American interests.

The time for change is now. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2007), x. Emphasis added.

² *Ibid.*, I–3.

³ *Ibid.*, IV–1.

⁴ Field Manual 3–0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2001), 2–16.

⁵ Edgar Allan Poe, "The Philosophy of Composition," *The Oxford Book of American Essays* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1914).

⁶ Presidential Policy Directive 1 (Washington, DC: The White House, 2009), 4, available at <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-1.pdf>.

⁷ Homeland Security Policy Institute, *Policy & Research Forum on Presidential Study Directive–1: Organizing for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism* (Washington, DC: The George Washington University, May 27, 2009), video clip 3, at 15 minutes 12 seconds, available at <www.gwumc.edu/hspi/events/psd1PRE.cfm>.

⁸ Thomas L. Friedman, "Super (Sub) Secretaries," February 28, 2009, available at <www.nytimes.com/2009/03/01/opinion/01friedman.html>.

⁹ Karen DeYoung, "Obama's NSC Will Get New Power: Directive Expands Makeup and Role of Security Body," February 8, 2009, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/07/AR2009020702076.html>.

¹⁰ The Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield* (Arlington, VA: The Project on National Security Reform, 2008), 469–470.

¹¹ Department of Defense (DOD), *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, version 1 (Washington, DC: DOD, September 11, 2007), B–5.

¹² Air Mobility Command, *Concept of Operations for Active Associate Units* (Scott Air Force Base, IL: Air Mobility Command, June 1, 2007), 4.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁴ Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Handbook, Volume 2, Handbook 2—Post Management Organization* (Washington, DC: Department of State, November 29, 2005), 3.

¹⁵ See the extract of the Clay Paper in U.S. Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, *The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination* (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Historical Studies Division, September 13, 1963), 60–61.

¹⁶ See the breakdown of typical agencies included on Country Teams in Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, “The ‘Country Team,’” *U.S. Diplomacy: An Online Exploration of Diplomatic History and Foreign Affairs* (Arlington, VA: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2009), available at <www.usdiplomacy.org/state/abroad/countryteam.php>.

¹⁷ Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr., “The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First Line of Engagement,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 47 (4th Quarter, 2007), 146.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 150–151.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 152. Emphasis added.

²⁰ Friedman.

²¹ See Department of State, “Senior Officials,” available at <www.state.gov/misc/19232.htm>. The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs is incorrectly listed here as the *third*-ranking Department of State official, with reference to the time period before a second deputy secretary was added. See also Department of State, “Department Organization Chart (image map): May 2009,” available at <www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/99494.htm>.

²² Oakley and Casey, 152.

²³ *Ibid.*, 153: “There should not be a permanent regional Ambassador.” Instead, Oakley argues that “it is critical that the State Department’s cadre of regional assistant secretaries enjoy good two-way communication with Defense’s five (soon to be six) regional combatant commanders, while taking steps, however, not to bypass their equivalents at the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.” Notwithstanding Oakley’s argument, the regional combatant commanders are themselves the closest current functional equivalents of the regional assistant secretaries, and looking at it any other way is counterproductive.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 154.

²⁵ JP 1–02, 398.

²⁶ Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on the White House Organization for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,” May 26, 2009, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-the-White-House-Organization-for-Homeland-Security-and-Counterterrorism/>.

²⁷ Ivo H. Daalder and I.M. Destler, “In the Shadow of the Oval Office: The Next National Security Adviser,” *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 1 (January 2009), 118.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 114–115.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 128.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 127.

³² Thomas Gibbings, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore, “Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can’t Ignore,” *Parameters* 28, no. 4 (Winter 1998–1999), 3, available at <www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98winter/moore.htm>.

³³ See, for example, Edward Marks, “Rethinking the Geographic Combatant Commands,” *InterAgency Journal* 1, no. 1 (Fall 2010), 19–23.

³⁴ Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” December 1, 2009, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan>.

Interagency National Security Teams

Can Social Science Contribute?

BY JAMES DOUGLAS ORTON WITH CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB

There is a consensus that many national security problems require interagency solutions.¹ However, as veteran national security legislator Ike Skelton noted, the current national security system has trouble meeting this requirement: “For many years, we’ve repeatedly heard from independent blue-ribbon panels and bipartisan commissions that when it comes to interagency collaboration on national security, our system is inefficient, ineffective, and often down-right broken.”² Many of those same blue-ribbon panels and commissions have recommended interagency teams as a potential solution to interagency coordination problems.³ Recently, for example, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Commission called for more “interagency teams with capabilities to plan for and exercise, in an integrated way, departmental and agency responsibilities in predefined mission[s].”⁴ Historical descriptive accounts indicate interagency teams can indeed perform with great effectiveness, but recent research also suggests that interagency team effectiveness is not widespread, easily replicated, or well-understood. It would be easier to act upon the recommendations for more interagency teams if national security executives knew with greater certainty what factors and what conditions make these teams effective.

We believe that social science research on team effectiveness can help in this regard. We reviewed the literature on team effectiveness, particularly 12 comprehensive literature reviews published between

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1982 and 2008.⁵ We concluded that the organizational literature on team effectiveness offers many insights, but its collective value is limited because the team literature is ambiguous, unstructured, and so rich that it is disorderly. Many researchers use terminology that distinguishes between groups and teams while denying there is a substantive difference; this is a fundamental contradiction that complicates categorization and thus cumulative research. In addition,

social science research on team effectiveness offers many insights, but its collective value is limited

researchers do not agree on the most important explanatory variables for team effectiveness, which makes it hard to build up generalized findings. Another impediment to generalized findings is that researchers do not agree on the different types of cross-functional teams so that findings from research on one type of team are more likely to be misconstrued as applicable to all team types. Finally, insights from the rich team literature are difficult to extract and apply, which is a severe limitation for those desiring to build up knowledge of how interagency teams might best be constructed and employed. In this article, we argue that imposing some definitional rigor, methodological clarity, and plausible categorization on the literature provides a solid platform for interagency team research, and that doing so can produce immediate benefits for those interested in better interagency performance.

Groups, Teams, and Cross-functional Teams

The first problem in the literature is that many researchers do not consistently

distinguish between groups, teams, and cross-functional teams, thus confusing and undermining the relevance of their findings. Many researchers use the term *teams* interchangeably with the term *groups*.⁶ Even literature reviews on teams that purportedly focus on the team phenomenon often use both terms interchangeably.⁷ Basic organizational textbooks capture the confusion over the substantive difference between groups and teams when they acknowledge that most researchers use group and team interchangeably, but then address groups and teams separately as different organizational types.⁸ The conflicted treatment of teams as entities that can be differentiated from groups is a problem for researchers. Absent some agreed-upon defining characteristics for what distinguishes a team from other organizational groups, how can they or their effectiveness be studied systematically?

The solution we propose is to distinguish between groups, teams, and cross-functional teams by level of task interdependence, a well-accepted concept developed by James D. Thompson in the 1950s and 1960s. Thompson, in his classic 1953 case study on a “medium bomb wing of the Strategic Air Command of the United States Air Force . . . operating B–50 manned aircraft,”⁹ identified three different types of task interdependence: pooled, sequential, and reciprocal. These three levels can be used to distinguish teams from groups, and cross-functional teams from teams more generally.

Pooled interdependence is the minimal level of task interdependence within an organizational group’s task environment.¹⁰ Shared leadership, shared tools, shared office space, shared tasks, shared missions, and/or shared identities are all manifestations of pooled interdependence. Many groups never exceed

this level of task interdependence but can nonetheless prove effective as long as they are not expected to perform at a higher level of task interdependence. For example, a Joint Interagency Coordination Group that shares information and offers advice, rather than actually being empowered and employed to solve complex problems, is probably aptly designated a group because its level of task interdependence is low.

Sequential interdependence is a moderate level of task interdependence within an organizational team's task environment. Activities at the sequential interdependence level require a division of labor or some level of specialization, but also standard operating procedures, calendars, schedules, and at least some degree of team leadership to coordinate the activity.¹¹ In the presence of sequential interdependence, group members will find a way to coordinate their activities among people and across time and thus satisfy the minimum qualification for designation as a team. Some interagency planning teams rise to this level of task interdependence as they coordinate plans by passing them from one agency or department to another until a generally agreed-upon plan is approved.

Reciprocal interdependence is the highest level of task interdependence and reflects a cross-functional team's task environment. According to Thompson, activities that require rapid coordination of diverse functional expertise require "mutual adjustment" among the functional specialties on an ongoing basis. All teams may experience some level of mutual adjustment between specialties, but effective cross-functional teams do so routinely and rapidly. Despite the proliferation of cross-functional teams in corporate America (sometimes called a "quiet revolution"¹²), there is not yet much research specifically focused on

cross-functional teams as opposed to teams more generally.¹³ There is even less research on interagency teams in the national security system, which are by definition "cross-functional," insofar as different departments and agencies represent major functional specialties (military, diplomacy, homeland security, economics, law enforcement, intelligence).

We believe that level of task interdependence is a useful way to distinguish among groups, teams, and cross-functional teams in the national security system and an important first step toward improving the knowledge base on interagency teams. Since we are interested in interagency performance, we focus on the third category: cross-functional interagency national security teams. Because we want to know more about what best explains the performance of interagency (or cross-functional) teams, we examined the literature for insights on the most important explanatory performance variables.

there is not yet much research focused on cross-functional teams as opposed to teams more generally

Ten Core Variables

We identified 10 tentative key variables that seem to best explain team effectiveness. We emphasize the word tentative because we acknowledge these variables extracted from a rich literature base are heuristic and not well established by a cohesive body of research on interagency teams. We organize the 10 variables in 3 sets: one at the organizational level, one at the team level, and one at the subteam level. Team purpose, team empowerment, and team support have all been shown as necessary

organizational conditions for team effectiveness, and often depend upon organizational factors beyond the immediate control of the team. Team structure, team decisionmaking, team culture, and team learning are all variables directly controlled by the team. Team composition, team rewards, and team leadership are all variables at the individual level of analysis that are strongly related to team effectiveness.

Each of the 10 core variables selected has been the topic of many hundreds of studies and dozens of literature reviews and meta-analyses. By examining this body of research, we identified subsidiary team characteristics that researchers have shown affect team effectiveness and that usefully illustrate the range of variation within each of the variables. The net result is a range of performance characteristics for what we postulate are the most important 10 explanatory variables for performance. We explain the variables in table 1 by drawing upon cross-functional team research literature and using illustrative examples from research under way in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU). The authors and other

teams require at least initial broad direction as to their purpose

researchers in the institute are using these variables and their performance characteristics to better understand the performance of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), high-value targeting teams, human terrain teams (HTTs), and other interagency teams that have been created and employed by the national security system. A set of case studies has been completed and results are forthcoming. Our purpose here is

simply to illustrate the value of the variables to structure future research for more generalized knowledge of interagency team performance.

Purpose, Empowerment, and Support

Team purpose is the broad, long-term mandate given to the team by its management, the alignment of short-term objectives with its strategic vision, and agreement on common approaches within the team. Despite widespread belief that management should not dictate team objectives, the literature on teams does suggest that teams require at least initial broad direction as to their purpose.¹⁴ Agreement on team purpose is manifest in varying levels of detail.

Most organizations have well-understood overarching organizational-level strategies that can provide a foundation on which more precise team purposes can be built. One of the best known broad organizational strategies was John F. Kennedy's pronouncement that by the end of the 1960s, the United States would land a man on the moon and return him safely. Team purposes are typically more focused, however; for example, "Locate and return Private James Francis Ryan safely to his mother." Successful cross-functional teams are able to create an initial strategic consensus, and then build on that kernel to create a more elaborate strategic concept of how work is done in the team. One of the reasons that the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)–South has been so effective is that it has a focused strategic consensus (interdict drugs) and over time has been able to translate that narrow purpose into a well-shared operational concept for team performance of how things are done at JIATF–South.

Team empowerment is having sufficient wherewithal to accomplish the team purpose.¹⁵ Three types of team empowerment have been linked to team effectiveness: resource

Table 1. Ten Core Variables Affecting Team Effectiveness

Organizational-level Variables			
Purpose	Team founding	Strategic consensus	Strategic concept
Empowerment	Structural	Resources	Psychological
Support	External communication activities	Supportive organizational context	Team-based organizations
Team-level Variables			
Structure	Design	Mental models	Networks
Decisionmaking	Heterogeneity	Conflict	Implementation
Culture	Climate	Cohesion	Trust
Learning	Exploitation	Experimentation	Exploration
Individual-level Variables			
Composition	Diversity	Competencies	Personality
Rewards	Attractive motivations	Active incentives	Affective impetus
Leadership	Traditional	Coaching	Shared

empowerment, structural empowerment (for example, authority, power, and control), and psychological empowerment (confidence, efficacy, and potency). Many people lament the lack of directive authority on interagency teams so that they would have the power to give directions to other components of the national security system.¹⁶ However, we find that lack of resources for interagency missions may be a more substantial impediment to team performance given the current configuration of the national security system.

Corporations are routinely able to allocate resources from corporate headquarters into cross-functional teams that are seen as strategic investments for the organization. In contrast, interagency teams in the national security system are not typically given the resources necessary to accomplish their tasks. Experienced interagency participants often note that even when such groups agree on objectives, they commonly cannot agree on which departments and agencies will provide the resources necessary to achieve those objectives. There are exceptions, such as Plan Colombia, which was successful in large part because it received needed resources. The Plan Colombia team was created by President Bill Clinton’s national security advisor, Sandy Berger, in the summer of 1999 to reverse Colombia’s slide into a cocaine-driven illicit drug economy. Ambassador Thomas Pickering, who led the interagency team, later explained that one of the reasons behind the success

of Plan Colombia was the fact that the U.S. Congress allocated \$1.6 billion to the effort.¹⁷ Pickering believed that this significant infusion of resources eliminated much of the friction that normally bogs down interagency teams.

Team support is the set of relations that connect a team to other levels of the organization. It matters a great deal whether teams are constructed with the cooperation of the rest of the organization, with the ambivalent noninterference by the rest of the organization, or in the face of opposition from the rest

interagency teams often do not receive a great deal of organizational support from the national security system

of the organization. Numerous team researchers have found that organizational support is a primary determinant of the effectiveness of the team.¹⁸ Contrary to the common prejudice that hard-working and well-intentioned lower ranking officials will work out interagency differences if left alone, most successful interagency teams benefit from substantial senior leadership support. Anecdotally, it seems extremely difficult if not impossible for an interagency team to be successful without some broader level of support from the national security system and its leaders.

Unfortunately, interagency teams (or groups) often do not receive a great deal of organizational support from the national security system. The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) experience is a common one. Created in 2001 to bring together diverse counterintelligence capabilities across the U.S. national security system, the NCIX found it difficult to get operating quickly:

For the administrative support system, anything that is different is a problem at least initially, because it does not fit into the known set of rules and procedures. This effect is multiplied when the objective is to wire together disparate security regimes governing computer systems, personnel practices, and physical space. . . . One of the enduring problems we encountered was in recruiting capable personnel to work in the new [counterintelligence] office. All national "centers" have an inherent personnel problem: you want and need the best and brightest, but there are never enough of those to go around. . . . Even if a given individual is personally disposed to take an assignment with the national office, getting their line management's okay is far from easy. ("No. You are needed here.")¹⁹

Some organizations are purposefully managed to provide quick and effective support for cross-functional teams, and they thrive on such fertile ground. Other organizations provide such support on an exceptional basis, and it is much more difficult for teams to quickly start up and prove effective when they are starved for organizational support.²⁰

Structure, Decisionmaking, Culture, and Learning

Team structure refers to the mechanics of teams: their design,²¹ collocation,²² and network dynamics.²³ In general, research shows that effective team structures are small, collocated, and embedded within powerful networks. Team design encompasses decisions about the tasks performed by the team, nature of subunits within the team, specific number of team members needed, and tenure of the team.

As discussed in more detail later, cross-functional teams vary significantly by type and design. A standing national-level team near the top of the organization requires a different design than a temporary action committee at the bottom of the organization. Size is a team design variable that is highly subject to the types of team tasks being performed. Here we can perhaps extrapolate from the Harvard Business School’s classic guide to managing meetings, which recognized the practical size limit on productive group efforts with its 8–18–1800 rule.²⁴ If the purpose of an interagency team is mere “coordination” or simple communication of information across multiple departments and agencies, the group can be quite large (for example, up to 1,800 people or as many as an auditorium or listserv will hold). If the purpose is non-binding “cooperation,” such as brainstorming or perhaps the accomplishment of a common and relatively simple objective, the team should be much smaller (18 people in a conference room or on a conference call). If, though, the purpose is “collaboration,” or creative decisionmaking that integrates different viewpoints to solve complex problems, the cross-functional team must be small (8 people around a table or on a videoconference) because a “large number of people—by virtue of their size—have trouble interacting constructively as a group, much less agreeing on actionable specifics.”²⁵

Interagency organizations at all levels—the National Security Council committees, JIATFs, or field operations such as PRTs—are under pressure to let more organizations send representatives to participate in the decision process. Social science research on cross-functional teams, however, shows that teams cannot be effective if they are too large. On the other hand, team structure research also suggests that

the core team must network well to be successful, both internally and externally. In high-performing cross-functional teams, it is common to find that members have a detailed understanding of the role that other members play, sometimes referred to as “transactive memory systems.” Practically speaking, the team members know “who knows what” and “who can do what” and “who has access to people outside the team who can solve specific problems.” Shared transactive memory has been shown to increase resilience through a process known as “deference to expertise,”²⁶ in which problems migrate to the people most likely to have the ability to solve them, rather than centralizing at the top of the organization. This phenomenon has been observed, for example, in cardio-surgical teams and wildland firefighting teams. Effective teams also compensate for their small size by networking externally with other bodies of needed expertise.²⁷

teams with a high level of trust are more innovative, learn more quickly, have higher cooperation, and experience less damaging conflict

Team decisionmaking processes are employed to make sense of and solve a variety of complex problems faced by the team. Understanding the factors that distinguish effective team decisionmaking processes from less effective ones is a high priority in organizations because marginal improvements in decision quality can result in benefits, and marginal degradations in decision quality can result in catastrophes.²⁸

National security events have been studied from the vantage point of team decisionmaking processes for over 50 years.²⁹ The Bay of Pigs

Invasion decision is often cited as the prototypical example of a case in which the norms of the group overpowered the ideas of individuals in the group, a phenomenon labeled “group-think.”³⁰ Subsequent research shows that groups with high levels of cohesiveness may suffer from the inability or unwillingness of individuals to contest emergent team decisions.³¹ Sometimes teams that have been together for a while lose their effectiveness because the team members converge on a common viewpoint and lose their capacity to engage in constructive team conflict. Researchers now recognize two different types of team conflict: emotional conflict (“a condition in which group members have interpersonal clashes characterized by anger, frustration, and other negative feelings”) and task conflict (“a condition in which group members disagree about task issues, including goals, key decision areas, procedures, and the appropriate choice for action”).³² Research shows that emotional conflict leads to poor decisions, while task conflict can lead to better decisions.³³ The objective in team decisionmaking is to ensure a productive clash of divergent views while still forging agreement on the best way forward—something much more easily said than done.

Team culture is the combination of norms, values, and beliefs shared by team members. Effective cross-functional teams require team cultures that are cohesive,³⁴ foster a climate of shared values,³⁵ and are based on high degrees of trust. Research on cross-functional teams shows that teams with a high level of trust are more innovative,³⁶ learn more quickly,³⁷ have higher degrees of cooperation,³⁸ and experience less damaging conflict.³⁹

The creation of a team culture with a high degree of trust is not easy to do within an interagency national security team. Interagency team members come from different parts of

the national security system, each of which has a powerful culture of its own (for example, the Secret Service, Diplomatic Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Federal Bureau of Investigation). These cultures must be bridged at the team level in order to foster cohesiveness. This is a major and growing challenge for Ambassadors who must lead country teams:

*Not only must Ambassadors coordinate major government activities such as diplomacy, commercial relations, use of force, and intelligence activities, but they also must provide interagency coordination for numerous sub-specialties within a given area. With over 30 government agencies now dispatching employees overseas, non-State Department personnel often outnumber diplomats.*⁴⁰

With so many diverse organizational cultures represented on the Country Team, the Ambassador has a major problem establishing trust and cohesion. In fact, one study of Country Team performance found that distrust of Ambassadors is a major impediment to team performance insofar as the Ambassador is often *not* seen as the overarching national representative but rather as a representative of the Department of State who is pursuing Department of State interests. Thus, “agencies encourage their personnel on the Country Team to pursue their own objectives and lines of operation, without adequate consultation or coordination.”⁴¹

Team learning is an ongoing process of action, reflection, and change, through which teams acquire, share, combine, and apply knowledge.⁴² Effective teams not only make good decisions, but they also rapidly acquire new knowledge and embed that knowledge into the team’s structure, processes, and culture.⁴³ In

rapidly changing global environments, teams that learn accurately and quickly have a significant competitive advantage over teams that learn poorly and slowly.⁴⁴

Interagency national security teams can be designed to efficiently replicate old knowledge, to artfully experiment with old and new knowledge, or to plunge headfirst into new knowledge domains. Historically, the U.S. national security system has been dominated by “exploitative learning,” or a belief in replicating past successes. Presumably, future interagency national security teams will want to focus more on learning capacity. Effective experimental learning teams place a high value on after-action reviews, lessons-learned exercises, and agile retrospectives in order to learn how to improve their strategy, organization, and processes.⁴⁵ Effective exploratory learning teams survey their environments through sensemaking, scouting, and mental “map-making activities.” Facing the unknown can be disconcerting and incline a team to ignore the unfamiliar, but good exploratory practice “moves the unknown to the known and enables action.”⁴⁶

Composition, Rewards, and Leadership

Team composition refers to the characteristics of individuals chosen for the team, presence of subcultures or factions within the team, and amount of diversity in attitudes, demographic characteristics, and functional boundaries. The large literature on team training is focused on creating properly qualified personnel for teams.⁴⁷ Team personality uses selection, socialization, and strategy processes to ensure that each member has the necessary personality characteristics, goal orientations, or other individual-level attributes to contribute.⁴⁸ In contrast, diversity covers a range of member characteristics presumed

to affect performance, including demographic, attitudinal, and functional diversity.⁴⁹ Team members can be chosen both to accentuate homogeneity or heterogeneity, and also to create subunits, factions, or subcultures.

Lessons learned at great cost are being lost because the Defense Department makes no effort to track which personnel participated in and led interagency teams well

Research on effective cross-functional teams suggests that some people are seen as “good” team members and others are seen as “bad” team members. One path to the creation of more good team members is through the creation of a new class of people trained in interagency practices. Executive Order 13434, signed by President George W. Bush on May 17, 2007, called for the creation of a cadre of national security professionals: “it is the policy of the United States to promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions.” A second way would be “tagging” the human capital files of people who already have had significant experiences on interagency teams.

Recent NDU research on interagency teams used in Iraq explains the powerful but fragile performance of these innovative organizational constructs. The research found that lessons learned at great cost are being lost in part because the Defense Department makes no effort to track which personnel participated in and led interagency teams well. Admirable oral history databases “provide scant insights on performance of the interagency teams,” and “personnel who now have bureaucratic black

belts in interagency collaboration in the field are moving on with their careers.” Currently, these experienced interagency veterans cannot be located to obtain insights, rewarded for complex and successful assignments, or identified for future interagency assignments.⁵⁰

A third path to creating good interagency team members is through education. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) “provides a robust training, education, and exercise program to further develop skills and knowledge needed to address identified performance gaps for the full range of potential reconstruction and stabilization efforts.”⁵¹

a best practice for one type of cross-functional team could actually be a poor practice for another type

Team rewards are systems of attractive motivations, material reinforcements, and emotional benefits that direct team members toward the accomplishment of the mission.⁵² Effective reward systems not only encourage individual members in their discrete responsibilities as team members, but also provide significant rewards for team accomplishments measured against the metrics for success.⁵³ Conversely, inconsistency between a team’s purpose and its reward system can undermine the effectiveness of the team.

Research suggests cross-functional teams are fueled by three different types of team rewards. One type of reward can be used to convince high-performing professionals to jump out of their safe career paths within a stovepipe into a more precarious, more demanding, and less highly valued position on an interagency team. A second type of reward is used within the team to create

incentives for overcoming numerous impediments to interagency teams within the current system. Finally, members of effective teams report that the most effective team rewards are emotional: affect,⁵⁴ mood,⁵⁵ and emotions.⁵⁶ Research on interagency teams at INSS also supports the contention in the literature that “psychological rewards” are by far the most motivating type of team reward. Members of high-value targeting teams in Iraq described the strong positive emotions that intelligence analysts experience when they see their work immediately translated into action. Multiple interviewees with experience at JIATF–South reported that working there was the high point of their careers. Similar sentiments were expressed by every member of the interagency Bosnia Train & Equip team who was interviewed. Under the right circumstances, participation in interagency teams can create extraordinary positive team emotions.

Team leadership is broadly defined as the collection of strategic actions that are taken to accomplish team objectives, ensure efficiency, and avoid catastrophes. Although it flies in the face of popular opinion that assumes good leadership is the key to success in virtually everything, over 50 years of organizational research shows that a good leader in a dysfunctional system is likely to fail, while a bad leader in a well-organized system is likely to succeed.⁵⁷ Good team leaders are successful not because they are forceful, decisive, charismatic, or inspirational, but because they build good team systems, and good team systems subsequently create the desired outcomes.⁵⁸ Teams require leaders who can secure critical resources for the team, exercise authority without suffocating the creativity of the team, and manage the team’s effective performance.

Leadership within the U.S. national security system is usually defined in near-Napoleonic terms of individuals, hierarchies, and chains

of command.⁵⁹ In stark contrast to this “great man” approach, though, is Donald Philips’s and James Loy’s description of leadership in the U.S. Coast Guard:

*[T]he United States Coast Guard lives and breathes leadership. It pervades every aspect of an organization where every person is a leader. Most studies of leadership involve a single person—one leader who has made a difference in an organization. But this is the story of . . . a service organization imbued with proper leadership thinking and behavior by the nation’s founders. That leadership has endured for more than two and one-quarter centuries.*⁶⁰

The rise of interagency teams is an indication that the U.S. national security system is starting to wean itself from a great man leadership model and move toward a distributed leadership model.

These 10 core team variables are broad, but the range of variation we extracted from the literature in the 30 subsidiary team variables is much more specific to team experience. We think this construct befits the sprawling nature of team literature, providing structure for further research without imposing too narrow a set of lenses for examining team performance. We do not presume that this set of variables is definitive. Rather, we assert it is consistent with the literature on cross-functional teams and a good starting place for organizing disciplined research on interagency national security teams.

Executive, Project, Parallel, Command, Production, and Action Teams

A third problem in trying to extract insights from research is that team researchers

have not yet produced a disciplined and agreed-upon taxonomy of cross-functional teams. Since 1990, researchers have been distinguishing among different types of cross-functional teams,⁶¹ but there is not yet agreement on a typology of these. Such an underdeveloped typology of cross-functional teams and their subcategories creates problems for educators and practitioners alike. A best practice for one type of cross-functional team could actually be a poor practice for another type.⁶² For example, our research to date suggests strong traditional leadership may be appropriate for ad hoc interagency teams, but shared leadership may be far better for well-established standing teams. Two concepts that are particularly helpful for a typology of cross-functional teams are Cohen and Bailey’s concept of *managerial scope* (strategic, operational, tactical) and Devine’s concept of *temporal duration* (standing, temporary). Combining the concepts of managerial scope and temporal duration yield the six types of cross-functional teams presented in table 2.

Those creating interagency national security teams must consider whether the team is primarily a strategic, operational, or tactical team, with corresponding workload and design implications. Strategic teams tend to be near the corporate headquarters of the organization, tend to be under the direct control of the organization’s strategic leadership team, and tend to require a long-term strategic viewpoint. Operational teams—often responsible for policy and plans—are more likely to be located away from organizational headquarters (for example, a combatant command, Haiti earthquake team, BP oil spill response team). The primary responsibility at the operational or managerial level is the translation of long-term national security strategy into short-term tactical actions and/or the resolution

Table 2. Six Types of Cross-functional Teams

	Team Duration	
Scope of Duties	Standing	Temporary
Top Management ❖ Institutional ❖ Strategic	Executive	Project
Middle Management ❖ Managerial ❖ Operational	Parallel	Command
First-line Management ❖ Technological ❖ Tactical	Production	Action

of relatively specific productivity problems. Tactical teams are often described as “the pointy end of the spear” or “where the rubber meets the road.” They actually engage in activity that directly produces desired outcomes. Tactical teams also often have an organizational intelligence function, serving as sensors with high situational awareness. They could, someday, constitute the “eyes and ears” of the national security system. By definition, there are a small number of strategic teams, more operational teams, and a larger number of tactical teams. Each of the variables described above may have a different influence on team effectiveness depending on whether the team is strategic, operational, or tactical.

Those creating interagency national security teams must also determine whether the team is primarily a standing or a temporary team. Standing teams leverage effectiveness variables differently than do temporary ones. For example, as previously mentioned, traditional leadership is likely to work better for ad hoc interagency teams that jump right into unique and limited problems. A temporary group is highly dependent on a team leader to create, share, and maintain the purpose. However, shared leadership is likely to work better for standing teams that are using well-established procedures to tackle well understood problems repetitively. Another example is team culture. Team cohesion is likely to be more challenging for an ad hoc team where the members know they will soon be returning to their parent organizations. A standing team might rely primarily on a historical team climate—a shared understanding of specific norms, values, and beliefs within the team. However, a temporary team might have to compensate for the lack of a long-term unifying climate with short-term efforts to create cohesion and trust. An intriguing new field of research in this regard is studies of “swift trust” in temporary teams.

Social Science Can Contribute

Our small organizational performance team in INSS is now conducting case studies of different types of interagency teams using the variables and typology explained in this article. The results to

date have been most encouraging and are being published under separate cover. We also believe, however, that the insights extracted from organizational literature on teams can be used more directly as well.

For example, understanding best practices for PRTs is a goal for several national security entities. The U.S. Institute of Peace publishes interviews with PRT members on its Web site, and National Defense University's Center for Complex Operations is systematically examining lessons learned on PRTs.⁶³ Using the variables identified here to develop exit interviews for PRT members could prove most valuable for better understanding performance.

The research findings presented here also could be put to immediate use by those working to improve the performance of human terrain teams. One of the most visible national security experiments in recent years has been the deployment of perhaps as many as 120 HTTs in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2007 and 2010. In addition to much social commentary and popular press, including a forthcoming book on the teams by journalist Vanessa M. Gezari, there are at least three forthcoming studies of the Human Terrain System (one by the Center for Naval Analyses, one by the U.S. Army, and one by RAND). HTTs are—by design—cross-functional teams comprised (usually) of an ex-military team leader, a senior social scientist with a doctorate in his or her 50s or 60s, a junior social scientist with a master's degree in his or her 30s or 40s, an Active-duty research manager, and a social network expert or “human terrain analyst.” Using the variables and insights from literature reviewed here could assist those trying to analyze and improve HTT performance.

Informing interagency education would be yet another contribution this research

might make. Draft legislation on “Interagency National Security Professional Education, Administration, and Development” released by former Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO) and Representative Geoff Davis (R-KY) on September 30, 2010, calls for significant improvements in the capacity of the U.S. national security system to produce people who are likely to be good members of interagency national security teams. With the historical record suggesting that interagency teams are capable of stellar but irregular performance, and with so many national security panels and commissions recommending interagency teams, it makes sense to study their performance in a disciplined manner and share those results through educational programs for participants on interagency teams. Such an interagency team curriculum could be offered at the National Defense University, perhaps through the College of International Security Affairs.

Social science has a great deal to contribute to interagency national security teams. The austerity climate that is almost certain to confront the U.S. national security system in the future will give even more impetus to the intelligent use of social science to increase effectiveness, decrease costs, and improve national security organizational performance. In fact, as Harvard professor Steven Kelman notes, it is odd that more effort is not made to exploit social science disciplines for national security benefit:

The U.S. Department of Defense is the largest organization in the U.S. government: Its budget (\$410 billion in 2006) is noticeably larger than sales of ExxonMobil (\$339.9 billion) and of Wal-Mart (\$315.7 billion), the world's two largest corporations by sales. . . . The Department of Defense has about 3.3 million employees

(2.6 million uniformed and 700,000 civilian), compared to 84,000 for ExxonMobil and 1.8 million for Wal-Mart. . . . Improving government performance is a topic worthy of significant research attention, yet dramatically insufficient scholarly firepower is directed at it.⁶⁴

We agree with Kelman that too little firepower is directed at extracting insights from social science.

However, as this article should make clear, translating work from academia into national security practice is not as simple as moving wheelbarrows of knowledge from one place to another. The team literature does not yet effectively distinguish among groups, teams, and cross-functional teams, and has not yet converged on a well-structured list of variables and team types. Thus it is difficult to extract maximum value from the rich literature base. Imposing some theoretical order on the literature would make it easier to find and apply insights, and in fact is a necessary prerequisite for cumulative knowledge in this field. Leonardo da Vinci was right when he asserted, “He who loves practice without theory is like the sailor who boards ship without a rudder and compass and never knows where he may cast.” Smoother sailing ahead for our interagency teams is only likely if we can provide them better means of direction constructed from disciplined social science research. **PRISM**

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Afghan boy, 1 of more than 13 million cell phone users in Afghanistan, shows phone to U.S. Marines in Khwaija Jama

The Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan

BY JAMES G. STAVRIDIS

Today, the Afghan people and the international community have an opportunity to secure large areas of terrain and population from the Taliban while simultaneously creating sufficient governance and security capacity in the Afghan government to enable them to take the lead in their own country. Above all, we can prevent the return of al Qaeda, the fundamental reason we are there.

Training and operations to create this environment are ongoing and meeting with a steady level of success. Although the war is far from over, positive trends are developing that demonstrate this approach is working and that the international community and the Afghan people

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are heading in the right direction. The best way to combine their efforts is to improve on the current level of cooperation between security forces, other government activities, and the rest of the actors involved, which can be called the *Comprehensive Approach*, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) term for bringing together all the elements of effort—political, economic, cultural, military, and so on.

The Comprehensive Approach

Warfare is an inherently political act. As such, it requires the participation of more than only security services. Indeed, because it is a political act, the entire society of the challenged state is involved. A solution requires a holistic approach, which combines security forces with other government entities and the rest of society to form a whole-of-society approach.

At the global level, the Comprehensive Approach is a point of view that articulates the links along the spectrum from security to humanitarianism, illustrates the most appropriate roles for soldiers and civilians in this complex arena, appropriately resources government agencies crucial for success in the military and humanitarian nexus, and searches for productive partnerships with allied governments and international organizations that share an interest in promoting security and prosperity around the world.

At the national level, as in Afghanistan, it is an approach that conceptualizes the interaction between security forces, the rest of government, and the rest of Afghan society. This approach involves the Afghans and the entire international community. The Comprehensive Approach seeks to achieve the highest possible degree of coordination, cooperation, and unity of effort from the different actors involved.

The current situation in Afghanistan stems from part of the global response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1378 was passed to support a new Afghan government, provide urgent humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the Afghan people, provide long-term assistance for the social and economic reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan, and ensure the safety and security of Afghanistan.

As a result of the Bonn Agreement in late 2001, the United Nations (UN) authorized the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. In December 2003, the North Atlantic Council authorized ISAF to expand its operations. By October 2006, ISAF expanded to cover the entire country.


Over time, troop levels increased in response to a stubborn insurgency, and more countries agreed to support operations. There are currently 49 countries on the ground in Afghanistan providing roughly 150,000 troops. From the beginning, most key international organizations have been involved.

As time went on, ISAF and the other participants realized this effort needed to be expanded to include the population of Afghanistan in addition to the Afghan security forces and government. Additionally, the international community realized this situation could not be addressed by military means alone, and so supporting governments deployed more civilians to Afghanistan.

Counterinsurgency

Although it is possible to defeat an insurgency through security means alone, it is highly challenging. As such, successful modern

Figure. Comprehensive Approach = Integrated Efforts of Afghans, the International Community, and the United States



counterinsurgency missions always involve an aspect of integrating at least the majority of a society. The Comprehensive Approach is the most recent manifestation of the idea of mobilizing the resources of an entire society to face these challenges.

Many contemporary authors have argued that most modern problems derive from a lack of stability in some states. Some developed democracies are able to handle internal frictions through the democratic process enabled by law enforcement. It is in the underdeveloped countries, primarily where the state has not yet overcome societal factions, where instability that breeds insurgency flourishes.

In a situation where the insurgency develops over time, a country may be able to quell the issue through internal means of improving governance and police forces, perhaps enabled by security assistance from abroad. In cases where there is no state to improve, where an insurgency suddenly explodes without warning, or an insurgency is triggered by external events such as an intervention, the situation is different. If there is no government, one must be formed. If there is no security, it must be provided.

In the case where there is no government or security, the first major part of counterinsurgency operations involves expanding security. Although providing security is difficult and challenging under these circumstances, it is often the simplest counterinsurgency task, and is one of the few tasks that is clearly the key responsibility of one group: security forces.

Security forces, both from the host nation as well as any international assisting forces, provide initial security by entering an area and determining the situation, often by physically facing any challengers. This could be as violent as the street-to-street fighting encountered in Baghdad during 2007 or as nonviolent as initial Kosovo Force entry into Kosovo in 1999.

At this point, other aspects of counterinsurgency should be addressed. Although some believe security forces must provide absolute security before development can begin, it is impossible to provide 100 percent security without development. Once the enemy forces are cleared, other actors become involved, including contact with local elites to attempt to co-opt them into supporting the government.

Someone has to hire the local young males in an attempt to diminish their desire to assist the insurgency, effectively draining the manpower pool available to the insurgents. If these men have a job, they are less likely to be bored

and they will not tend to be as bitter toward security forces that might be perceived as occupiers. This also provides a manpower pool that may be used to provide local security and

inject money into the local economy. When this occurs, local markets will reopen and prosperity will begin to return. If security forces or other government entities do not hire the local youths, they will likely take up arms for ideological reasons, for economic purposes, or out of boredom.

Once this stage is reached, operations shift from clearing to holding and building. In these phases, a government must be formed if one is not present, and the government must then provide the services that the people expect.

The government must be legitimate in the eyes of the people and provide a system of governance that is appropriate to the population involved. The rest of society becomes involved because they are the target of the insurgency and, by necessity, the counterinsurgency. The people in the area are participants whether they want to be or not. Although the majority of the general population tends to avoid supporting one side over the other as long as their basic needs are met, both the government and the opposition seek their support. The rest of the society that is located in previously pacified areas participates by providing support (via taxes, for example) to the government.

Other actors such as businesses participate in building the economy. The central government participates by mobilizing resources to assist the fight while simultaneously promulgating policies designed to maintain the support of the population in pacified areas and address grievances in insurgent areas. The whole of government of any assisting states is involved by not only providing security assistance, but also providing development assistance. They can also deploy civilians from government agencies who can assist with rule of law issues, help develop governance capabilities, and assist with

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building the political infrastructure and developing the host nation intelligence community.

The rest of the whole of society of the assisting states can also help, although this is difficult to achieve. Nongovernmental organizations and other groups can assist. As examples, political specialists from organizations such as the International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute can assist with grassroots democratization efforts, private medical organizations can send doctors to provide medical assistance or advice, and universities can come forward to help with the educational infrastructure or provide agricultural advice as part of public-private initiatives. They can also mobilize resources at home to send forward, such as medical and school supplies. They can also take people from the host nation out of the combat zone and give them the opportunity to learn from spending time with functioning political, legal, law enforcement, and agricultural or educational organizations, all in a safe atmosphere.

One major thing that assisting societies must keep in mind is that the challenged state is usually composed of cultures different from their own. This requires a deft touch and willingness to entertain different approaches that are appropriate for the problem at hand.

The whole of the international community is also an important player within a country that is beset with problems. The United Nations is the most obvious organization to provide assistance. Not only does the UN Security Council provide resolutions that legitimize international involvement while simultaneously delegitimizing the opposition, but it also creates organizations such as the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to coordinate operations on the ground. UNAMA has 23 field offices throughout

Afghanistan and mobilizes resources belonging to the 18 different UN organizations involved in Afghanistan. In 2006, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) assisted in the creation of district development plans in 138 districts in 14 provinces. These plans are updated annually and reflect the district, provincial, national, and international goals for the districts and provinces.

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The United Nations is only one such international organization operating in challenged countries. Other international organizations such as the World Bank and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) operate in a variety of countries. Some regional organizations are available as well, such as the Asian Development Bank, which operates in Afghanistan. The international community can also set up unique organizations to deal with individual countries, such as Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme, developed by the UNDP to assist with disbandment, demobilization, and reintegration.

In addition to international whole-of-government efforts, portions of the international whole of society are available as well. These organizations are self-chartered and self-organized, and are present throughout the world. Some of the more famous include Médecines Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), which provides medical assistance, and Reporters Without Borders, which works to ensure freedom of the press and security for reporters.

Thus, the pool of potential assistance is huge: security forces, national whole of government and national whole of society from the challenged state, government capabilities and the whole-of-society resources from assisting countries, international organizations, and the whole of international society.

the deployment of whole-of-government capabilities is difficult, even for countries that have a well-developed governmental capacity

Difficulties

Although the potential of the Comprehensive Approach is limited only by the desire to assist, in actuality it is difficult to mobilize, organize, and coordinate the activities of all these disparate actors. Even agreeing to a common purpose can be difficult to achieve, much less agreeing on where and how to do things.

Security forces tend to be the easiest to mobilize and deploy because they normally have the mandate as well as operations and logistical capability to do so. Within the challenged nation, however, security forces may be an issue. In some cases, there is almost no security force present, and sometimes they are part of the problem: they may be corrupt, participate in ethnic cleansing, or just be incompetent or afraid of the insurgents. Security forces from assisting nations may be easier to deploy, and more utilitarian once they arrive.

In some cases, they may only be needed as trainers, but sometimes external forces may need to deploy for training, advising, and combat missions. Although most states will not deploy to other countries, there are several

countries that will deploy to assist challenged states if it is in their interest. Legitimization in the form of a UNSCR, internal political debate, and collective decisions can make it much easier for countries to participate. Once countries decide on deployment of forces to combat and training, an agreement must be developed between the host nation and assisting nation(s). This arrangement will determine the way ahead on the ground in the assisted nation. These relationships will change over time as the situation develops and as the host nation capacity grows.

The deployment of whole-of-government capabilities is difficult, even for countries that have a well-developed governmental capacity. Many governmental organizations are used to a more benign security atmosphere than is currently present in countries such as Afghanistan. Several require freedom of movement in order to do their jobs. In places with limits on movement, this impedes their capability to perform their missions.

The deployment of the whole of society is even more challenging. Many elements of society outside of the government balk at the concept of “deploying.” Many would be reluctant to be seen affiliating with a governmental organization, especially the military. These organizations tend to have a tradition of free-thinking and self-motivation that they see as incompatible with subordinating themselves to government-led organizations. Where a security force sees cooperation, a volunteer organization may see subordination to the security services, and by extension support for policies in which they may or may not believe.

International capabilities are also problematic. After the bombing of the UN Assistance Mission to Iraq, the UN circumscribed its activities because of deteriorating

security conditions. Other international organizations such as the ICRC will operate in austere conditions; however, there must be an acceptable level of security for them to operate fully. During deteriorated security conditions, these organizations may travel to an area while working through trusted intermediaries or their own local employees.

Working with international whole-of-society groups can be even more difficult. Many international organizations and individuals can have a different point of view from the perspectives of security forces and government actors. Several of these groups believe that their freedom to move around in a zone of conflict rests on their perceived neutrality, and that any cooperation with governmental efforts will cause opposition groups to perceive them as no longer neutral, and subsequently target them.

When differences can be overcome, complementary capabilities provide what the challenged country does not have so it can make appropriate changes and produce a state that governs well, provides security, rule of law, and economic opportunity, and addresses the needs of all its population. Although difficult to achieve, this has worked in the past and can work again in the future. The Comprehensive Approach is never perfect; it is an ongoing effort, requiring dialogue among all of the actors in order to have the appropriate capacity at the right time. When it works, it works well.

Afghanistan

The Comprehensive Approach is ongoing in Afghanistan. Although it has proceeded by fits and starts, it has matured over the years and is functioning at a higher level now. As the conflict has changed over the years, more actors

are involved, bringing more capabilities to the effort. The situation has stabilized and is changing for the better.

Success in counterinsurgency requires the people to support a legitimate government and to resolve disagreements through agreed-upon mechanisms that are inclusive, transparent, and equitable.

Government legitimacy is fundamental because it derives from the population of all regions and protects all ethnic groups, ensuring minority rights rather than indulging in the tyranny of the majority. If the people do not believe the government represents their best interests, they will not support it. When enough of the people stop supporting the government, it loses the war.

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Over the last 15 months, this drive for legitimacy has been manifested by two nationwide elections. Afghanistan had a presidential election in 2009 and a parliamentary election in September 2010. National and international organizations participated in making these elections an arguable success. The Afghan people were represented in this process by both the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission. The United Nations also is deeply involved in the system. The Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA) is an organization established by a number of civil society organizations to monitor elections to ensure that they are free and fair, promote democracy, promote

public participation in electoral affairs, and help consolidate public trust and faith in democracy and elections. It has observed elections since October 2004, providing assistance on the ground as well as transparency to the electoral process by publishing reports. FEFA lists 24 different partners from Afghanistan and the rest of the world and is supported by the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, and Canada, as well as the Asia Foundation and the AIHRC.

Although there were reports of low voter turnout, ballot stuffing, intimidation, and other electoral fraud, the fact that there were two elections planned and completed in Afghanistan is a success in itself and shows

if the government does not protect the people, they have no reason to support the government

that the Afghan people and government support the idea of elections to select their government. The system continues to seek improvement. In the most recent elections, some 40 percent of those eligible voted in spite of a Taliban call for a boycott of the election and 309 Taliban attacks in 17 of the 34 provinces on election day. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) largely prevented these and other attacks from succeeding. Although 11 Afghan civilians and 3 police were killed during the September 18, 2010, parliamentary elections, this was in contrast to the 2009 elections where 479 attacks killed 31 civilians, 18 Afghan police, and 8 Afghan soldiers.

Another prerequisite for success is for the government to secure the population. If the

government does not protect the people, they have no reason to support the government. The ANSF are at the forefront of this struggle, with ISAF playing a vital role in training the ANSF and supporting their efforts in the field. A very dangerous job in Afghanistan is to be a Taliban “shadow governor” of a province. Between mid-June and mid-September 2010, ISAF and ANSF special operations forces conducted 4,000 precision targeted raids, resulting in the death or capture of 235 Taliban leaders and 2,600 enemy fighters. The insurgents’ responses have resulted in costly defeats.

The ANSF are the key to sustainable success against the insurgents. Although there have been ups and downs over the years, current trends for the ANSF are reasonably positive.

For ANSF to take the lead in security operations, it must be fully manned and trained. The NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan is supported by 29 different nations and has been the single greatest driver of this ANSF growth and improved quality. We are training the future of Afghan security, which will ultimately enable transition to self-sustaining indigenous security, stability, and progressive governance and development. The equation is stark: if we do not commit now to providing what is required on the ground, we place the future of our Afghan partners in jeopardy.

ANSF end strength at the end of the year was 260,000 personnel—5,000 higher than the target. The Afghan National Army reached its 134,000 goal 3 months early, having integrated 39,000 troops since November 2009. The Afghan National Army Air Force has also grown, increasing from 42 to 52 aircraft since November 2009. The Afghan National Police (ANP) has also reached its 2010 goal of 109,000 police 3 months early, adding 21,000 since November 2009. The ANP is also creating

units of the Afghan Civil Order Police who have capabilities similar to those of European Gendarmerie Corps, and who have rapidly won the confidence of ordinary people by their professionalism. To help the population protect themselves, President Hamid Karzai signed a decree on August 16, 2010, establishing the Afghan Local Police.

Good governance has always been problematic in Afghanistan. The country has rarely had a central government that controlled its entire territory, rule of law rarely protected the population, and the economy was destroyed by decades of violence. The anti-education and anti-female policies of the Taliban prevented Afghanistan from developing the potential of its human capital and made it difficult for Afghans to have a vision for a better way of life.

The United Nations Development Programme is addressing this need by advising the Afghan parliament and the civil service to improve their professionalism and efficiency. They also support provincial, district, and municipal administrations to improve service delivery by reforming organizational structures, streamlining management processes, and developing essential skills and knowledge of civil servants. In addition to the UN, a variety of national development agencies are assisting the three levels of Afghan government to significantly improve its ability to govern competently.

Although Afghanistan's economy was destroyed during decades of war, the economic future looks comparatively bright. An expanding economy is vital to the long-term health of the country. Sixty-three percent of Afghans believe their economic situation is better than it was 5 years ago. Although starting from a low point, last year the gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 22.5

percent, while growth in 2010 is projected to be 8 percent.

Because agriculture accounts for 45 percent of Afghan GDP and employs 70 to 80 percent of the population, a variety of actors work with the Afghan people to rebuild their agricultural capability. Development agencies cooperate with farmers, providing advice to improve and modernize their techniques as well as rebuilding shattered agricultural infrastructure. ISAF supports these efforts with several programs such as the Agribusiness Development Teams, where a variety of actors come together to bring agricultural expertise into communities in Afghanistan. As a result, Afghanistan had a 53 percent growth in its agriculture sector and a 50 percent growth in wheat yield in 2009.

Afghanistan also enjoyed a 30 percent growth in mining and a 53 percent growth in collected domestic revenues in 2009. The Ministry of Minerals and Afghanistan Geological Survey work closely with the British and U.S. Geologic Surveys and a variety of

sixty-three percent of Afghans believe their economic situation is better than it was 5 years ago

development agencies to tap into the estimated \$1 to 3 trillion worth of minerals located under Afghan soil. Another economic indicator was the over 13 million cell phone subscribers in Afghanistan as of March 2010. All this economic activity is improving the lives of some of the population.

Efforts to support the rule of law progress as well. Rule of law advisors are embedded in NATO units, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and offices of the Afghan government.

These experts assist the Afghans in revamping the entire legal structure while retaining the nature of Afghan culture, empowering local leaders while countering Taliban efforts to spread the influence of their “night courts.” International actors have developed a training program that prepares Afghan authorities to

the Afghan government and its international partners are taking steps either to eliminate corruption or mitigate its effects

take control of all prisons while the first trials of detainees in Afghan courts began in June 2010. With outside assistance, the Afghans now lead the Major Crimes Task Force and Sensitive Intelligence Unit, which combat corruption, drug-trafficking, and kidnapping. They act on arrest warrants endorsed by the Attorney General and Afghan judges, ensuring their efforts are in accord with Afghan legal norms, rules, and regulations.

One of the most well known problems in Afghanistan is corruption, and pervasive corruption prevents efforts for improvement. But today the Afghan government and its international partners are taking steps either to eliminate corruption or mitigate its effects. Recent violence, the repeated destruction of governments, economic collapse, and large-scale narcotics cultivation have caused corruption to spike. Graft in the ANSF includes predatory behavior against soldiers and the people as well as selling assets provided by the government such as fuel, food, ammunition, and equipment. Some corruption is a natural outgrowth of the billions of assistance dollars that flowed into an underdeveloped system.

Many different actors are modifying their practices to minimize corruption while other organizations have launched investigations. ISAF has placed Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, who has successfully adopted innovative techniques in the past, in charge of all ISAF anticorruption efforts. They have developed the anticorruption Combined Joint Interagency Task Force, which will help enable *shafaf* (transparency), and have already announced a new set of rules designed to combat corruption perpetrated by contractors. Additionally, as the largest contributor of aid, the United States is rewriting the rules for contracting and foreign assistance money to ensure that it does not fuel corruption.

The UN is also advising the government on reforming anticorruption legislation to conform to the UN Convention Against Corruption. In response to all of these international actions, President Karzai announced Afghanistan’s own program to stamp out corruption. The Afghan president told reporters that his government will fight corruption, but that it must be done in accordance with Afghan law. He has also backed up his words with actions, recently approving the removal of the Deputy Minister of the Interior, the most senior government official sanctioned so far for corruption.

Efforts continue to move forward in countering narcotics as well. Poppy cultivation has decreased by 35 percent over the past 2 years. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 20 of 34 provinces are currently poppy-free. The Drug Enforcement Administration states that there has been a threefold increase in the number of drug smugglers incarcerated in Afghanistan this year.

Education is important to the future of any country. Afghanistan will need to invest in its human capital in order to achieve long-term

stability. Both the government of Afghanistan and the various groups assisting it have been able to improve the literacy rate in young Afghans to 34 percent and have enrolled 7 million children in school, of whom nearly 3 million are girls. These gains are in spite of the Taliban aggressively attacking efforts to educate future Afghan leaders.

The collective efforts of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, international community, and ISAF to provide security and good governance have helped the Afghan people believe in their government. Polls indicate that 59 percent of Afghans have confidence that their country is moving in the right direction. Seventy percent of Afghans supported the presence of international forces, which indicates that Afghans understand that international forces are not those of an empire seeking to conquer and occupy Afghanistan, but a UN-mandated multinational operation designed to support their national goals and ambitions. The Afghan government also has the support of the majority of Afghans: 55 percent of Afghans believe their government is successful while the ANSF earned a 75 percent approval rating among Afghans. This compares very favorably with the Taliban popularity rate below 8 percent.

The Afghan government, people of Afghanistan, and various actors that support them are continuing to plan and fight for the future. On September 4, 2010, President Karzai created the High Peace Council, designed as a negotiating body made up of representatives of a broad section of society, to initiate a discussion with the Taliban. President Karzai's office stated that the formation of the High Peace Council was "a significant step towards peace talks."

President Karzai previously offered a list of conditions that Taliban fighters must meet

to be a part of Afghanistan's future: accept the constitution, lay down their weapons, sever ties to al Qaeda, and become productive or participating members of society. Reconciliation can be achieved only if it is negotiated from a position of strength. History shows that if the opposition does not feel pressured, they will negotiate to buy time and try to improve their situation. They will only negotiate in good faith if they understand that the price of fighting is greater than that of a negotiated agreement. The surge and

Afghanistan will need to invest in its human capital in order to achieve long-term stability

the continued commitment of the nations whose forces are deployed to Afghanistan will provide that motivation.

All of these gains alone cannot guarantee success. They do provide a strong base from which to launch efforts that will lead to success. The Afghan people seem to want a solution and are working toward that end. Members of the international community are announcing that they will not be departing Afghanistan but will transition to training and advisory roles as the ANSF take the lead. The international community is continuing to work to build capacity in the Afghan government while continuing to cooperate in improving the lot of the Afghan people. The future involves many steps, with many groups working together as part of the Comprehensive Approach to continue development work in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The Comprehensive Approach is not a new idea. Counterinsurgency has always required a

holistic approach. With the arrival of new actors on the national and international stage, we need a new concept of how to integrate the efforts of the old and new actors. The Comprehensive Approach gives us that way of looking at things, of coordinating planning, and of aligning efforts and mobilizing the resources that the local, national, and global communities have to offer.

Make no mistake—this is a huge challenge, but we will be able to defeat the opposition if we maintain our resolve and work together to become stronger. Soon we will reach the point where we can safely modify and reduce our combat support to the Afghan government while it takes the lead in this fight. Historically, spikes in violence during an insurgency tend to mark the beginning of the end.

This is the time to maintain resolve, as was done in Malaya in the late 1950s, in the Balkans and Colombia in the late 1990s, and Iraq in the 2005–2007 timeframe. Though violence may not be completely eliminated in the short term, it can be reduced to manageable levels. We must sustain our own resolve to achieve this, and to deliver the success in Afghanistan that is within our grasp. **PRISM**

Conflict Prevention in East Africa

The Indirect Approach

BY BRIAN L. LOSEY

*Helping other countries better provide for their own security will be a key and enduring test of U.S. global leadership and a critical part of protecting U.S. security, as well. Improving the way the U.S. government executes this vital mission must be an important national priority.*¹

—Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

The United States Central Command established the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA) as part of the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In December 2002, the task force deployed to the Gulf of Aden aboard the USS *Mount Whitney*. Its mission was to counter terrorists linked to al Qaeda in Afghanistan during the initial stages of Operation *Enduring Freedom*. In May 2003, the task force moved ashore to Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, to conduct counterterrorist operations throughout the East Africa region.² Over time, and spurred by the formation of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in October 2008, the task force’s efforts have evolved into one of persistent engagement focused on building partner nation capacity in order to promote regional stability and prevent conflict.

The indirect approach used by CJTF–HOA is aimed at increasing the security capacity of partner militaries through military-to-military and civil-military engagements. These engagements enable our partners to bolster security and generate trust and confidence in populations impacted by instability and vulnerable to the influences of violent extremism. This article explains how and why, through persistent engagement, the task force conducts security-focused operations and activities that are in line with diplomatic and development initiatives in support of U.S. and partner nation objectives in the region.

The evolving whole-of-government approach in East Africa (otherwise known as the 3D approach—diplomacy, development, and defense) represents a “new and more effective means

Rear Admiral Brian L. Losey, USN, is Commander of Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa.

of applying the skills of our military, diplomats, and development experts”³ as directed in the 2010 National Security Strategy. Collaboration, coordination, and cooperation with key leaders, to include the Ambassador, Embassy staff, and host nation military counterparts, help align the military-to-military and civil-military operations (CMO) to support attainment of objectives. These measures “help us diminish military risk, act before crises and conflicts erupt, and ensure that governments are better able to serve their people.”⁴ Operating under USAFRICOM, the task force serves as one of the defense components supporting this approach. In some cases, engagements with East African partners are evolving beyond a whole-of-government approach to a more Comprehensive Approach where these engagements complement the capabilities and capacities of our allies, coalition partners, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations.⁵

developing education, health care, and security helps to mitigate the root conditions that contribute to instability

The whole-of-government emphasis fosters transparency, accountability, and rule of law—in other words, *it builds governance*. Developing education, health care, and security helps to mitigate the root conditions that contribute to instability. The CJTF-HOA mission to prevent conflict is aligned with mutual interests in stability shared by the United States and partner nations. U.S. military partnerships and engagements not only build security capacity, but also promote military obedience to civil authority, human

rights awareness, and standards of conduct, which are translated into African Union and other regional security initiatives. Building partner nation civil-military capacity, in addition to meeting basic human needs, generates trust and confidence among vulnerable populations and the military, helps to create important connective tissue between the host nation government and its citizens, and reinforces mutual support between the citizen and the state.

Background

The CJTF-HOA area of operations presents challenges and opportunities that are both complex and dynamic. This diverse area encompasses 18 sovereign nations that cover a land mass roughly the size of the continental United States.⁶ Aside from limited infrastructure, multiple factors contribute to the potential for conflict and threats to stability and security in the region: poverty, drought, food and water insecurity, corruption, porous borders, constrained resources, and ethnic, tribal, religious, and political tensions. Undergoverned spaces provide sanctuaries that foster violent extremism, piracy, and trafficking of humans, weapons, drugs, and other contraband.⁷

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait lies between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. It is a 20-mile-wide strategic chokepoint through which 11 percent of the world’s maritime commerce passes.⁸ To the northeast lies Yemen, where security, economic, and social challenges have made the country a fertile breeding ground for violent extremism. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has demonstrated that it is a threat to Yemen, the region, the United States, and its allies. The inability to secure the borders of Yemen enables violent

Uganda Peoples Defense Force and CJTF-HOA members practice a modified litter carry during basic lifesaving skills course



CJTF-HOA

extremists, criminals, and contraband to flow in and out of East Africa using the historical smuggling routes across the Gulf of Aden.

Somalia has been mired in chronic violence and chaos for nearly two decades. This failed state poses a significant threat to regional and international security by providing a safe haven for violent extremists. Al-Shabaab (The Youth) militia remains the principal security threat to the internationally supported Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Key al-Shabaab leaders have publicly aligned themselves with al Qaeda and operate multiple terrorist training camps in Somalia with al Qaeda's direct support and participation.⁹ International efforts to restore a functioning government through the TFG are bolstered by the presence of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) led by Ugandan and Burundian troops, but not without costs. In a single incident that occurred in July 2010, 73 people were killed and hundreds more injured in a series of bomb attacks in Kampala, Uganda. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attacks, which they announced was a response to Uganda's support of the AMISOM mission.

Several other areas of ongoing or potential conflict pose challenges to security and stability in the region, to include:

- ❖ In Sudan, the Darfur region is insecure and tensions in Southern Sudan may escalate into violence following the independence referenda in 2011. Internally displaced persons and refugees fleeing from the conflict have the potential to impact the stability of Sudan

and neighboring countries, particularly western Ethiopia, northern Uganda, and the Turkana region of Kenya.¹⁰

- ❖ The government of Eritrea has problematic relations with both the African Union and the West. It has played a disruptive role in regional affairs through recent armed conflict and ongoing tensions with neighbors Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti, and by providing arms and support to forces opposing the TFG in Somalia and to the Ogaden National Liberation Front in Ethiopia.¹¹

along the Swahili coast of Kenya and Tanzania, minority Muslim populations are vulnerable to the influence of violent extremism

- ❖ Uganda faces challenges to its disarmament campaign in the volatile northeast region, where cattle raiding and violence are still common issues plaguing stability. Additionally, the Lord's Resistance Army continues to impact stability in northern Uganda, northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic.¹²
- ❖ The region's porous borders and internal demographic pressures combined with large internally displaced and refugee populations present additional challenges to partner nations.¹³ Along the Swahili coast of Kenya and Tanzania, minority Muslim populations are vulnerable to the influence of

violent extremism given their proximity to extremist influences emanating from Somalia and traditional smuggling routes.¹⁴

A few of many positive features include the vision, energy, and commitment of leaders and citizens in the region, rich natural resources, along with investments and infrastructure projects such as the proposed Lamu, Kenya, port and associated road, pipeline, and rail links. All have the potential to enable African prosperity and stability. Promising engagement opportunities are resident in supporting the development of regional partner capacities to secure and sustain these infrastructure investments.

Concept of Engagement

The CJTF-HOA mission is “to build partner nation capacity in order to promote regional security and stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. and Coalition interests.”¹⁵ This approach, achieved through long-term commitment and engagement, exemplifies the indirect approach to enhancing regional stability by enabling partner nations and regional security organizations to more effectively address East African security challenges. The indirect approach used emphasizes two principal types of engagements. The first is by implementing professional military-to-military training focused on providing basic soldiering skills that can be employed in direct support of regional security initiatives. The second is partnered civil-military operations, which meet basic human needs and build trust and confidence between the military and vulnerable populations.

Military-to-military engagements occur throughout the area of operations and generate security capacities that can positively influence areas of instability. These engagements

generally occur under Title 22 authorities, primarily under the Department of State–led African Contingency Operations and Assistance (ACOTA) program.¹⁶ Other military-to-military activities include (but are not limited to) traveling contact teams and functional engagements, such as intelligence, logistics, and Public Affairs training authorized under Title 10.¹⁷ Ongoing task force efforts include support provided to a broad spectrum of training and the collaboration of best practices relevant to peace support operations, with a higher level of focus and support to those forces that deploy to the AMISOM and the United Nations Mission in Darfur. Over the last 4 years, 89 traditional military capacity-building engagements were conducted. These events involved nearly 4,000 man-days contact training and imparted knowledge and skills to over 7,000 African military servicemembers.

Civil-military engagements and projects are dispersed along an arc-shaped area that roughly shadows the Somali border area, to include the western reaches of Ogaden Region in Ethiopia, and extends from Tanga, Tanzania, on the Swahili coast across eastern Kenya, Ethiopia, and north of Djibouti. This arc generally defines the forward edge of violent extremist influence in the East Africa region. Engagements with partners along this arc focus on meeting basic human needs and on providing essential services through development projects that build trust and confidence between the host nation government, military, and populations vulnerable to the influence of extremist groups and their ideology. Over the last 4 years, sustained commitment has delivered the new construction of, refurbishment of, or additions to 148 schools, 83 medical clinics, and 66 essential service projects (water wells, cisterns, water catchment systems, medical waste incinerators, and other infrastructure), and multiple veterinary and medical

Civil Affairs (CA) program engagements. Each of these engagements employs small, but scalable teams that operate in a geographic area the size of the United States. The distributed and extended nature of many of these engagements requires unique training, logistics, and operational support, and most important, the extra measure of experience and maturity to operate independently in uncertain environments. In many areas, the teams have generated positive civil-military relations and built trust and confidence. By meeting basic human needs, they help to mitigate instability and catalysts that provide a footing for extremist groups.

In April 2010, the government of Kenya and Lamu West community, supported by CJTF–HOA U.S. Navy Maritime Civil Affairs

by meeting basic human needs, they help to mitigate instability and catalysts that provide a footing for extremist groups

Team (MCAT) and the Kenya Country Team, launched a Community Watch on the Water (CWOW) program. The CWOW integrates local government officials, local community, and Kenyan Defense Force in a joint initiative to improve the level of maritime security, report suspected criminal activities or injuries on the water, and expedite response times to incidents. The program has helped foster a community awareness campaign that builds security capacity within the local community. Additional CWOW programs have also been initiated in Malindi, Tana Delta, and the Lamu East Districts of Kenya, covering a key stretch of the Swahili Coast. In this potentially vulnerable area, acts of piracy (supported from motherships at sea) are increasing, but will find difficulty in securing

footing for shore-based support. Active engagement and leadership from the Deputy Chief of Mission in the 3D process have enabled the carefully measured growth and Kenyan Defense Force partnership in this effort.

Other civil-military operations outside of the arc are conducted at the direction of USAFRICOM or at the request of Country Teams to support U.S. Government initiatives. In the aftermath of Kenya's December 2007 to January 2008 post-election violence, where more than 1,000 people died and over 300,000 were displaced, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya requested the task force support a series of school rehabilitation projects in the Greater Rift Valley, an area then reeling from the significant trauma of post-election violence. The subsequent 14 school rehabilitation projects conducted over a 2-year period represent an application of CMO in a tense environment where the population had security concerns, both personal and in the ability of the government to respond to another civil crisis. The intercommunity dialogue, which resulted from the population's involvement in the series of projects, contributed to returning stability in the Greater Rift Valley before, during, and after the Kenyan constitutional referendum of 2010.

3D Coordination

As part of the whole-of-government approach, CJTF-HOA closely collaborates with each Country Team and partner military to coordinate its activities. There is no single template that can be used for this coordination process as the dynamics of the Country Team, the host nation, and their objectives vary considerably. Task force projects and engagements must be vetted through the 3D process with the Country Team, which in turn coordinates with host nation government ministries. This ensures

that activities are arranged in time, space, and purpose to achieve shared goals that support the Mission Strategic Resource Plan, USAFRICOM theater strategic objectives, and host nation objectives from inception through execution. The principal responsibility and authority for these whole-of-government efforts, particularly when used in conflict prevention, lie with the Ambassador. During execution, the same close collaboration is maintained. The population in the area of operations must also be included in the process. The key indicator of successful collaboration and cooperation is a positive reflection from all equity holders on the effects of the project or engagement.

The 3D process should guarantee long-term sustainability of projects and activities through other agencies and the departments or ministries of partner nations. Sustainability is a shared responsibility, not one that can be carried by a single U.S. Government department or agency. Task Force project funding authorities enable the construction, refurbishment, or additions to a school or clinic. However, without desks, books, consumables, credentialed teachers, medical supplies, or clinicians, projects will neither succeed nor be sustainable. The formal 3D coordination process highlights those areas in which Country Team coordination with host nation ministries is essential for achieving long-term sustainability. Three D project coordination is best when projects are constructed with quality, the partner nation military or local contractors are involved, and the project is outfitted with essential staffing, equipment, and supplies as coordinated between governments, and finally, is sustained by the partner nation.

In Djibouti, the leadership and commitment of the Ambassador and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion and Army CA team members celebrate with locals on completion of new well



CJTF-HOA

director in bringing school, clinic, and essential services projects, supported by the task force Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (Seabees) and Army CA teams, have precipitated collaborative military-to-military engagements with the Djiboutian Armed Forces on both national and regional security issues, and are reflected in an increased demand for training to build military capacity and deploy forces in support of AMISOM. The task force supported a substantial increase in State Department ACOTA training programs in the fall and winter of 2010 and into 2011. Djiboutian leadership roles in the East Africa Standby Force and as a facilitator for diplomatic initiatives such as the Djiboutian Accords are additional positive indications of advancement under the whole-of-government approach.

Lines of Operation

CJTF-HOA conducts a range of engagements that fall under several broad areas: military-to-military engagements, CMO, strategic communication, functional engagement (for example, intelligence, logistics, communications support, and public affairs), and key leader engagements.

Military-to-Military Engagements. Military-to-military engagements utilize small, scalable units that integrate experienced subject matter experts in a variety of military training and familiarization events. In addition to increasing the security capacity of partner nation military and regional security organizations, these engagements foster the development of strong professional relationships founded on mutual respect. The benefits of military-to-military engagements flow both ways; U.S. Servicemembers have the opportunity to learn valuable skills and tactics from partner forces while they gain a better understanding of complex operating environments.¹⁸

ACOTA, the task force, and Marine Forces Africa¹⁹ teams work together continuously to refine and enhance each program of instruction. Specific engagement areas over the past year include collateral damage and casualty avoidance, riot control, countering improvised explosive devices, force protection, casualty care, logistics, and tactical operations center best practices. In late 2010, a senior commander

“when the U.S. goes somewhere and stays, it works out well for that country—look at Germany and Japan”

from a troop-contributing country explained that he conducted a survey of the troops who recently returned from Somalia, and “they overwhelmingly stated that the training they had received from the ACOTA training prepared them for Mogadishu.” In addition, the ACOTA program manager has pointed out that “since 2004, the task force has continuously supported ACOTA training, providing essential technical and tactical reinforcement for the ACOTA curriculum while lending an invaluable presence of ‘role-model’ military professionalism.”²⁰

From June to July 2010, CJTF-HOA supported an ACOTA-led command and staff training and confirmation exercise at the International Peace Support Training Centre in Karen, Kenya, an African regional training center of excellence. The task force mentors were able to provide relevant staff and operational experience to the new staff of the East African Standby Force designed to assist in their preparation for multinational peace support operations in Africa. Interactive discussions based on a wide range of experiences helped to foster cohesion and the exchange of ideas between professional officers at a more personal level.

During an overheard discussion between a Kenyan, Burundian, and Ugandan officer speaking on the pros and cons of long-term U.S. involvement in the region, the Kenyan commented, “When the U.S. goes somewhere and stays, it works out well for that country—look at Germany and Japan.”

The demand for military-to-military engagements has been steadily increasing as partner militaries seek additional training and security capacity. The growth in missions has been especially evident in fiscal year 2011, where scheduled engagements for the first two quarters have already exceeded the totals from any single year since 2002. With the use of subject matter experts from across the Services and a “train-the-trainer” approach, the task force enables partners to generate their own capacity. With ACOTA, Ugandan, Rwandan, and Burundian defense forces have each developed trainers who support capacity-building within their forces.

Civil-Military Operations. Task force CMO and host nation CMO counterparts build trust and confidence with populations vulnerable to violent extremist influences by providing essential services and meeting basic human needs. The focus is typically on low cost, smaller infrastructure projects that are partnership intensive and aimed at building capacity through locally sustainable projects. CMO military-to-military partnerships also build partner nation capacity to conduct CMO.

Within East Africa, task force CMO elements face the following unique conditions:

- ❖ CMO is conducted as a main effort and follows an independent line of operation vice the traditional supporting role normally conducted under a local area commander.

- ❖ Teams are small, operating over large geographic areas (joint distributed operations).
- ❖ Operating locations are generally in rural areas and uncertain environments, with complex language, culture, and tribal dynamics that can serve as common obstacles. These areas are chosen based on their susceptibility to violent extremist influence and are subject to rapidly changing conditions.
- ❖ Engagements are aimed at activities and projects that enhance stability. Operations and projects are coordinated via the 3D process, and reinforced with strategic communications.

Given these complex conditions, task force CMO elements must build and maintain an in-depth understanding of the environment and continually look for ways to increase local stability and security. The most effective teams tend to be mature with excellent interpersonal skills, which are critical when working independently with host nation minority or vulnerable populations. CMO engagements and projects are most effective when the local community is actively engaged. Locally contracted support in the form of skilled and unskilled workers for projects, as well as drivers and interpreters who are often attached to teams for an extended period of time, is a key enabler in connecting the team with the community while also helping to stimulate the local economy.

Whenever possible, CJTF-HOA works hand-in-hand with partner nation CMO elements to emphasize the train-the-trainer approach. An example of this approach is the Navy MCAT in Tanzania. Located in an area of increasing piracy and vulnerability to violent

extremist influence on the Swahili coast, the team conducted basic lifesaving (BLS) training to 110 security personnel over a 3-month period on Pemba Island in the summer of 2010. Following the final class, the MCAT conducted train-the-trainer BLS courses at the regional medical facility on Pemba Island. The local population and Country Team were engaged throughout the process, helping to create shared ownership. As of November 2010, the program has become self-sustaining and used by local clinic staffs to train their own medical personnel.

From May to September 2010, the task force's functional specialty and CA teams partnered with the Uganda Peoples Defense Force (UPDF), Uganda District Veterinary Officers, and local animal health NGOs to provide a

uncertain environments with complex language, culture, and tribal dynamics can serve as common obstacles

two-phased Veterinary Civic Action Project (VETCAP) in the Karamoja Region of Uganda. The project included training to UPDF Civil-Military Coordination Centers while enhancing Community Animal Health Worker (CAHW) capacity by supplying equipment, medicine, and training in sustainment of veterinary services. The VETCAP provided classrooms, practical hands-on training, and certification to 110 CAHWs, and treated over 44,000 animals in the process. The VETCAP focused on disease vector control and selective breeding as measures to enable the Karamojong to more effectively expand their herds to reduce rustling and associated violence. Throughout the mission, U.S. forces observed improved trust and confidence, as well as increased cooperation between

the UPDF leadership, local village elders, and NGOs. They also observed a transfer of knowledge and capacity to the Ugandan participants. Task force members who began the mission as trainers transitioned into partner mentors, and ultimately, into observers.

The highest form of engagement builds enduring capacity largely reflected by the following three indicators:

- ❖ Partners are able to generate their own security and CMO capacity through the train-the-trainer approach.
- ❖ Regional partners organically sustain U.S. Government–sponsored projects (schools, clinics, wells, and other infrastructure).
- ❖ Partner militaries use expanded capacities to directly support or participate in regional security initiatives.

task force members who began the mission as trainers transitioned into partner mentors, and ultimately, into observers

Strategic Communication. Strategic communication is key to generating understanding and support of activities in a distributed operations environment. The process of getting the message out occurs continuously throughout the engagement cycle, with the goal of setting conditions prior to the engagement, creating effects during the engagement, and reflecting effects upon completion of the engagement. These three temporal categories make up one axis of an effects-based, collaborative “3×3” external communication matrix, with the other axis referring to the means of delivery. At the

first level, the task force uses public, proprietary, and USAFRICOM means (traditional media, organizational Web site, and social media). The next level seeks to coordinate integration of team public diplomacy capabilities as appropriate. Finally, at the highest level, the partner nation generates its own coverage through local outlets and public affairs representatives, which can be enabled by interactions with task force public affairs personnel.

To optimize effective and accurate communications reflecting partnering objectives, the task force conducts formalized strategic communication training for all teams and individuals who will be working with partner militaries or populations. Operating under the idea that every member on the team is a communicator, the training pulls together the expertise of the task force staff, the Socio-Cultural Research and Advisory Team (SCRAT), Public Affairs office, and coalition officers assigned to the task force to ensure that actions and words are aligned and reflect the mutual interests and objectives of all participants.

Functional Engagements. Military-to-military engagements in functional areas such as intelligence; logistics; information and command, control, communications, and computers systems; and Public Affairs enable the task force to build capacity through exchanging ideas and best practices with our partner militaries. An example of this type of engagement was the participation by CJTF–HOA Staff Judge Advocate personnel in a regional seminar held at the Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff College in April 2010. A multinational audience of 42 students, comprised of field grade to general officers, participated in courses that revolved around law of war, operational law, and rules of engagement.

Key Leader Engagements. An integral part of building enduring partnerships is the

interaction between the task force and decisionmakers within our partner nations' militaries, governments, and religious organizations. These engagements establish personal relationships that support a common understanding of the environment, areas of mutual concern, and opportunities for future cooperation. The task force's commander, his deputy, and senior staff, to include the Foreign Policy Advisor and Unified Action Advisor (both seasoned State Department officials), engage with senior government and partner nation officials in ways that create opportunities to mature partnerships and deepen capacity-building effects. In July 2010, the aircraft carriers USS *Eisenhower* and USS *Truman* supported two engagements that enabled over 45 ambassadors, chiefs of defense, chiefs of services, and key officials from throughout the East Africa region to embark, participate in discussions, and view military operations and an airpower demonstration at sea. These engagements pay dividends in fostering relationships that continue to enable cooperation and capacity-building in the region.

Coalition Integration. Coalition officers play a vital role in carrying out the overall strategic objectives of the task force. On average, there are 20 coalition officers from across 12 nations assigned. They are integrated into the various staff sections to help develop and execute engagement concepts.²¹ Their perspectives and experiences enhance the task force's cultural awareness and understanding of the political, social, religious, and economic contexts for issues in East Africa.

Measuring Impact

The very nature of an indirect, population-centric approach to foster enabling stability through CMO and humanitarian assistance activities makes determining whether a specific

activity achieved a tactical or strategic objective, rather than being correlated with its occurrence—a very tall order.²² Assessing how individual and aggregated engagements have achieved security

the assessment process catalogues lessons learned and supports the evolution of engagement practices through cumulative qualitative and quantitative indicators

interests is one of the task force's top priorities. CJTF-HOA continues to refine and mature an assessment process that analyzes the effectiveness and impact of engagements while helping to provide feedback that informs decisions on the placement, nature, and timing of future engagements. The assessment process also catalogues lessons learned and supports the evolution of engagement practices through cumulative qualitative and quantitative indicators. These indicators are reflected in daily reporting, postmission after-action reporting, focused studies by SCRAT, and various databases populated by task force members, to include Tactical Ground Reporting and Joint Civil Information Management System. The commander's emphasis on assessment helps to provide feedback on how well each of the Country Teams' objectives, host nation objectives, and USAFRICOM's theater strategic objectives has been met. Phase zero conflict prevention activities do not yet lend themselves to metrics that can conclusively demonstrate their success "beyond a reasonable doubt." However, with the increasing density of reports and data points, a slightly lower, but still meaningful standard of "the preponderance of the evidence" can be achieved.

Assessment studies further help the task force to determine the longer term impacts of

engagements and projects and help to develop future efforts. The task force employs SCRAT social anthropologists to gain a better understanding of the social and cultural effects of CMO and other activities. These anthropologists measure the local perception of the role of the U.S. military in their community, and views on the United States and their own military. Examples of assessment studies conducted in 2010 include sociocultural impact studies on CA projects in Kenya's Rift Valley and Dire Dawa, Ethiopia, well projects in Garissa, Kenya, and on a series of VETCAPs in Pemba, Tanzania.

In June 2010, an assessment team comprised of personnel from the task force and the Kenyan Ministry of Defense conducted a joint assessment of past CMO well-drilling projects in the North Eastern province of Kenya. These projects were conducted between 2006 and 2008 as a partnered effort between the Navy Seabees and the Kenyan Army's Engineering Battalion. In addition to conducting a technical assessment of the functionality and utility of each project, one of the SCRAT's social scientists explored social views and local perceptions on U.S. and Kenyan militaries by conducting interviews with 139 members of the community. The assessment provided a critical look at longer term impacts of task force civil-military efforts in a key region, and provided a positive overall sensing of the Kenyan-U.S. engagement with a vulnerable population. It also shed light on the need to be utterly transparent and inclusive in these interactions. This assessment reflected that the impact of such an engagement goes well beyond just the project focus of provisioning water to a rural area, but into personal connections with the local populace.

Enduring Presence Impacts

There are clear indicators that an enduring presence and genuine commitment to capacity-building do contribute to advancing regional security and stability. The evidence supporting this observation is rooted in the assessment of capacity-building activities and involvement in civil-military operations and humanitarian assistance projects in the region that have been conducted over the past 8 years. Some indicators that have been assessed in the last year include:

- ❖ The Djiboutian commitment to be a troop-contributing country to the African Union Mission in Somalia in 2011, and their increased desire to partner in CMO activities in Northern Djibouti. There has also been an increase in Djibouti's willingness to support the international community on security initiatives such as counterpiracy in the Gulf of Aden and West Indian Ocean.
- ❖ Continued utilization and partner state-supported improvements of forward operating locations at Manda Bay, Kenya, and Kasenyi, Uganda, that enable operations and training because of an increase in demand for CMO and peace support operations capacity-building.
- ❖ Multiple occasions where residents took care to inform task force CA team members of violent extremist presence in the area.
- ❖ Fourteen school projects conducted with the community and Kenyan Government ministries that helped to facilitate dialogue between tribes in Kenya's Great Rift Valley following the election violence in 2008. These projects and the community healing they

fostered contributed to the peaceful execution of the 2010 Constitutional Referendum vote in the area.

- ❖ A matured relationship between USAID and the task force that has enabled capacity-building veterinarian services in remote and austere locations of Uganda, and similar USAID support for partnering in Ethiopia on initiatives to stem malaria.
- ❖ A Tanzanian aspiration to increase maritime security capacity and develop a maritime CA presence on the Swahili coast.
- ❖ A State Department ACOTA and task force partnership that has continuously improved the program of instruction that supports multiple African Union and United Nations peace support operations.
- ❖ A Comorian commitment to contribute newly trained civil-military professionals to support AMISOM.

The task force continues to evolve to make its capabilities more effective in responding to the demands of operating in a complex security environment. Capacity-building requires a total team effort between partner nation governments, military forces, and Country Teams. The focus on enduring partnerships and capacity-building over time has created positive impacts on attaining partner nation and U.S. mutual interests within East Africa.

Conclusion

The CJTF–HOA mission in East Africa as a component of USAFRICOM and as a part of a whole-of-government approach is a continuously maturing effort. The examples reflected in this article demonstrate only several of many different ways that partner nations are developing capacity and are welcoming greater responsibility for security in their region. The complex operating environment of East Africa is a varsity-level challenge, but one in which we find genuine partners serious about developing capacities to address security issues while simultaneously addressing the root causes of instability. Eight years of task force operations have been centered on building security capacity and trust and confidence among vulnerable populations, the military, and government. This trust cannot be surged on demand, but is only built through sustained engagement and commitment over time.

It must be acknowledged that security trends in the most unstable areas of the region are not favorable. Inside “the arc of instability” (Somalia as a whole, extending across the Gulf of Aden into Yemen), violent extremist influences have expanded.²³ The evidence presented in this article indicates that U.S. Government objectives in conflict prevention, capacity-building, generating trust and confidence, and setting overall conditions for stability are achievable in those areas where time and even limited resources have been committed. In continued implementation of this approach, consideration of additional leverage points to enhance indirect approach efforts by, with, and through partners will be examined. When supported by policy, consideration of indirect approach activities to be undertaken in areas of expanding extremist influences and not accessible under current conditions is warranted. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2010.

² Lease at Camp Lemonnier was signed in 2001.

³ *The National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC, The White House, May 2010).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Quadrennial Defense Review in perspective.

⁶ The United States partners with 13 of the 18 nations in the area.

⁷ USAFRICOM 2010 Posture Statement and U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Operating Environment.

⁸ Shaul Shay, “Piracy and Terror in the Gulf of Aden,” Born to Freedom Foundation, accessed at <www.10million.org>.

⁹ United States Africa Command, 2010 Posture Statement.

¹⁰ Christine Storo, “Sudan’s 2011 Secession Referendum: Border Tensions with Chad, the LRA, and the Humanitarian Situation,” Consultancy Africa Intelligence, June 16, 2010.

¹¹ See <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11287682>.

¹² “Uganda Seeks New Recruits as Security Challenges Mount,” *Jane’s News*, February 12, 2009, available at <www.janes.com/news/defence/land/jdw/jdw090212_1_n.shtml>.

¹³ Chris Tomlinson, “Corruption, Porous Borders, Poverty Make Horn of Africa Vulnerable,” Associated Press, October 22, 2006.

¹⁴ Elizabeth A. Kennedy, “Analysis: Horn of Africa Beset by Troubles,” Associated Press, April 10, 2009.

¹⁵ USAFRICOM OPORD 09–001.

¹⁶ USC Title 22, Department of State appropriated funds, include Security Assistance (administered by Defense), and Development Assistance (administered by State).

¹⁷ USC Title 10, Department of Defense appropriated funds.

¹⁸ *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008), 15.

¹⁹ CJTF–HOA and MARFORAF supplied the preponderance of forces in support of ACOTA requirements in Africa. CJTF–HOA’s focus is mainly Eastern Africa.

²⁰ Richard Roan was the ACOTA program manager.

²¹ As of October 2010, task force coalition officers represent the United Kingdom, France, Romania, Kenya, South Korea, Mauritius, Djibouti, Yemen, Ethiopia, Uganda, Egypt, and Comoros.

²² Reuben E. Brigety, “The Military’s Role in Development Assistance,” testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, submitted for the record, July 29, 2008.

²³ Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder on al-Shabaab, accessed at <www.cfr.org>.

Rethinking the Fundamentals of State-building

BY ROGER B. MYERSON

Plans for state-building or stabilization missions should take account of the political nature of the state that is being built. A state is a political system that puts some people into positions of power and induces the rest of the nation to accept their authority. The feasibility and cost of a state-building mission can depend critically on the way that the state distributes power. In particular, when foreign forces help to defend the authority of a state, its national leaders have more incentive to centralize political power narrowly around themselves. But such centralization can alienate key local leaders and so can substantially increase the need for costly foreign efforts to maintain the state.

Planners for state-building missions need an analytical framework for recognizing the vital importance of such questions about the constitutional distribution of power. For a framework to be broadly applicable in different countries, it should be derived from a general analysis of incentives in political organizations, not from a projection of some idealized view of our own political system. This article develops such a framework.

To show how constitutional structures can be vital for counterinsurgency, it may be useful to review the development of the Sunni Awakening movement in Anbar Province in 2006. The tribal leaders who formed this coalition to cooperate with American and Iraqi forces were taking great personal risks, and they would not have done so without a realistic prospect of greater long-term political rewards. Under the federal structure of Iraq's democratic constitution, leaders of the Sunni Awakening could realistically anticipate that their cooperation with American forces would position them well for political gains in Anbar's provincial government after the next election, even if

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they had difficulty trusting long-term political promises from the Shi'ite-dominated national government. Indeed, Awakening leaders gained decisive influence in the provincial government of Anbar after the 2009 provincial election, in which their Iraq Awakening party got the largest number of votes. But imagine how different their position would have been if Iraq instead had a centralized presidential regime like that of Afghanistan today. Presidential politics in Iraq would have inevitably focused primarily on

successful stabilization depends on a political network that distributes power and patronage throughout the nation

Iraq's Shi'ite majority, and Sunni tribal sheiks in Anbar could not have expected much political influence in such a presidential system. Promises from American officers could not have given the Sunni sheiks any serious reason to risk their lives in defending a political system that had no place for them.

Leadership and Patronage

In a classic study of counterinsurgency, David Galula emphasized that the essential goal of any stabilization operation is to build a political machine from the population upward, but he also observed that political machines are generally built on patronage.¹ Successful stabilization depends on the new regime developing a political network that distributes power and patronage throughout the nation. As the Counterinsurgency Field Manual has suggested, winning "hearts and minds" may actually mean convincing people that they will be well rewarded and well protected when they serve as local agents in the regime's political network.²

An analysis of how to build such political networks must begin, however, with a recognition of the essential role of political leaders in any state-building process. The simple fact is that states are founded by leaders, and the relationship between these founding leaders and their supporters can determine the nature of the state.³

To compete for power in any political system, a leader needs to build a base of active supporters, and the essential key to motivating this base is the leader's reputation for distributing patronage benefits to loyal supporters. Any leader needs to show his supporters that he can provide material rewards as well as basic protection in return for good service, and he must maintain their confidence that he will judge their service reliably and reward it generously. We cannot expect a leader to do anything that would cause his supporters to lose this basic confidence in him because then he would no longer be a leader. To maintain this essential trust of their supporters, leaders at all levels are fundamentally constrained by cultural norms and traditions that define what their supporters expect of them.

If a stabilization intervention is to establish a political regime that can stand on its own, it will happen because the leaders who hold power in the state have developed networks of supporters that are wide and strong enough to defend the regime against those who would take power from it. Disciplined security forces can be formed only under such political leadership. The real political strength of the regime must be found in the leaders who have stakes in the regime and in their ability to mobilize active support. When they are too few or too weak, the regime can be sustained only with foreign support.

At any point in time, in any society, there are recognized structures of local social



leadership in all communities. When a state has failed, such local leadership can become even more important to people as a source of basic protection. A successful military occupation may be followed by a “golden hour,” when the population is initially inclined to accept the occupier’s political directives, but the long-term successful establishment of a political regime will depend on its general recognition and acceptance by such local leaders in all parts of the nation. This is the meaning of political legitimacy. If a new regime is endorsed by an overwhelming majority of local leaders throughout the nation, then the others will feel compelled to acquiesce. But if there are communities where the regime lacks any local supporters, then these communities can become a fertile ground for insurgents to begin building a rival system of power with encouragement from disaffected local leaders.

The regime’s constitutional distribution of power can determine how many local leaders will find a comfortable place for themselves in the regime, and how many local leaders will feel excluded from power in it. Everyone understands that in the long run, once a state is firmly established, it will be able to redefine and redistribute positions of local leadership in the nation. Thus, the success of the state-building mission may depend on key decisions about how power is to be distributed in the new regime. Any successful state, whether democratic or autocratic, must be able to recruit local leaders and assure them some share of the long-term benefits of state power. Before considering such questions of constitutional distribution of power in democratic states, let us consider them in nondemocratic states.

Autocratic, Feudal, and Colonial State-building

Any state needs generally recognized rules that define how powers are allocated to offices and individuals in the state. These rules may be expressed formally in a written constitution, or they may be constituted informally by an implicit understanding or agreement among the leaders and active supporters of the state. Any such constitutional rules, whether formal or informal, become binding on the leaders of the state when any leader who violated one of these fundamental rules would risk losing the confidence of his supporters and the trust of colleagues in the state. Even autocratic rulers, who may seem unconstrained by any written constitution, generally promote or dismiss high officials only in consultation with a state council or court, where courtiers implicitly judge their leader's actions even as they serve him. The standards of behavior that major political supporters collectively expect of their leader become a kind of personal constitution for him, to which he must conform or lose their confidence.

For example, the most important political asset of the Taliban insurgency is the confidence of its field commanders and governors that effective service to the insurgency will be recognized and rewarded by the movement's top leaders. To maintain this confidence, the high councils of

agents in the field. The simplest way to do this is to promise that a commander who performs well can get a continuing right to exploit the fruits of power in his area of operation, unless he is reassigned to an even more valuable area. Some who have influence at the top might be tempted to find fault falsely in a commander's performance, however, so as to bestow the fruits of his efforts on other favored courtiers. Each commander in the field must have confidence that the central councils of the state would not tolerate any such misjudgment against him. In general, the responsible agents of any state must feel confident that they are accepted members of a broad circle of trust that can guarantee appropriate judgments of their performance and commensurate rewards. In a state without broad public accountability of political decisions, bonds of shared religious faith or ideology or ethnic identity may be essential for new recruits to feel securely included in the state's circle of trust.

Throughout history, states have often built a network of loyal local leaders by granting them long-term feudal privileges and rights to a share of the revenue from their communities in exchange for maintaining local order and authority. Establishing control by creating a feudal aristocracy may be the simplest way to establish stable political control, but the high costs of maintaining such systems of restricted privileges for a ruling elite can result in the mass impoverishment of others in the nation.

For example, when the British were first establishing their colonial rule in India, they regularly granted long-term local privileges of power and taxation to local agents, called zamindars, who took responsibility for keeping order in their districts. The zamindars' local authority was granted as a permanent property right that could be sold or bequeathed to heirs,

America cannot and should not consider feudal or neocolonial strategies to establish political stability in any part of the world

the Taliban must be careful to allocate resources and promotions according to well-understood criteria that reinforce the motivation of their

so they became a class of local leaders with a vested interest in maintaining the regime. The effectiveness of this feudal power proved remarkably durable, but it also had long-term economic costs. Decades after India's independence, the regions where the British distributed such feudal privileges were still found to be suffering significantly lower agricultural productivity and higher infant mortality than other regions of India.⁴ Similar scars of colonial state-building operations may be found in many poor countries. Such a feudal solution to the problem of motivating local political supporters requires a long-term imperial commitment, however, which fortunately is not available to American forces in stabilization missions today.

Today, America cannot and should not consider feudal or neocolonial strategies to establish political stability in any part of the world. Internationally supported stabilization operations need to assure the world that their goal is different: not to exploit, but to establish a stable regime that will protect and serve its citizens. A nation can be torn apart when other nations intervene to put rival clients in power. For a neutral state-building operation that can avoid becoming yet another such competitive intervention, broad support from other regional powers is essential. An intervention can best earn such broad international support by a commitment to the principle of democratic popular sovereignty in the distribution of power, allocating power to local and national leaders who win free elections.

Democracy and Decentralization

Ideally, democracy should help to diminish fears of permanent exclusion from power. When there is a credible commitment to democracy, some losers from the first elections could still hope to win power in future elections by

competing democratically within the system, rather than fighting against it. But if power is narrowly concentrated in a few national offices, then only a few out-of-power leaders can have any realistic hopes of competing successfully for these offices.

The most prominent leaders who cooperate with a stabilization intervention may expect to get positions of national power at the center of the new regime, so they would benefit from a constitutional structure that concentrates power in the center. Furthermore, foreign interveners often find it convenient to have one strong national leader who is empowered to work with them in all the myriad complications of their occupation. So the leading collaborators of a stabilization operation may endorse a system of narrow political centralization, and such centralization may initially seem convenient for the intervening forces. But this centralization can alienate other local leaders who are not aligned with the faction that holds power in the capital, and their alienation can cause the regime to depend more on costly foreign support.

For example, under Hamid Karzai's leadership, a centralized presidential regime was installed in Afghanistan in 2004. Only one elected leader can get a direct political stake in the presidency, and President Karzai's refusal to create a political party meant that he did not build a national network of local political supporters who could expect to share sustained benefits from his presidential power. In the National Assembly, the formation of parties was also discouraged by the use of single non-transferable voting in the 2005 legislative elections, and the predictably incoherent results of this voting system elected representatives who had support from only a small fraction of the voters. Under the unitary constitution, provincial councils were not given any autonomous



U.S. Air Force (Thomas Dow)

Afghan Air Corps and National Army delivered ballots and other election materials to remote Afghan locations in support of the elections

powers. A change in any of these aspects of the political system could have yielded a broader distribution of political power in which more local leaders would have had a direct stake in the regime, and their ability to mobilize local political supporters could have reduced the regime's chronic dependence on foreign forces.

In a decentralized regime that devolves substantial power to locally elected councils of provincial and municipal governments, local leaders throughout the nation can compete for a share of local power even if they are not affiliated with the faction that controls national power at the center. Thus, decentralized democracy can create a broad class of local leaders in all communities who have a positive expected stake in defending the new political system.

In occupied Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) could have begun in 2003 to cultivate local democratic leadership by holding local elections throughout Iraq and then giving the elected leaders responsibility for spending local reconstruction budgets. Much of this money might have been wasted, as it was even under CPA control, but local leaders who spent it well would have gained good reputations that could have made them serious contenders for higher office after national sovereignty was restored. Instead, however, the CPA put priority on negotiating with selected national leaders to draft a constitution before any introduction of local democracy in occupied Iraq. While local leadership was neglected, insurgencies took root.

Political decentralization can seem undesirable or burdensome to national leaders because it entails more difficult negotiations with local leaders, some of whom may have the potential to become new rivals for national power. But a national leader who accepts this cost may find,

in the long run, that a reputation for working effectively with local leaders within an accepted constitutional system can become an invaluable asset for building strong broad-based political coalitions. The power of such a reputation can endure even after the departure of foreign forces who initially supported the development of this constitutional system.

It may be argued that, in order to demonstrate an appropriate respect for national sovereignty, foreign supporters of a state should try not to influence its constitutional structure. However, when foreign forces are guaranteeing the national leaders' authority, the promise of foreign support can itself affect the state's constitutional development. If there were no foreign support, national leaders could hope to gain effective national authority only by negotiating more political deals with local leaders. Thus, centralization of power may be a result of foreign support. So the constitutional impact of foreign support could actually be reduced when foreign supporters press national leaders to accept more political decentralization, even as such decentralization reduces the state's costly dependence on its foreign supporters.

Local Democracy in National Politics

Successful democracy depends on vital interactions between local and national politics. Local democracy can help to make national democracy more competitive, as a record of using public resources responsibly in local government can qualify a local leader to become a competitive candidate for power at higher levels of government. In effect, local democracy can reduce barriers against entry into national democratic competition.

Conversely, the threat of small unrepresentative cliques or warlords dominating local governments can be countered by the participation

of national political parties in local democracy. From the first organizational meetings, local elections should involve representatives from two or more parties that have made a commitment to democracy. Local political bosses should know that, if they lose popular support, they could face serious challengers supported by a rival national party. With such national political safeguards, local democracy can provide an antidote to warlordism.

with political safeguards, local democracy can provide an antidote to warlordism

In areas that are threatened by political violence or insurgency, some restrictions on nomination to local elections may be necessary, to prevent elections from being stolen by candidates who use force to threaten voters. Such restrictions should not be used to exclude candidates of national democratic parties, however. Democratic political parties can develop naturally in an elected national assembly, where members owe their positions to competitive popular elections but also need to work as colleagues with political rivals. Once a national assembly has been elected, a good rule is that any party that is endorsed by at least some minimal fraction of the national assembly should be able to participate in all elections, both in nominating candidates and in monitoring electoral processes.

When candidates for local elections are nominated by national political parties, the parties develop a competitive interest in recruiting popular local leaders to serve as their local candidates in each community. Thus, local democracy can encourage national parties to

extend their political networks to include local leaders throughout the nation. Parties are social networks that distribute power and privilege to their active members, but such networks are needed to mobilize agents who have stakes in sustaining the democratic political system.

There may be concerns about decentralization exacerbating regional separatism. In a region that has a strong popular separatist movement, its candidates would be likely to win local elections, but local democracy would not then be causing the separatist movement. In fact, separatist movements are often caused by a history of oppressive centralized rule that leaves no place for local leadership. Election to local offices can actually give local leaders

effective policing requires more than just recruitment and training of police officers

more interest in preserving the political status quo because of concerns that the next successor state might reduce or redistribute their local powers. In a province that is large enough to stand alone against the rest of the nation, however, the top provincial leaders could perceive some chance of gaining sovereign national power by cultivating a separatist movement. Thus, where separatism is a concern, political decentralization may be better limited to local councils for small districts.

Political Oversight of Security Forces

A state cannot achieve sovereign national authority without an ability to protect its supporters throughout the nation. Basic military control is not sufficient to provide such protection for individual citizens

until it is complemented by effective policing and law enforcement.

Professional security forces, both military and police, can be developed only under a leadership that can take political responsibility for guaranteeing the terms on which their service will be evaluated and rewarded. Paul Bremer saw the development of professional military and police forces as central goals for his CPA administration of Iraq, but it was difficult for the CPA to train security forces to obey civilian constitutional authority when Iraq did not have any civilian constitutional authority.⁵ For security officers to develop a general loyalty to elected democratic leadership, rather than a specific loyalty to one particular leader, all the major party leaders must share a commitment to common standards of advancement for security officers. From this perspective, failures of discipline should have been expected when the CPA ordered Iraqi forces to attack political groups that were later to become part of the governing coalition in Iraq.

The development of effective policing requires more than just recruitment and training of police officers.⁶ The powers of the police can be seriously abused when appropriate legal and political supervision is lacking. For a state to provide effective protection to its citizens, it needs police who are monitored and controlled by a legal and administrative system that is ultimately accountable to political authorities.

Seth Jones has described the government's failure to provide effective police protection in most of Afghanistan after 2003 as the critical failure that ceded wide areas of the country to insurgent control.⁷ The police in Afghanistan were organized as a national force that, under the centralized constitutional state, could be held politically accountable only by the

presidential government in Kabul. National police forces are effective in many successful states, of course, but for police throughout the nation to be controlled from the capital requires extensive lines of administrative oversight, which are difficult to provide in rural areas of Afghanistan where illiteracy is prevalent. Furthermore, if these difficulties were overcome and an effective national police force with a centralized system of control was developed in Afghanistan, it would be impossible to guarantee that such a national police force could not become an instrument of centralized political repression under a new regime after the withdrawal of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. So the attempt to develop an effective national police force in Afghanistan should have been recognized both as unlikely to succeed and as potentially threatening to local liberties if it did. Both of these problems could have been avoided in a more decentralized political system where locally elected leaders had authority to develop local police forces.

Distributing Control Over Public Funds

An effective system of public financial management is essential for successful modern political development.⁸ Political decentralization increases the need for a central finance ministry that can reliably and transparently distribute public funds to different levels of government.

To be politically effective, local councils must have opportunities to allocate public jobs and contracts because the elected leaders can develop their political strength only by building reputations for rewarding active supporters with patronage jobs. When the goal is political reconstruction, the essential measure of success for a reconstruction project may be not in how

many bridges or schools it repairs, but in how it enhances the reputations of the political leaders who spend the project's funds. So to develop local political leadership, a substantial fraction of the national budget should be regularly allocated to local governments. Indeed, to create

reconstruction of the public finance ministry may be a vital priority even when other agencies are badly underdeveloped

a federal system that distributes power across national, provincial, and municipal governments, the distribution of aid funds directly to units of government at all these levels may be more important than the promulgation of provisional constitutional documents.

The essential key to successful democratic development is to increase the nation's supply of leaders who have good reputations for using public funds responsibly to serve the public at large, and not just to give jobs to their active supporters. For this goal, it is important to develop systems of transparent accounting for public funds that are spent by political leaders at all levels. The essential accounting here must be to the local population, however, not to foreign donors who may have provided the funds. But donors should insist on such public accountability. Local people must be able to learn what funds were spent by their leaders and must be able to monitor what public services were provided by these funds. For these purposes, reconstruction of the public finance ministry may be a vital priority even when other agencies of the government are still badly underdeveloped. Basic press freedoms are also essential for such accountability.

Concluding Example

We have argued that, in a democratic state-building mission, a vital first step should be to encourage the development of democratic local councils that can take some responsibility for local reconstruction and policing. This argument may seem particularly appropriate for Afghanistan, which has a long tradition of decentralization, but political decentralization was also essential for democratic state-building in Iraq, even with its history of centralized rule.

It might be helpful to offer one example of a good transitional regime for a state-building operation: the American Articles of Confederation (1776–1788), which distributed power widely among 13 locally elected provincial assemblies. This decentralization of power might have sometimes seemed inconvenient to the regime’s foreign supporters, but it guaranteed that every community had at least one local leader (its representative in the provincial assembly), who had a substantial vested interest in defending the new regime. This broadly distributed political strength was what made the American Revolution unbeatable.

The contrast is stark between this broadly inclusive political structure and the centralized regime that was installed in Afghanistan in 2004. Narrow centralization may seem more convenient for those at the pinnacle of power, but it increases demands on foreign supporters of the regime. Those who would support state-building should be aware of how the broad strength of the regime can depend on the way that its constitutional structure distributes power and on the way that donors distribute funding to groups and leaders throughout the nation. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964), 69, 136.

² U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), appendix A–26.

³ Roger B. Myerson, “A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization: Theory of Leadership and Lessons of Iraq,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 3 (2009), 470–482.

⁴ Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer, “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India,” *American Economic Review* 95, no. 4 (2005), 1190–1213.

⁵ L. Paul Bremer and Malcolm McConnell, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2006), 203.

⁶ James Dobbins et al., *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), chapters 3, 4.

⁷ Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan* (New York: Norton, 2009), chapter 10.

⁸ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Nation-building Interventions and National Security

An Australian Perspective

BY MICHAEL G. SMITH AND REBECCA SHRIMPTON

In their compelling book *Fixing Failed States*,¹ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart offer a sobering prognosis for global stability and human security. They assert that “[f]orty to sixty states, home to nearly two billion people, are either sliding backward and teetering on the brink of implosion, or have already collapsed.”² This reality has profound implications for the future of foreign interventions for the purpose of nation-building. What might this entail for Australia? And what is involved in nation-building in failed or failing states? According to Ghani and Lockhart, the situation “is at the heart of a worldwide systemic crisis that constitutes the most serious challenge to global stability in the new millennium.”³

Such questions imply that nation-building interventions have a past, and arguably a present, in international politics. But as the current debate on international objectives in Afghanistan shows, nation-building is a contestable notion, meaning different things to different actors. History suggests that states undertake foreign interventions primarily in pursuit of national security interests rather than through a desire to build capacity for independent and competent governance in other countries per se. That said, nation-building does occur as a result of international interventions, even if this outcome is not always the intervention’s

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primary objective, and successful nation-building demands a long-term commitment of considerable resources by donor states, as well as from organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank.

If interventions are to occur in the future—a given if we accept the picture of global stability and security painted by Ghani and Lockhart—to what extent could they be driven by proactive and preconflict nation-building strategies, rather than ad hoc formulations as a response to conflict or war? And to what extent might nation-building be incorporated into the formal national security policies of Australia in the years ahead? Could the “3D Approach” for stabilization interventions—diplomacy, development, and defense—be applied in a coordinated preconflict manner to enhance security, governance, and sustainable development, rather than waiting for stabilization in a postconflict environment?

Australia should consider nation-building as an integral component of its national security strategy

This article contends that Australia should consider nation-building as an important pillar in conflict prevention and as an integral component of its national security strategy, and addresses four related questions:

- ❖ What are nation-building interventions?
- ❖ What is meant by nation-building, and can it be measured?
- ❖ What is the relationship between nation-building and international military interventions?

- ❖ What is the future for nation-building interventions in which Australia might be involved?

Nation-building and National Security

Conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy have been consistent themes in Australia’s foreign and defense policies for many years. More recently, conflict prevention was emphasized in Australia’s first National Security Statement in December 2008, when then–Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced that Australia’s approach to regional engagement should be one “that develops a culture of security policy cooperation rather than defaults to any assumption that conflict is somehow inevitable.” Rudd also saw utility in “creative middle power diplomacy . . . capable of identifying opportunities to promote [Australia’s] security and to otherwise prevent, reduce or delay the emergence of national security challenges.”⁴

Australia’s policy roadmap for conflict prevention, however, is yet to be articulated clearly. There are sound arguments that the next National Security Statement (and arguably a first National Security Policy document) should incorporate Australia’s contribution to coherent and coordinated nation-building strategies for fragile states, particularly those in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Such an approach would go beyond intervention to effect regime change, to achieve a military victory, to kickstart stabilization and reconstruction following conflict, or even to achieve the important Millennium Development Goals—goals currently lagging in the Pacific region.⁵

Positive nation-building policies would enhance Australia’s long-term security by helping to strengthen the resilience of the Asia-Pacific

1st Joint Public Affairs Unit (Leigh Cameron)

Australian soldiers—part of the International Security Force—maintain presence across East Timor through regional patrol program

region to conflict, natural and man-made disasters, and political and economic setbacks. To be effective, however, this nation-building approach would require Australia to continue to strengthen its commitment to whole-of-government (and whole-of-nation) civil-military⁶ analysis, planning, and project coordination. This would demand the development of efficient mechanisms, and a cadre of trained personnel, to work collegially with host governments and international and regional organizations. Importantly, government departments and agencies would need to contribute to nation-building strategies in a collaborative way to achieve objectives agreed to by Australia and the governments of host nations. In practical terms, from Australia's perspective, this would require enhanced synergy between the programs of leading agencies—principally the Australian Agency for International Development, Defence, the Australian Federal Police, and the Attorney-General's Department—to develop country strategies that assigned responsibilities and priorities in concert with those of the host nation.

Focused nation-building policies of this kind offer an opportunity to provide the assistance necessary to arrest a fragile state's slide toward collapse *before* it reaches the critical tipping point—to strengthen a state's capacity to govern and provide security for its citizens. Such policies look to address the root causes of the systemic crisis described by Ghani and Lockhart to help turn the tide of a state's deterioration. Security policies can often link regional instability with national insecurity in a negative manner. More useful is a focus on building regional stability to enhance national security under a positive nation-building approach.

The implications of moving the locus of effort from perceived threats to existential opportunities are significant. Implementing an opportunity-based approach is more cost-effective over the long

term than having to respond to conflicts when they occur. As well, such an approach accentuates a focus on the following:

- ❖ identification of positive influences and forces that can be harnessed (as opposed to negative forces which must be defeated or countered)
- ❖ empowerment of local actors (as opposed to replacement with international actors), and support for local solutions (rather than importation of foreign solutions)
- ❖ a clear paradigm of local ownership with the host nation central to the process
- ❖ a long-term commitment based on mutual trust and interests.

By contrast, international postconflict stabilization responses risk weakening the host nation's authority and central responsibility (or even temporarily replacing it), potentially resulting in dependency and a delay in the restoration of state functions by local authorities.

A coordinated nation-building approach, beyond the efforts of individual departments and agencies, would not replace Australia's current threat-based approach to national security, but provide a complementary preventive mechanism to enhance regional security. Such nation-building policies would offer a suite of options for international engagement that address root causes of violence and conflict, not just the violence itself. Positive nation-building policies have the potential to neutralize threats before they arise.

Within the Asia-Pacific region, future competition between China and the United States for power and influence is a distinct yet parallel possibility to the problem of failed and failing states. Australia's dilemma will be to

structure and balance its national capabilities for possible great power (and their proxy) conflicts with the ability to respond to instability within a region comprising fragile states. History and geography confirm that instability in its immediate region become conflicts of necessity rather than choice for Australia, demonstrated not only by World War II but more recently by Australia's commitments to Bougainville (an autonomous region of Papua New Guinea), Timor-Leste, and the Solomon Islands. A preemptive, coordinated, and long-term nation-building approach by Australia to regional fragile states would not only help reduce the prospects of serious conflict and great power rivalry, but also contribute to sustainable development by helping empower people to avert the human indignity of poverty and the impact of natural disasters. This is a bold strategy, and one that would contribute purposefully to the Australia-U.S. alliance in a meaningful way beyond providing assets to more distant conflict and postconflict situations, as important as such contributions will continue to be. Australia's commitment to greater responsibility in its immediate region would be in line with the longstanding quest of the United States for "burden-sharing," now even more important given the impact of the global financial crisis and soaring national debt of the United States.⁷

Over the longer term, such a nation-building approach by Australia would be more cost-effective than accepting the inevitability of having to respond to regional instability through expensive military operations (in human, platform, and dollar terms as well as opportunity costs). In shifting the policy emphasis from a conflict response-based model to a conflict prevention-based one, the capability requirement becomes more civilianized,

more purposeful, less expensive, less overt, and less disruptive. Or, as the former Chief of the Australian Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, noted recently, it provides “more security through less defence.”⁸

Interventions

The importance of strengthening state resilience has become a central feature of approaches to international peace and security over the past two decades. “Nation-building” (or its associated but more narrowly focused sibling, “state-building”) is generally recognized as an essential tool in addressing the causes of conflict, as well as in bridging the divide between the traditional state-centric concept of power politics and the contested concept of human security as advocated predominantly by non-state actors.

Not all international security analysts may agree with Ghani and Lockhart’s assessment of state failure, but there is general consensus concerning the difficulties in implementing effective intervention strategies that lead to state resilience—strategies that in recent years have proved contestable or, at best, only partially successful. Paul Collier points out that one-sixth of the world’s population is currently caught in a poverty trap from which escape is problematic. He notes that the ultimate negative impact of such poverty will have far-reaching effects on global security, as well as having immediate and protracted local humanitarian consequences.⁹ In December 2008, U.S. strategist Patrick Cronin highlighted the growing significance of “fragile and ungoverned spaces,” listing this as one of eight global security challenges facing the then new Obama administration. Cronin commented: “There is no surefire way to build effective states. And there are too many weak states to address them at once or to consider

investing everything in a solitary problem. . . . While weak states are not automatically threats, fragile states may aid and abet a host of other problems, from piracy to trafficking to incubating terrorism and pandemics.”¹⁰

The Fund for Peace, in its Failed State Index for 2010, highlights significant concern at the poor state of global governance.¹¹ This situation seems unlikely to improve markedly, given the slow recovery from the global financial crisis, coupled with the potential for increased intensity in the number of megadisasters resulting from climate change. The findings of the Failed State Index also indicate that Australia’s immediate geopolitical region requires closer policy attention and that more “heavy lifting” will be required of Australia in the years ahead.¹² There is a strategic choice to be made in Canberra about the nature of such heavy lifting, with a balance needing to be struck, weighted toward either responsive/reactive or preventive/proactive policies.

The United Nations and World Bank have also highlighted the importance of nation-building in contributing to global stability. The UN blueprint for reform—the Brahimi Report of 2000—links peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding strategies to better enable states emerging from conflict to avert a return to fighting through the development of effective governance structures based on open communication with their citizens.¹³ The World Bank has increasingly related its development responsibilities to security sector reform and the rule of law, to the extent that the working title of its forthcoming *World Development Report 2011* (WDR11) is “Conflict, Security and Development.” Although not stated as such, WDR11 is quintessential nation-building, tying the responsibilities of the state to the needs of its local communities, while at

the same time recognizing the need for coordinated international support.¹⁴

Individually and collectively, states and coalitions engaged in expeditionary interventions since the end of the Cold War have sought to achieve a more coherent, comprehensive, and whole-of-government approach to their endeavors, employing the 3D Approach. But in these undertakings, nation-building has been a product rather than a reason for intervention, and the product has demanded significantly more focus than anticipated to reach the standard required for stability.

Definition and Measurement

Nation-building should not be confused with humanitarian intervention, which focuses on the immediate provision of life-support services. The ultimate goal of successful nation-building is a resilient, viable, and politically stable society supported by a responsive and accountable state apparatus. The concept of nation-building can be applied to strategies for both postconflict reconstruction and conflict prevention. Since

optimal nation-building is a dynamic interaction between a state and its people, supported by international intervention

the 1990s, however, Australian nation-building efforts have principally been responses to conflict situations, concentrating on stabilization and reconstruction. Far less attention has been given to important civil-military opportunities for conflict prevention, security sector reform, political reconciliation, and strengthening government accountability to

local communities as part of holistic nation-building and poverty reduction programs.

The terms *nation-building* and *state-building* are often used interchangeably, although there can be important differences between the two. Nation-building represents the broad process of constructing a national identity and linking it to the authority of the state. It involves unifying the majority of the population within the state—despite ethnic, social, cultural, and/or religious diversity—and fostering a national identity that is reflected in the character and authority of the state. State-building is narrower in its focus, referring to the functioning of a state from the consolidation of its territory to the development of effective institutions, processes, specialized personnel, and a monopoly over violence. State-building involves improving the architecture and effectiveness of government instrumentalities in a nontotalitarian manner that is representative of the people it serves. Nation-building requires the establishment of ongoing dialogue and mechanisms for effective and safe interaction between the people and the state as opposed to building institutional frameworks and mechanisms. A focus on state-building alone can lead to the establishment of inappropriate governments for longer term stability. Without an accurate and appropriate understanding of what unifies (or conversely divides) a population, the potential exists to measure success based on short-term inputs and costs rather than longer term outcomes and processes. The reality is that international interventions are unlikely to be successful in the long term unless they are committed to nation-building.

Measuring the effectiveness of nation-building is a complex undertaking. The task requires looking beyond the easily quantifiable and tangible metrics of dollars spent, training

provided, militants demobilized, police and civil servants recruited, and growth in the private sector. It involves complementing quantitative data with qualitative analysis to provide an accurate appraisal of the accessibility, responsiveness, credibility, and legitimacy of the government, community perceptions of security and justice, and the effective and efficient delivery of basic services to the population. Strong and decisive political leadership is critical, and the process should result in a conflict-sensitive, locally owned, bottom-up popular investment in a host government and its national institutions. A range of political checks and balances on government action cannot be limited to a single milestone of free and fair elections. A strong sense of national identity can and should shape the development of government institutions to be responsive, appropriate, legitimate, and credible to the host population. Optimal nation-building, therefore, is a dynamic interaction between a state and its people, supported and facilitated by international intervention providing resources, advice, and expertise. Such an ideal does not incorporate regime change through intervention, although regime change may sometimes occur as an important step in the nation-building process.

Isolating the elements for successful nation-building further adds to the complexity of measuring its effectiveness. Each situation is unique, and solutions defy simple templating or transplanting. Building on the Brahimi Report of 2000, and reviewing peace interventions in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan, an important Kings College study in 2003 identified five key areas for effective peacebuilding in postconflict environments: planning and process; public administration and governance; rule of law and

postconflict justice; the security sector; and the humanitarian-peacekeeping-development interface.¹⁵ If each is developed in a manner that appropriately accounts for the unique history and culture of a host nation, these areas could represent the pillars of a nation-building strategy. But the relevance of these pillars can be applied equally to the viability of conflict prevention strategies as international assistance to nation-building is likely to be more effective in a preconflict environment.

Various organs of the United Nations, such as the United Nations Development Programme, Peacebuilding Commission, and UN Secretariat's Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs, have expended considerable effort in improving capacity in postconflict reconstruction, usually with limited resources and in situations of fragile peace. In such circumstances the Security Council has increasingly mandated missions with tasks that are akin to nation-building.

Ghani and Lockhart's "Ten Functions of a State" (see table) provide a useful guide in helping to measure effectiveness in nation-building. These functions, however, are not a prescription for success and must be contextualized within an individual nation's history and culture. What seems clear, however, is that countries that appear most at risk on the Failed State Index tend to display poor progress in these functions.

Two significant historical examples of nation-building are the post-World War II economic and political reconstructions of Western Europe and Japan. These triumphs of nation-building, nonetheless, were fundamentally based on U.S. and Western national security interests that arose in response to intense ideological, political, and military competition with the Soviet Union. As such, nation-building was a strategy for containing communism,

Table. Ten Functions of a State

National executive controls the <i>public administration</i>
National actors in education, training, health, and welfare invest in <i>human capital</i>
National utilities actors run effective <i>infrastructure services</i>
National enterprise actors invest in <i>natural, industrial, intellectual assets</i>
National legislature defines social contract and delineates <i>citizen rights and duties</i>
National diplomats and negotiators oversee <i>international relations and public borrowing</i>
National judiciary and police uphold the <i>rule of law</i>
National military controls a <i>monopoly on the means of violence</i>
National treasurers manage <i>public finances</i>
National economists/trade actors regulate and oversee <i>the market</i>

Source: The Institute for State Effectiveness, available at <www.effectivestates.org/ten.htm>.

rather than a commitment to build strong and stable societies per se, supporting the earlier claim that nation-building policies complement more realist and conventional defense policies. The rebuilding of Western Europe and Japan, and later South Korea following the Korean War stalemate, were interventions for the long haul, and focused on a deliberate civil-military approach that remained subordinate to civilian authority. Subsequent interventions have failed to replicate the size and success of these three nation-building enterprises. Aspirational aspects of this model, however, can perhaps be seen in the UN's modern integrated peacekeeping approach, although with a less clear political overlay and generally without the commitment of sufficient resources by member states.

In Australia's immediate region there are also examples of nation-building efforts that have had varying degrees of success, such as in Bougainville, Timor-Leste, and the Solomon Islands. Despite substantial differences in the political and security genesis of each of these interventions, each has required civil-military and multidimensional responses (even those that were originally more narrowly conceived as primarily military operations). These three different examples continue to be works in progress, despite the success achieved to date; the withdrawal or downsizing of foreign military and police forces does not necessarily correspond with or equate to a robust peace or signify sustainable nation-building. This becomes apparent when such forces are required to return to reclaim peace and stability as another start-point for nation-building, as was the case in Timor-Leste in 2006.¹⁶ Much remains to be done in each of these countries for nation-building to prove successful, and emphasis needs to be given to conflict prevention strategies.

The interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq evolved differently from those that led to the rebuilding of Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea, which occurred over an extended period as part of a deliberate Cold War strategy. The former have been based on short-term planning horizons, respectively aimed at disrupting terrorist safe havens (Afghanistan) and neutralizing weapons of mass destruction (Iraq). These interventions commenced while lacking coordinated and coherent civil-military planning, and they have morphed repeatedly, without clear long-term visions and without promises of long-term commitments. Nation-building has neither been promised nor applied in earnest, yet the 3D Approach has the trappings of nation-building.

Operationally, the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions have been only partially successful in gaining the overall support of the local population, and in providing for their protection. In this modern and complex 3D environment, strategic priorities have oscillated between enhancing global security through countering terrorism and assisting host states in their nation-building efforts. A confluence of these two (sometimes contradictory) priorities has not been uniformly achieved between interveners and host states alike, particularly when regime change has been perceived as the prime motive for intervention. Nation-building in postwar Europe, Japan, and South Korea had a central focus on building democracies. The more recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have been more focused on military objectives, with the political imperative of fostering democracy a secondary concern. In these interventions the first principle of war, the selection and maintenance of the aim, has proved difficult and rubbery, and long-term commitments to nation-building have been avoided by, and uncoordinated among, contributing

coalition partners. The *Christian Science Monitor* recently noted that “helping faltering regimes defend themselves because they supposedly face a terrorism problem, which may somehow morph into a threat to the United States [and by implication other countries], will often just mean assisting repressive governments defend themselves against their own people.”¹⁷ Such action clearly does not constitute effective nation-building. Rather than being used as examples for future nation-building strategies, or as reasons for not undertaking nation-building, Afghanistan and Iraq should be consigned to the category of “exception” rather than of “rule.”

there is a lack of understanding of “the deep-rootedness of the political conflict” that spawns a complex crisis

Relationships

The nation-building agendas of the international community and host states are fundamentally political in nature, but the political underpinnings of crises and national political dynamics are not always well understood by international actors. Based on practical experience gained in a host of operational crises from Angola to Afghanistan, James Kunder has emphasized that there is a consistent lack of understanding of “the deep-rootedness of the underlying political conflict” that spawns a complex crisis.¹⁸

Not all interventions respond to conflict or are military in nature. Interventions based primarily on long-term economic aid and development occur by mutual agreement between sovereign states, even if in some instances the receiving country may be dependent on foreign aid and have limited practical room for political

autonomy and maneuver. The relationship between Australia and countries such as Papua New Guinea and Nauru are sometimes cast in this light. Such aid and development interventions may be necessary for the economic survival of the receiving nation, but they do not always have a positive impact on nation-building. A challenge for donors such as Australia is how to channel aid and development into meaningful nation-building strategies, including at the community grassroots level, rather than creating situations of budgetary dependence. If fragile states are to prosper and escape the traps of poverty and insecurity, they and their donors will require strategies beyond the meeting of the expenditure targets of the Millennium Development Goals.

Foreign interventions that include the use of force for nation-building, on the other hand, must accord with international law, which rests on the principle of state sovereignty and the norm of nonintervention. Other than acting in self-defense or under specific mandate of the United Nations, no state can interfere in the domestic affairs of another (article 2[4] of the UN Charter). A recent exception to this principle, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), was unanimously agreed upon by world leaders in 2005 as a new norm. R2P encompasses the notion that sovereignty is a responsibility and not a privilege, and that when a state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens the international community has a responsibility to intervene when sanctioned by the Security Council. R2P, however, is yet to be invoked in practice.

The rise of militant nonstate actors has challenged the efficacy of international law between states. While irregular forces have been accommodated under international humanitarian law through the Additional Protocols to the

Geneva Conventions, international law has not always proved useful in managing asymmetric conflict between state and nonstate actors. To allow for nation-building in contested environments, old principles of irregular and counterinsurgency warfare have been dusted off and relearned. Principally, this requires the subordination of military forces to civilian authority in theater. But this has proved difficult to achieve in practice, particularly when host governments have been ineffective or corrupt, and when those intervening lack the necessary pool of well-trained civilian diplomats, mentors, change agents, administrators, development specialists, police, and technocrats.

Last-minute calls in such interventions for a “civilian surge,” capable of understanding the cultural requirements of different fragile states, cannot be accommodated quickly as such elements require years of preparation. In this light, Australia’s recent initiative to establish an Australian Civilian Corps (ACC) is sensible. Rather than short-term responses to conflicts and disasters, however, the ACC’s long-term utility may ultimately rest on its assistance to unstable and fragile states as part of conflict prevention through an understanding of the culture, history, politics, and language of the people in locations where they may need to be deployed frequently.

The lessons from nation-building interventions in nonpermissive environments such as Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and the Solomon Islands are yet to be codified, while old lessons are relearned and misapplied. Nevertheless, some preconditions for success in such environments warrant repetition. These include:

- ❖ no intervention without strategy
- ❖ a political commitment for the long haul



1st Joint Public Affairs Unit (Chris Moore)

Royal Australian Navy dentist shows girl her infected tooth after removal at dental clinic aboard USNS *Mercy* on regional humanitarian mission in East Timor

- ❖ coordinated civil-military analysis, planning, and execution—the 3D Approach to security, governance, and development
- ❖ a supportive and receptive host government, relatively corruption-free and leading the change
- ❖ sufficient resources to ensure public security and to isolate insurgents and spoilers
- ❖ primacy of political objectives—civilian leadership and military subordination to a capable civil authority
- ❖ population respect for, and confidence in, the security forces of intervening states
- ❖ a genuine local and international commitment to governance and the rule of law
- ❖ effective mechanisms for population protection
- ❖ early and effective communications and information strategies
- ❖ a coordinated national development plan.

It is likely that the international community's experience in Iraq and Afghanistan will curb the appetite of many countries for nation-building interventions in the near future. Ambition may have run well ahead of capability in these interventions, and mistakes made are likely to result in justifiable caution in future expeditionary endeavors. While it is not impossible to achieve success in such situations, the costs are significant and may be disproportionate to the benefits without

a clear understanding of the context, the task, and a capacity to apply the right tools to the right problems. Nation-building in hostile environments is a highly complex and political undertaking that is both resource- and time-intensive. The relearning of this long-known but ultimately forgotten lesson by the international community in Iraq and Afghanistan has been an unforgiving process. Yet much wisdom has emerged from recent experience and care should be taken to catalogue and institutionalize these civil-military lessons.

Future Interventions for Australia

The prognosis for effective nation-building interventions by Australia in the future is not clear. For major conflicts such as Afghanistan, the time horizons seem ridiculously short for nation-building to be effective, and contributions by Australia (while important in Oruzgan Province) will have minimal impact on Afghanistan's overall nation-building outcome. In tough economic times, and acknowledging that the conflict has become increasingly unpopular among the populations of some coalition countries, the strategic focus has shifted to limiting public expectations of success and contemplating withdrawal timelines. Current NATO strategy does not represent a consolidated plan for building the nation-state

nation-building beyond Afghanistan, and the priority of nation-building as a component in national security strategy.

Post-Afghanistan, the priority for Australia's nation-building efforts should concentrate on the archipelagic and maritime environment of its immediate region, incorporating strategically important countries in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Rather than focusing on responses to conflicts and natural disasters, priority should be given to strategies for conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction. Comprehensive civil-military nation-building strategies will be required over the long term, with an emphasis on identifying opportunities to strengthen physical security, economic development, governance, and the rule of law. This is a mammoth task, but, compared with many other continents and regions, it should be possible to reduce the current level of fragility and to contribute to a more secure, prosperous, and peaceful region. Such an approach will require Australia to work closely with host governments and multilateral agencies, and to harmonize expectations and programs into less stovepiped and more coherent nation-building strategies. Through these efforts, and by working to achieve a careful and effective balance in emphasis between proactive nation-building strategies and the enduring traditional defense policies for conventional threats, Australia will enhance its own security and be respected as a regional middle power "punching to its weight."

Such a strategy, if implemented effectively, would make an important contribution to strengthening the Australia-U.S. alliance, and would be consistent with the U.S. goal of burden-sharing its global responsibilities, particularly as the balance of power between the United States and China continues to evolve. Optimizing peace and security in the important

Australia's nation-building efforts should concentrate on the archipelagic and maritime environment of its immediate region

of Afghanistan. Australia must honor its commitment in Afghanistan, but equally it needs to consider and plan its future approach to

maritime environment of the Indian and Pacific Oceans proximate to Australia is an important contribution to global security.

Australia is a small but respected middle power in the global context. Contributions to global peace, security, and development will be optimized through purposeful engagement with the United Nations and the Bretton Woods economic institutions. Increased multiagency engagement by Australia will contribute positively to the UN's capacity and reform program, and enable Australia to learn important global lessons for potential application in regional nation-building strategies. For example, Australia has much to learn from Africa, the global epicenter of security and development case studies that dominate the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding agenda.

Conclusion

Australia's national security can be enhanced through proactive and long-term civil-military nation-building strategies based on conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction, principally focusing on Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. More work is required by policymakers if Australia's immediate region is to be peaceful, prosperous, and secure. These efforts should be complemented by support to multinational agencies in the global arena—principally the United Nations and the World Bank Group. By contrast, nation-building efforts focused on stabilization and postconflict reconstruction, particularly in more distant locations, are likely to be more costly and less successful. Such interventions should be considered by exception. Australia's experience in regional nation-building interventions has shown greater success than ventures farther afield.

A national security strategy with increased emphasis on regional conflict prevention through coherent nation-building strategies will help strengthen Australia's contribution to the Australia-U.S. alliance. This alliance is likely to remain the cornerstone of Australia's security policy even as the balance of power continues to evolve in the Asia-Pacific region. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3, 4.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Kevin Rudd, "The First National Security Statement to the Parliament: Address by the Prime Minister of Australia," December 4, 2008. Kevin Rudd is currently Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁵ Lowy Institute for International Policy, *Advancing Innovative Development and Aid Strategies in the Asia-Pacific: Accelerating the Millennium Development Goals: Final Conference Report, July 2010*, available at <http://lowyinstitute.richmedia-server.com/sound/2010_Aid_and_MDGs/Final_Conference_Report.pdf>.

⁶ The civil component is broad, including all nonmilitary functions such as policing.

⁷ The quest for alliance burden-sharing commenced with President Richard Nixon's Guam Doctrine in 1968. It has been estimated that by 2017 the annual interest payments on the U.S. national debt will exceed the defense budget.

⁸ Peter Leahy, "Shifting Priorities in National Security: More Security Less Defence," *Security Challenges* 6, no. 2 (Winter 2010). Retired Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, Officer of the Order of Australia, is a former

Chief of the Australian Army and foundation Director of the National Security Institute at the University of Canberra.

⁹ Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

¹⁰ Patrick M. Cronin, “Barack Obama Faces 8 Global National Security Challenges,” *U.S. News & World Report*, December 15, 2008, available at <www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/2008/12/15/barack-obama-faces-8-global-national-security-challenges.html>.

¹¹ See Fund for Peace, Failed State Index, available at <www.fundforpeace.org>.

¹² *Ibid.* According to the Fund for Peace, Failed State Index, of 177 countries listed, 37 were in the “alert” (red) category, including Burma (16) and Timor-Leste (18). Regional countries in the “warning” (amber) category (from 38–129) included the Solomon Islands (43), the Philippines (51), Papua New Guinea (56), Indonesia (61), Fiji (74), Thailand (81), and Samoa (107). Not all smaller countries in the region were listed, such as Nauru and Tonga. A further 34 countries were included in the “moderate” (yellow) category, including Singapore and the United States. Only 13 countries were included in the “sustainable” (green) category, including Australia and New Zealand.

¹³ See United Nations *Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects: Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations*, UN document A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, referred to as the “Brahimi Report.”

¹⁴ This assessment is based on the draft “Concept Note” for WDR11, dated January 7, 2010.

¹⁵ Nicola Dahrendorf, *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change* (London: Kings College, March 2003).

¹⁶ The International Crisis Group series of reports provides an account of, and important insights into, the crisis in Timor-Leste in 2006: International Crisis Group (ICG), *Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis*, Asia Report No. 120, October 10, 2006; ICG, *Timor-Leste’s Parliamentary Elections*, Asia Briefing No. 65, Dili/Brussels, June 13, 2007; ICG, *Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform*, Asia Report No. 143, January 17, 2008; ICG, *Timor-Leste’s Displacement Crisis*, Asia Report No. 148, March 31, 2008; ICG, *Timor-Leste: No Time for Complacency*, Asia Briefing No. 87, Dili/Brussels, February 9, 2009; ICG, *Handing Back Responsibility to Timor-Leste’s Police*, Asia Report No. 180, December 3, 2009.

¹⁷ Dennis C. Jett, “US Military Support for Troubled States: A Dangerous Doctrine Returns,” *Christian Science Monitor*, August 20, 2010.

¹⁸ James Kunder, “The Politics of Complex Operations,” in *Commanding Heights: Strategic Lessons from Complex Operations*, ed. Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, May 2010), 80.

U.S. Army (Richard Daniels, Jr.)



District and provincial leaders listen as Ministry of Finance official discusses CERP in Nangarhar, Afghanistan

The Commander as Investor

Changing CERP Practices

BY REBECCA PATTERSON AND JONATHAN ROBINSON

Postinvasion Iraq and Afghanistan have compelled the United States to expand its focus on and capacity for conflict resolution and postwar reconstruction. Our strategic objective in both countries has become the transformation of dysfunctional and war-affected societies into stable, viable, and sustainable states. To this end, economic development and security are regarded as mutually reinforcing elements: without security, development cannot progress far, yet development is essential to attaining security. With civilian aid agencies impaired by prohibitive security conditions and burdensome

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bureaucratic requirements, the Department of Defense (DOD) has, for the first time in 60 years, become a dominant player in creating the conditions for economic growth in conflict areas.

Problematically, standard economic theory is not instructive on how to foster growth amid persistent violence and political instability, so while the United States spent \$29 billion on various reconstruction programs in Iraq from March 2003 through December 2007, the money had little obvious impact.¹ In many Iraqi districts, greater spending on reconstruction correlated with greater violence. Large-scale projects, in particular, made easy targets for insurgents and were often plagued by allegations of corruption and graft.

standard economic theory is not instructive on how to foster growth amid persistent violence and political instability

The emerging field of expeditionary economics, advanced by Carl Schramm of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, is premised on the idea that one of the most effective ways to establish a trajectory toward economic growth in areas of conflict is to focus on the formation of indigenous companies.² New, locally based firms create new jobs, goods, services, and tax revenue—all vital to sustainable stability.³ Expeditionary economics further suggests that the military is uniquely positioned to play a leading role in bringing economic growth to devastated countries because it has an active presence in areas where such growth is so desperately needed, has an interest in seeing conditions there improve, has the resources to effect change, and has the ability to operate

in a security environment impervious to any other actor. This does not suggest that civilian capabilities should be displaced by the military, but rather augmented by it.

The Commander's Emergency Response Program

With this in mind, how might the military use the resources it has been given to foster economic development? The practice of using “money as a weapons system” to advance military objectives is currently most fully realized in the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which began as a discretionary pool of money from which commanders could fund projects they believed would improve the security conditions in their areas of operation. Although CERP continues to be valued primarily as a tool for securing short-term security gains, there is reason to believe the program has untapped potential for promoting long-term economic growth and stability as well—if the two goals can be reconciled. While most would agree that security and economic growth are mutually reinforcing, the decision of where, when, why, and how to fund a project will yield different results if a commander is thinking about short-term security or long-term growth. Are the security and development missions truly at odds when commanders make funding decisions, and are there some important changes we can suggest to help commanders better satisfy short- and long-term imperatives? These are the questions this article addresses.

What is CERP and how is it used? During the invasion of Iraq, U.S. forces seized approximately \$900 million from various locations across Iraq. In a brilliant military innovation in the aftermath of the invasion, many of the U.S. military's first reconstruction

projects used these seized funds in what was the genesis of the Commander's Emergency Response Program. The initial success of CERP was in large part due to its flexibility and responsiveness to the unique situations commanders faced on the ground. Over time, CERP has been increasingly burdened by process (the new standard operating procedure is 165 pages), degrading some of its early benefits. Its usage also expanded from smaller scale projects that could be effectively overseen by the military to larger scale development efforts that outstripped the military's oversight ability. Although CERP was effective at capitalizing on security gains through a short-term purchase of loyalty or information, its use for nonsecurity and nonemergency purposes has been highly criticized. Nonetheless, this article assumes that DOD will continue to use CERP. Moreover, its usefulness in reducing violence and its potential for fostering long-term economic growth suggest that some care should be taken to examine how to improve its application, in particular with the latter goal in mind.

Begun as a program to build and repair the social and material infrastructure of Iraq, CERP grew into the DOD flagship reconstruction program, receiving more than \$3.8 billion in U.S. appropriations by the end of 2010.⁴ CERP made it possible for U.S. commanders to improve life in Iraqi communities by quickly repairing roads and bridges, rebuilding schools, improving health care, and removing trash. The program has come to play an important and high-profile role in U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

CERP has three primary components: reconstruction, death benefits/battle damage payments, and economic development.

Reconstruction includes repair or reconstruction of hospitals, clinics, power transmission and distribution networks, water or sewer systems, police and fire stations, schools, telecommunications systems or infrastructure, roads, bridges, and civic or cultural buildings/facilities. Death benefits/battle damage payments include condolence payments as a means of expressing

CERP has come to play an important and high-profile role in U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan

sympathy and repair of damage resulting from military operations that cannot be compensated under the Foreign Claims Act. Economic development includes protective measures for critical infrastructure sites, microgrants to disadvantaged small businesses and entrepreneurs, job promotion, and civil cleanup activities.

The diversity of projects forces great variation in the effectiveness of the spending: In cases where CERP project managers do not have sufficient expertise in a project (particularly as projects have become increasingly complex), there are problems in implementation. This has led to some criticism of the program's effectiveness and scalability.

At first, CERP projects were generally not chosen to foster long-term economic growth, but rather to allow the military to operate with greater local cooperation in the short term. CERP was designed to fund programs that immediately assisted the local population, can be locally sustained, and cost less than \$500,000 per project. Most important, the projects had to either meet urgent humanitarian needs or ongoing COIN objectives.⁵

Over time, however, CERP has evolved beyond meeting only emergency and security needs and has grown to include spending on water and sanitation infrastructure, food production and distribution, agriculture, electrical power generation and distribution, health care, education, telecommunications infrastructure,

successful aid programs must be designed around unique local conditions, circumstances, culture, and leadership

transportation infrastructure, rule of law and governance improvements, irrigation, civic cleanup activities, repair and construction of civic and cultural facilities, as well as incentivizing entrepreneurship and small businesses formation. The expansion of CERP as a tool for economic development has not been a centrally managed process—it is the result of field-expedient measures taken by many commanders in different areas of operation—and it flies in the face of strict limitations detailed in even the most recent version of the CERP standard operating procedure.

What makes CERP ineffective as a development tool? The stability and security mission has a short-term time horizon inconsistent with typical development initiatives, which require long-lead planning and a much longer timeline for measuring success. To exemplify this, we can consider a common focus of development energies: the construction of a local school. When local Afghan tribal chiefs ally with a U.S. commander on a school proposal, the U.S. military moves quickly through the planning and construction process, motivated by a security mindset that the rapid completion

of the project would reinforce security gains of kinetic operations by rewarding local allies and renting their allegiance. While sensible from a short-term stability perspective, this behavior stands in contrast to a development approach, which would see the following as vital planning considerations: vetting school-building proposals with community groups; consulting coalition anthropologists, sociologists, or human terrain teams; obtaining national education ministry approval on the location of schools; and building ministry capacity to staff, equip, and meet the recurrent costs of the education system. To a commander, each of these steps represents a potential chokepoint with the capacity to deprive him of momentum in a golden hour; to buy allegiance from local leaders, CERP project managers need to build the school as quickly as possible, and they fear that the due diligence required of conventional long-lead development projects may negate the short-term security goal. By skipping these steps, however, the project may result in a school without local student attendance, unstaffed by ministry of education teachers, and worse still, an unprotected, high-profile target for the insurgency.

What makes CERP effective? As the local school example demonstrates, successful aid programs must be designed around unique local conditions, circumstances, culture, and leadership, which require a highly decentralized approach—development scholarship is universally in agreement on this point. It should not be counterintuitive to say that the military is, in many ways, well positioned to provide such an approach, given its constant interaction with the local populace; CERP spending, at its most effective, can be highly responsive to the needs of communities, providing them

with an immediate, tangible benefit. Arguably CERP successes can be attributed in large part to the military commanders who committed the funding with a true appreciation for the needs of the community and for the predicted impact of the proposed project. Furthermore, commanders have the means to supervise its completion. While sometimes lacking technical or sociological expertise, their continued security presence improved the likelihood of the project's completion. This stands in sharp contrast to many civilian organizations for which the security environment in a target area prohibits free movement.

With practice, the military also got better at disbursing CERP funds. As U.S. COIN strategy in Iraq evolved in 2007, there was a notable improvement in CERP outcomes: U.S. forces moved out of the large forward operating bases removed from the population to smaller outposts connected to communities and were given a mandate to focus on the needs of the populace through quality-of-life improvements.⁶ In making CERP spending decisions, commanders began measuring progress not by the number of projects started or completed but by the relative success or failure of outcomes. A similar shift in U.S. strategy occurred in Afghanistan in 2009.

What do we now know about CERP? In the 8 years since the program began, the military has developed some fundamental truths about the impact of CERP and the behavior of the commanders who use it:

- ❖ There is evidence that CERP is effective at accomplishing short-term security goals. Recent research suggests that government spending on public works—and CERP money specifically—reduces violence: “A 10% increase in the fraction of labor-intensive projects reduces violence by about 5% . . . this decrease comes largely from a reduction in labor-intensive forms of violence, such as gunfire, kidnappings, and torture and execution.”⁷ This is likely because, in the short term, the newly created job opportunities serve as a substitute for employment with the insurgency.
- ❖ CERP funds are allocated in small amounts without the layers of subcontractors that make the relationship between dollars spent and work done tenuous for most American reconstruction spending. Although military commanders are provided great flexibility in spending CERP money within their sector, there are caps on how much funding a particular project can receive so as to ensure the greatest benefit for the largest number of people.
- ❖ CERP spending is typically concentrated where violence is predictably high, and there is a natural proclivity for commanders to direct funds to areas with which their soldiers are most familiar—the more violent zones that they frequently patrol.
- ❖ Deploying CERP funds in support of large projects such as a power generation plant and its corresponding distribution system presents insurgent spoilers with an easy target. When a large project is disrupted by an insurgent attack, the government looks incompetent and the insurgent can inflame public dissatisfaction. But distributing CERP funds more broadly throughout the population by undertaking many smaller projects mitigates this risk and presents the insurgent with a targeting dilemma. In choosing to target a small economic development project, the insurgent risks alienating a community with a vested interest in the

project's completion because an insurgency cannot maintain support of the local community if it hinders economic development. (This strategy of many smaller projects has an added benefit for commanders: the consequences of one disrupted project can be contained at a much lower financial cost.)

The Importance of Entrepreneurship

Although the literature on economic development in developing economies provides few concrete truths, we do know a great deal about what has made successful economies

if our intent in spending CERP money is to improve the security situation, job creation is the heart of sustainable stability

grow. The United States, India, and China, for example, have taken different routes to growth and their economies are not identical, but the common element they share is the importance of entrepreneurship. As we think about how best to foster long-term economic growth in emerging markets, even and especially those in postconflict areas, we would be wise to focus on the success of entrepreneurs in continuously reinvigorating economies. The fledgling expeditionary economics doctrine holds that, even and especially in postconflict and insecure emerging economies, new firms, which will typically be small and medium sized, are the engines of growth, creating jobs, a middle class, and a substantial tax base. Growing firms, besides creating wealth and jobs, introduce new services and business methods that help the entire economy become more productive.

The potential of entrepreneurship to transform economies is not limited to the developed world. If our intent in spending CERP money is to improve the security situation, job creation is the heart of sustainable stability and is best accomplished through the establishment and expansion of new small- and medium-sized businesses with a vested stake in the security and prosperity of their country—wherever possible, that is where commanders should be committing their resources.

Providing prescriptions to enhance CERP effectiveness is challenging for several reasons, not the least of which is that the initial purpose of the program was as a stop-gap measure to fund rapid solutions to humanitarian emergencies in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion. Its transformation in purpose and implementation has been in large part a result of the ever-changing environments on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 and 2004, respectively. Commanders' intent for CERP today, which often flies in the face of the current CERP standard operating procedure, has moved beyond emergencies, far into the realm of economic development. There is still cause to consider how CERP, or some version of economic development money allocated to the military, might be made more effective to that end. It is important to note that while CERP has been, to date, a product of our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we should endeavor to detach the deployment of money as a weapons system from the context of these wars exclusively, thinking of CERP instead as a dynamic and flexible capability inherently essential to the prosecution of unnamed and as-yet-unknown future conflicts.

Recommendations

Improve transparency at the local level. One of the greatest causes of Afghan

dissatisfaction is the perception that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are colluding in elite empowerment and corruption. Donor conferences, local media, and the consistent presence of foreigners give the local population unrealistic expectations about how much money is being spent in their country and to what end. Although many of these factors are beyond the control of the military, it should be mindful when supervising a contract or spending CERP money to be as transparent as possible.

Provide the community with a comprehensive accounting of what money is being spent, by whom, and for what purpose. Projects disapproved for CERP funding should also be included in this list. Traditional psychological operations—flyers, military broadcasts, media outreach, and community briefings—are effective means of informing the local population.

Consult local leaders before committing money—the people must own the economy. Including citizens and community leaders in CERP spending decisions increases the chances of a project's successful completion and local integration. Despite the requirement, according to the CERP manual, of coordinating among many actors to gain the greatest effect, local opinion and expertise are frequently excluded from the decisionmaking process,⁸ which is still weighted in favor of approval by the battlespace owner and the PRT, the only two signatures required for funding approval. This means that citizens and local leaders are still frequently left out. This may lengthen the planning and project completion timeline, but securing local buy-in will provide short-term local support as well as, most important, long-term effectiveness for the project.

Invest where risk is low, and incentivize stability, not violence. Although aid may be a destabilizing factor in places of insecurity, in provinces of greater security international military presence is not seen as a destabilizing force.⁹ Moreover, when long-term economic growth is the goal, any successful investor will advise going to areas where human capital is strong and political and security risk is low. CERP has traditionally been disbursed in provinces of greatest insecurity because these are the areas with which the military has the greatest familiarity, but also the areas perceived as being in greatest need. Consequently, the more stable areas are comparatively underfunded. Spending where risk of violence is highest is counterintuitive from a conventional investor's perspective, and even with security objectives in mind should be viewed as potentially rewarding bad behavior. Different sets of potential returns must be weighed against each other—understandably, concentrating CERP projects in high-violence areas carries the prospect of reducing violence and increasing stability, a valuable return on investment.

At the same time, CERP spending in areas of established stability may have a comparably valuable though different return: the

when economic growth is the goal, any investor will advise going to areas where human capital is strong and political and security risk is low

social and economic return may be higher, and success in stable areas might offer a buffer against unstable areas as well as models for successful development. If residents of a violence-ridden region flee, they may seek



U.S. Army (Edward Reagan)

Woman participates in CERP-funded eye screening in Mosul, Iraq

refuge in an area of stability and low violence; in such an instance, CERP spending in the already stable area will have paid off in terms of offering residents a chance to vote with their feet and building up goodwill among the population.

Focus on outcomes, not inputs. With cash-on-delivery aid—an innovative approach to development assistance—commanders could pay a predetermined amount for every predetermined unit of progress but leave the recipients to pursue their own strategy.¹⁰ In one example, the community needs a road to connect two villages. Rather than fund construction of the road with CERP, the commander could pay the local government or community leaders for maintaining and guaranteeing a shorter journey time between the two villages, rather than for the presumed means. This would give the communities involved the flexibility to decide the best means to implement the project, and incentivize the maintenance and security of the road because the journey time is the outcome that is being rewarded.

Ask hard questions; money is not always the solution. In a postconflict setting, money can create as many problems as it solves. It can fuel corruption, enrich elites, invoke resentment among those who do not benefit from its largesse, create perverse incentives to maintain a state of insecurity, and create unrealistic expectations. Grants in particular should be used as a last resort. Starting a business begins with an idea, which is advanced through research in the market, pricing, brand, and logistics. Only then does an entrepreneur consider funding. When deploying CERP funds, commanders should think like investors:

- ❖ What am I achieving by providing funding?
- ❖ Is there a market for the goods or a demand for the service?

- ❖ What gains will my investment bring to the community?
- ❖ What other resources—such as security or business advice—can the commander provide in lieu of money?
- ❖ Has the entrepreneur completed all the other necessary steps to start or expand his or her business?
- ❖ Will this funding create a sustainable situation or is it a stop-gap measure? And if merely a stop-gap measure, will it create enough value to offset the potential of failure?

It is not just about where we spend the money but where we commit our security assets. Commanders use CERP with the intent of buying more security, but they should pay closer attention to using security to make CERP more effective. Commanders could have a game-changing impact on economic growth if they focused their efforts on ensuring the security of marketplaces and trade routes. Business owners who want guaranteed transportation routes in Afghanistan often must pay security dues to the Taliban. The additional transportation cost creates substantial overhead that prevents business owners from exporting goods at a competitive price. By providing improved area security along transportation routes or providing military escorts for goods to move from production to market through contested areas, the military can give a crucial security guarantee and encourage firm growth.

Make grants more efficient. CERP standard operating procedure prohibits loans, hence the military's use of grants. There are a few possibilities to improve the effectiveness, sustainability, and reach of CERP grants for the purpose of economic development. Grants could

be awarded conditionally, with a requirement to match the grant with an equal sum of capital raised by the grant requestor. Alternatively, a commander could purchase the needed construction materials and require the grantee to match the CERP expenditure with a corresponding labor purchase.

Prioritize the funding of Agribusiness Development Teams. In underdeveloped countries, agriculture is usually the dominant industry. In Afghanistan, for example, agriculture accounts for 45 percent of gross domestic

commanders could have a game-changing impact on economic growth if they focused their efforts on ensuring the security of marketplaces and trade routes

product and over 80 percent of the population is involved in farming, herding, or both.¹¹ There is thus a huge scope for improving agricultural productivity. Army National Guard Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) help local farmers with some of the more complicated agriculture problems. ADTs partner with U.S. and Afghan government officials and nongovernmental organizations to offer counsel and to avoid conflict with other projects. CERP money is currently the only funding source for ADT projects. Commanders would do well to rely on the ADTs to identify agriculture projects with high payoff potential.

Prioritize funding for entrepreneurship centers. Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are powerful engines of economic growth: They create jobs, wealth, a stabilizing middle class, and markets for microentrepreneurs. Even more important to local

and national governments, they are a leading source of tax revenue. According to a 2007 study commissioned by USAID and Britain's Department for International Development, one SME—through its purchase of inputs—supports an average of 331 other local businesses: 18 manufacturers, 10 distributors, 20 service providers, 3 equipment suppliers, and 280 microsuppliers.¹² Developing SMEs is a critical part of a holistic approach to economic development that includes improving physical infrastructure, legal and regulatory reform, and development of microfinance programs. Unfortunately, support for SME entrepreneurship has not enjoyed the same support in conflict or unstable environments as these other priorities. Founded in 2005, the Centers for Entrepreneurship and Executive Development is one example of a network of “business accelerators,” serving the entrepreneurs and senior

developing SMEs is a critical part of a holistic approach to economic development

managers who lead growth-oriented SMEs by developing communities of entrepreneurs and a culture of entrepreneurship in the countries it operates in, linking budding entrepreneurs with experienced mentors and providing business-to-business matchmaking within the country and the region. Entrepreneurship centers have the potential to achieve results at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels and have already proven extraordinarily effective in places such as Kosovo and Macedonia.¹³ Relevant to CERP spending, establishing a brick and mortar entrepreneurship center falls within the established guidelines for CERP spending with a price tag under \$500,000.

Focus a portion of CERP spending on electricity production. Access to electricity is a consistent problem hindering businesses in developing economies, particularly in conflict areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Although nation- or province-wide electrical infrastructure development takes years to create and presents a high-profile and impactful target to insurgents, smaller generators are a viable small business opportunity with a great multiplier effect on surrounding entrepreneurs. Commanders can deploy CERP funds to purchase generators, rewire surrounding businesses, and provide an initial supply of fuel to a local entrepreneur who could run the generator as a small business, charging local businesses for electricity to sustain the fuel and maintenance requirements, and other entrepreneurs can keep businesses open longer and more consistently, while households gain better access to electricity.¹⁴

Know how to identify entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are tenacious, resourceful, creative, curious, determined, and hard-working. Second only to security, these traits are even more important to a successful business than access to funding. To be successful, entrepreneurs must have the endorsement of their family. They must have intuitive business sense and understand the basics of pricing and making a profit. Commanders must not underestimate the importance of being able to know true entrepreneurial potential when they see it.

Conclusion

The value of CERP is indisputable. While imperfect and problematic in its implementation, the ability of military commanders to determine where money will be most effective and to oversee the disbursement of funds and development of necessary projects is beyond question. Several studies have illustrated its

effectiveness in securing security gains, and we see great potential for CERP as an enabler for long-term development. That said, the twin goals of security and development are in many ways in competition and cannot be totally reconciled. It is our hope, however, that by implementing some cultural and procedural changes to how commanders deploy CERP resources as well as the security assets to support them, the military will, at the very least, do no harm with respect to setting the conditions for long-term economic development, and hopefully make progress to that end. We hope that commanders will, in time, be better equipped to think like investors. Incorporating expeditionary economics at various levels of professional military education is an important means to that end. By considering the lessons of the grand tradition of American entrepreneurship and the tenets of expeditionary economics doctrine, and by making these suggested modifications to CERP, perhaps the two seemingly opposed missions can move a little closer together. We do acknowledge, though, that CERP is always going to be first and foremost a security tool.

The military is still lacking a holistic picture of what types of CERP projects have been effective and under which circumstances. Although the Center for Army Lessons Learned assembles a list of CERP do's and don'ts, we are still lacking a detailed catalog of CERP case studies that captures real world successes from the field and demonstrates sustainable economic growth or security gains. Such an effort would undoubtedly yield great dividends of understanding and would be a valuable next step in furthering our understanding—and better execution—of money as a weapons system. **PRISM**

Notes

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Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations

BY NORTON A. SCHWARTZ

In 2001, the U.S. military, aided by indigenous forces, swiftly toppled a Taliban government responsible for providing sanctuary to al Qaeda. In 2003, the Iraqi military disintegrated in the face of a devastating demonstration of American power that ended the regime of Saddam Hussein. America showcased its unique ability to project power over vast distances to achieve substantial results. Unfortunately, those initial victories were short-lived. As the security situations deteriorated in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States became engaged in longer term irregular conflicts. American and allied militaries struggled to adapt their doctrine, training, and technology to counter an elusive foe. While ground forces relearned and incorporated counterinsurgency (COIN) lessons, Airmen explored how airpower's flexibility, responsiveness, and bird's-eye view of the battlefield could respond to those lessons.

This reexamination of airpower revealed several enduring principles. Most important is that Airmen must gain airspace control, so the full advantages of rapid mobility, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and precision strike are available to the commander. At higher altitudes, the adversary generally ceded control, but at lower altitudes, control could be contested. By controlling the air and space over Iraq and Afghanistan, the air component was able to transport thousands of personnel, drop supplies to isolated units, evacuate wounded, gather real-time intelligence, and conduct precision strikes to disrupt and destroy insurgent forces. In addition, air and space control allows Airmen to conduct train, advise, assist, and equip missions for indigenous air forces and to strengthen civil aviation infrastructures necessary for national sovereignty and economic growth. These lessons have been a staple of airpower employment since its inception, and they remain relevant today and in the future.

Airpower Performance in Counterinsurgencies

Airmen made their first foray into COIN operations shortly after the invention of the airplane. In 1913, France employed aircraft to put down an uprising in Morocco, and in 1916, the United States used a squadron of aircraft during General John Pershing's expedition into Mexico to capture Pancho Villa.

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Various irregular struggles continued throughout the interwar period and escalated following World War II. In each instance, airpower's unique capabilities—speed, flexibility, and reach—helped to counter insurgent movements using rapid mobility, ISR, and aerial attack.

Rapid Mobility. Military operations of every kind are highly resource dependent. When these resources are required in a timely manner, in distant locations, strategic airlift assets are the delivery method of choice. Similarly, once the resources reach the theater of operations, the job is rarely done. In these situations, the speed,

airpower's unique capabilities—speed, flexibility, and reach—helped to counter insurgent movements

range, security, and flexibility of air mobility make it a vital component of any joint operation.

Intertheater Airlift. An obvious advantage of airpower is its ability to transport a substantial amount of troops and materiel into a theater of operation in minimum time. This characteristic of airpower is true in all types of conflict. In 2001, airlift accounted for 97 percent of the cargo carried into theater for Operation *Enduring Freedom*.¹ Since that time, intertheater airlift has been responsible for the transportation of nearly 9 million passengers, 3 million tons of cargo, and almost 500,000 sorties in U.S. Central Command. This massive mobility effort has been instrumental in recent U.S. successes in Iraq and will remain a fundamental advantage for operations in Afghanistan.

Intratheater Airlift. In most COIN operations, poor ground transportation networks, inhospitable terrain, and rampant insecurity necessitate the use of airpower to quickly deliver fuel, food, equipment, and security personnel to trouble spots

throughout the region, in essence providing a critical logistical and maneuver element for friendly forces. In fact, airpower's intratheater airlift mission has played a pivotal role in several COIN operations, and may arguably be airpower's greatest contribution to the counterinsurgency effort.²

An excellent example is the current struggle between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Government forces have experienced several setbacks since the conflict began in 1966. At one point, the FARC had substantial power and was even able to mount successful conventional attacks against government forces. In recent years, however, Colombia has made significant headway against the insurgency, and the FARC is believed to be almost entirely incapacitated.³ The dramatic turn of events occurred because of a change in the Colombian political environment combined with substantial assistance from the United States. Supported by military advisors, the Colombian military underwent an aggressive program to professionalize its force, but a professional force can do little if it cannot reach the insurgents in the rugged Colombian terrain. To overcome this obstacle, the Colombians significantly increased their air mobility capacity. Now, Colombia possesses the third largest UH-60 Blackhawk fleet in the world.⁴ Airpower and increased mobility gave the Colombian government the decisive advantage needed to deny the insurgent force any kind of sanctuary. Today, the FARC no longer poses a realistic threat to Colombia's governance.

Similarly, Afghanistan is plagued with a vast landscape of inhospitable terrain that hampers central government and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts to defeat insurgent forces. The current ISAF strategy to project central government influence throughout the country requires an enormous amount of intratheater airlift, and without it the operation would



MQ-9 Reaper is capable of carrying both precision-guided bombs and air-to-ground missiles

be severely hampered. Since 2006, coalition Airmen have airdropped over 64 million pounds of cargo, with over half of that in 2009 alone as ISAF expanded its reach into southern Afghanistan.⁵ This effort is aided by an intricate air mobility system that transports government and military personnel to multiple locations on a daily basis, and an aeromedical evacuation process that has saved thousands of lives. Since 2009, Air Force rescue forces have been credited with 1,781 saves and over 5,000 assists while evacuating coalition personnel and Afghan civilians for medical care. This critical, lifesaving mission assures Servicemembers that medical assistance is more responsive than at any time in history, and demonstrates our commitment to the local population.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. As the unprecedented demand for remotely piloted aircraft and other ISR assets indicates, intelligence in a counterinsurgency is paramount, and airpower provides a highly capable—if not the most capable—collection method. In fact, airpower’s ability to obtain a three-dimensional picture of the battlefield dates to its infancy. Unsure of exactly what to do with the new technology in the early 1900s, battlefield commanders first employed aircraft as artillery observation platforms and for intelligence-gathering. Although the priority for aircraft changed after commanders realized airpower’s utility as an offensive force, the importance of intelligence collection continued. Today, the ability of space, cyber, and air assets to collect and distribute battlefield situational awareness is a prerequisite to success in any conflict.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, aircraft such as the RC-135 Rivet Joint and Combat Sent, U-2 Dragon Lady, MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, RQ-4 Global Hawk, MC-12 Liberty, and several nontraditional platforms provide around-the-clock ISR coverage.⁶ The Airmen flying these platforms find, track, and target the insurgent command structure. They provide real-time intelligence to appropriate command centers, and more important, to the small unit leader on the ground—often through a direct link. The capability of these Airmen is immense. America’s air warriors operate over large



U.S. Air Force (Michele A. Desrochers)

U.S. Air Force C-130 aircraft taxis off runway after landing at Multi-National Base Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan

areas and often monitor targets for hours or even days. Since 2008, airborne ISR assets have been tasked with over 1 million targets, provided support in over 800 troops-in-contact situations, assisted in the capture of more than 160 high-value individuals, and identified over 1,000 possible improvised explosive devices. These ISR assets provide the continuous coverage necessary to protect American and coalition forces while ferreting out insurgents hidden among the population.

The ISR effort is amplified by the multitude of space assets supporting operations in the region. In the late 1950s, the French had to rely on a carefully planned infrastructure of radio relay stations to pass messages between isolated outposts in Algeria. Today, the United States and coalition allies harness the power of space-based systems to extend our communications network across the globe. Combined with imagery, intercepted communications, and the global positioning system (GPS), coalition forces have the most up-to-date information available to precisely target insurgents—a unique advantage they enjoy due to American airpower.

Precision Attack. Counterinsurgent strategies generally seek to target either the insurgent or his acceptance among the population. Current U.S. and coalition strategy emphasizes protecting the population. Once insurgents are isolated, firepower is brought to bear, and airpower is capable of focusing the appropriate amount of firepower in a minimum amount of time.

During the French involvement in Algeria, airpower played a significant role in every facet of the COIN operation.⁷ Like many other COIN conflicts, air transport and ISR were a fundamental part of the process. However, some of the most notable contributions came from aerial strikes. Confronted by foreign safe havens that supported the insurgency through air, sea, and land routes, the French air force controlled the airspace over Algeria, interdicted maritime-based support, and patrolled the extensive

border areas with Tunisia and Morocco to strangle insurgent supply lines. This operation eventually starved the insurgency of the personnel, weapons, and supplies necessary to continue military operations. Internally, the French air force prepared landing zones, provided close air support, and executed direct attacks against insurgent forces. These actions, in combination with ground efforts, substantially reduced and dispersed internal insurgent forces and kept additional forces in Tunisia and Morocco from entering the country.⁸

Like Algeria, precision attack plays a substantial role in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The ability to loiter over the battlefield, respond to ground personnel in need of assistance, and track and eliminate insurgents makes airpower an absolutely essential part of these operations. Coalition air forces are able to provide this counterinsurgent strike capability because of the technological advances in precision engagement. Small diameter bombs, GPS- and laser-guided munitions, and special weapons systems such as the AC-130 gunship bring discrete and proportionate firepower where and when it is needed.

This ability to bring firepower to bear throughout battlespace gives U.S. and coalition forces a distinct asymmetric advantage over the insurgents. Often insurgents are able to shape the fight by avoiding direct confrontation with conventional forces. This means government forces must “take to the streets,” conduct extensive clearing missions, and secure areas after they are cleared. This kind of operation is manpower intensive. However, it is much more difficult for insurgent forces to mitigate the asymmetric advantage of airpower. Orbiting overhead, Airmen are able to find, identify, track, and kill insurgents, and this capability constrains insurgent operations. The deadly firepower they bring allows commanders to prosecute time-sensitive targets, such as high-value individuals, and provides for the

timely protection of ground forces under attack. Since 2004, over 200,000 close air support sorties have been flown in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of this protective airpower umbrella, and coalition aviation has dropped 22,000 munitions in support of established COIN objectives.⁹ By doing this day after day, Airmen protected the lives of countless U.S. and coalition troops, while at the same time furthering coalition interests in the region.

Unfortunately, collateral damage and civilian casualties are a reality of war. However, despite the media’s focus on airstrikes, airpower has rarely been the cause. In fact, the Taliban is responsible for the vast majority of the attacks on Afghan civilians. According to the National Counterterrorism Center, terrorist attacks in Afghanistan were responsible for 6,796 casualties in 2009. Comparatively, ISAF actions accounted for 657 casualties, and only 78 of those were attributable to airpower. The reality is that between 2007 and 2009, nearly 14,500 air-to-ground weapons releases occurred in Afghanistan and less than one-tenth of one percent resulted in civilian casualties.¹⁰ That is a record of unmatched precision, and the result of tireless efforts to reduce noncombatant casualties. These efforts have paid off. From 2008 to 2009, the number of civilians killed or wounded by air-to-ground munitions dropped 71 percent, and numbers for 2008 decreased 31 percent over 2007.¹¹

Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip. While many of airpower’s contributions derive from increased mobility, ISR, and precision attack, another significant advantage is the development of military and civil aviation structures. By assisting in these areas, Airmen ensure a troubled government is able to protect its sovereignty and create an interconnected hub of economic growth.

Military Aviation. Typically, a counterinsurgency requires a substantial number of ground troops to secure the country from internal threats—something many developing

nations cannot afford. However, as in the case with Colombia, a smaller, highly skilled ground force complemented with a capable air force can significantly reduce the cost.

Furthermore, most nations cannot ignore the state-level threats that lurk just outside their borders. Unless a larger country is guaranteeing its safety, a developing state must have the ability to protect itself from would-be aggressors. One way to deter external threats is to invest in a sufficiently capable air force. Relative to its neighbors, Israel fields a fairly small active duty military. The Israelis offset this by having a significant reserve force and a highly credible and capable air force—arguably one of the best in the

aviation infrastructure can provide the connectivity necessary to improve governance and spur economic growth

world. While not every developing nation needs, or should seek, an air force as capable as Israel's, a reputable air force helps deter aggression. A nation emerging from instability or a protracted insurgency will be expected to defend its borders and that is difficult without a credible air force.

Iraq and Afghanistan will be no different. Even if both governments prevail internally, it is likely they will still face an external security threat. Each country borders other nations that, while they may not challenge national sovereignty directly, may attempt to coerce them militarily. With these competing challenges to national sovereignty, it is essential that each country has a credible and capable air force that can defend against internal and external threats. The U.S. Air Force contributes to this effort through its foreign internal defense mission.¹²

In Iraq, the “train, advise, assist, and equip” mission facilitated Iraqi air force development by acquiring 106 aircraft, training 7,200 airmen, and transitioning ownership of air bases in four locations. This commitment to Iraq's air development will continue in the future as it improves its ability to monitor its airspace, control aircraft within it, and defend its territory through ground-based air defense systems and a multirole fighter.

A sustainable Afghan air force is a much more challenging problem. Riddled by years of internal conflict, Afghanistan's air force must be built step-by-step in a country still racked with instability. This means that Afghans must focus on guaranteeing internal security: transportation of government officials to outlying areas, rapid deployment of security forces to disrupt insurgent operations, and the swift evacuation of casualties. Currently, much of this capability is provided by Mi-17/35 helicopters and C-27 transports, but as the Afghan air force matures, it must acquire additional lower cost transport, training, and close air support aircraft. Coalition airmen are working diligently to make this happen while devoting considerable time to develop a professional cadre of officers and enlisted personnel to lead and maintain such an air force.

Civil Aviation Development. An interconnected civil aviation infrastructure underpins the global economy and has become the hallmark of a developed nation. In 2008, air transport accounted for 3.4 percent of the world's gross domestic product, and goods traded by air were valued at 35 percent of total global exports.¹³ Taking advantage of this market requires the technology and infrastructure to operate safely, and those developing countries capable of meeting the safety standard have seen substantial economic benefits—usually resulting in double-digit returns on investment.¹⁴

Nations wishing to reap these benefits must first concentrate on improving the domestic

transportation structure. Typically, the aviation infrastructure is the last to develop as a nation evolves technologically; however, this does not need to be the case. In a place such as Afghanistan, where inhospitable terrain, a poor road and rail system, and no navigable waterways exist, it is logical to build an airway system to spur the development of trade and link disparate regions and people. Nearly 85 percent of the 81,000-mile Afghan road network is severely degraded, and a major portion is not sufficiently developed to accommodate even motor vehicles.¹⁵ This is an enormous impediment to economic progress since growth is heavily dependent on the transportation of goods, services, and people to national and international markets. An effective civil aviation infrastructure could complement future road improvements, but the Afghan air system requires near-term work. Short runways, the lack of paved surfaces, and the low number of airports restrict the usefulness of the system and could be improved.

By developing the aviation infrastructure in nations such as Afghanistan, the United States and its allies can provide the connectivity necessary to improve governance and spur economic growth. As the aviation structure matures, it will enable inclusion into the global economic market. In some instances, the necessary assistance may occur after a conflict has ravaged the local economy and infrastructure, and in other times Airmen may be able to assist strategically important states that are floundering but still in control. Either way, there is an important role for Airmen in aviation development.

The Way Ahead

The future of irregular warfare may look even more challenging than it does today. Nonstate actors, especially those seeking weapons of mass destruction, will continue to threaten international

stability and undermine the global economy. Future adversaries may get access to long-range, precision weapons and advanced information technology, blurring the lines between regular and irregular conflict. In particular, actors will pursue antiaccess and area-denial strategies in an attempt to thwart American military power projection. This will include the use of precision-guided missiles, mortars, and rockets that will place deployed air- and seabases at risk and further challenge our ability to control the air—a foundational requirement in any future conflict. As a result, military forces will increasingly be required to operate in insecure environments. The level of air and space control we have come to expect in Iraq and Afghanistan may not exist in future irregular conflicts. To maintain the asymmetric advantage of airpower that has been so consistently demonstrated over the past decade, the United States will need to focus efforts on overcoming these threats.

Added to this, engagement, building partnership capacity, and allied integration will become increasingly more important as ways to prevent instability and respond to a crisis. The Air Force will continue to maintain the ability to deploy teams of Airmen to strategically important regions to assist with stabilization and to develop a state's civil aviation infrastructure. In some cases, we will educate and train viable indigenous air forces to higher levels of effectiveness. In other situations, the Air Force will contribute as it has before with rapid mobility, ISR, and precision attack to stabilize a conflict in progress and restore effective governance.

Regardless of the conflict, airpower remains an important element of U.S. military power. It is a national asymmetric advantage. Using the unique capabilities of airpower, Airmen of all the Services can be counted on to adapt to evolving threats and overcome future challenges. We must continue to build upon the

lessons we have learned from previous conflicts and prepare our forces to fight and engage in increasingly contested air, space, and cyberspace environments. As they have throughout our current conflicts, Airmen will rise to these new challenges and, day by day, demonstrate their value as members of America’s joint and interagency team. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Defense Transportation: Air Mobility Command Needs to Collect and Analyze Better Data to Assess Aircraft Utilization* (Washington, DC: GAO, 2005), 6. Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, which was initially characterized as a highly conventional conflict, relied heavily on sealift to transport the large quantities of heavy equipment. However, airlift still accounted for 13 percent of the cargo transported into theater.

² James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 427. Examples include the U.S. Marine Corps intervention in Nicaragua (1920s), the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), El Salvador (1980–1992), and Colombia (1966–present).

³ Robert Haddick, “Colombia Can Teach Afghanistan (and the United States) How to Win,” *Air & Space Power Journal* (Summer 2010).

⁴ Peter DeShazo, Johanna Mendelson Forman, and Phillip McLean, *Countering Threats to Security and Stability in a Failing State: Lessons from Colombia* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 22.

⁵ Air Force Central Command (AFCENT), *Combined Forces Air Component Commander: 2007–2010 Airpower Statistics* (Shaw Air Force Base, SC: AFCENT, August 2010).

⁶ Nontraditional ISR platforms refer to those aircraft primarily designed for precision attack that also have a significant capability to gather intelligence. Examples of this include the B–1, B–52, F–15E, F–16, and in future conflicts the substantial ISR contributions of the F–22 and F–35.

⁷ While the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) eventually seized control after Algeria gained independence, many aspects of France’s military COIN operations were extremely successful in minimizing FLN influence while Algeria remained under French control.

⁸ A.H. Peterson, George C. Reinhardt, and E.E. Conger, eds., *Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Algerian War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1963), 72–74.

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¹⁰ AFCENT, *2007–2010 Airpower Statistics*.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Aviation Foreign Internal Defense is one of the five irregular warfare lines of operation applicable in and outside of a COIN environment.

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¹⁴ International Air Transport Association (IATA), *Aviation Economic Benefits* (Montreal, Canada: IATA, 2008), 1–2.

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Ministerial Advisors

Developing Capacity for an Enduring Security Force

BY JAMES A. SCHEAR, WILLIAM B. CALDWELL IV, AND FRANK C. DIGIOVANNI

*When asked how long the United States should stay [in Afghanistan], one elder said:
“Until the moment that you make our security forces self-sufficient. Then you will be welcome
to visit us, not as soldiers but as guests.”*

—Senator Carl Levin, Speech on the Floor of the Senate, September 11, 2009

The Taliban and other insurgent elements fighting against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan are convinced that they will succeed if they simply wait us out. They think if they maintain their influence in key areas such as Helmand and Kandahar provinces, they will be poised to regain control of the entire country when coalition forces begin to drawdown in the next few years.

What these enemies of the Afghan government fail to grasp is that they will not be able to outlast a self-sufficient and self-sustaining Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). As North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary-General Fogh Rasmussen has stated, the Taliban “might think they can wait us out. But within a year or so [of summer 2010], there will be over 300,000 Afghan soldiers and police trained and ready to defend their country. And they can’t be waited out.”¹ The mission to develop these forces, and build the Afghan government’s capacity to sustain them into the future, belongs to the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM–A).

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Empowering Partners to Defend Themselves

The NTM–A capacity-building mission is not only a strategic pillar of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strategy, but it is also a U.S. national security imperative that has been articulated at all levels of our government. The National Security Strategy charges our military with the responsibility to “partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.”² Reinforcing this theme, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has argued that “the effectiveness

only after Afghanistan’s security institutions are self-sufficient and self-sustaining will it be possible for the Afghan government to make geographic gains durable

and credibility of the United States will only be as good as the effectiveness, credibility, and sustainability of its local partners. . . . Building the governance and security capacity of other countries must be a critical element of U.S. national security strategy.”³ Although the Department of Defense (DOD) has made progress in answering the Secretary’s call to improve our partners’ abilities to defend themselves, there is more still to be done—particularly in Afghanistan.

NTM–A has been charged with building Afghan capacity in four primary areas: training and equipping the Afghan National Army and Police, developing the Ministries of Interior (MoI) and Defense (MoD), improving the country’s human capital, and investing in Afghanistan’s physical capital. To establish an *enduring* force that can provide security for its

country’s population over the long term, the most critical task is to develop effective and accountable security ministries. Only after Afghanistan’s security institutions are self-sufficient and self-sustaining will it be possible for the Afghan government to make geographic gains durable.

Sharing Ministry-level Expertise: The MoDA Program

Developing these critical and complex ministries requires a mixture of humility and realism. While technical assistance can help, ministerial capacity must ultimately be home-grown; it cannot simply be “exported” by well-intentioned foreign partners to their host-nation counterparts.

DOD recently tapped its considerable institutional resources to make a vital contribution to advising efforts. Drawing upon its own pool of civilian expertise, the Defense Department established the Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) program in 2009. The program pairs civilian specialists with officials at the Afghan MoD and MoI. Seventeen of these senior DOD civilians deployed to Afghanistan in the summer of 2010, advising their Afghan counterparts in specialized fields such as logistics, financial administration, and human resources. The program marks a significant evolution in the DOD approach to institutional capacity-building. It combines rigorous predeployment training in mentoring skills with a structured reachback capability that allows advisors to make full use of DOD resources. Additionally, the program provides backfill funding for each advisor’s parent organization during deployment and emphasizes the importance of building relationships with partners that will continue long after advisors return home. Recognizing the program’s immediate contributions and the growing need



U.S. Air Force (Efrén Lopez)

The Afghan National Police mission is to maintain law and order and support the government's efforts to regain control of the country

for civilian expertise in the development of Afghan security institutions, ISAF Commander General David Petraeus has called for the program to expand dramatically by summer 2011.

The MoDA program, with its emphasis on civilian-led institution-building, is only the latest innovation in the Defense Department's ongoing advisory efforts in Afghanistan. Military advisors began working with Afghan forces in the early days of the war, and their importance grew as building sustainable Afghan-led security institutions became a priority. However, these American advisory efforts were often carried out on an ad hoc basis, utilizing uniformed or contract personnel who did not always possess the requisite experience in the fields where their services were sought, or who lacked sufficient working knowledge of the sociocultural context into which they were being deployed. While filling tactical-level advisory requirements has proved relatively straightforward, if demanding, the sheer diversity of ministerial-level portfolios makes it more challenging to align advisory expertise with ministerial needs.

Ministry-level advising requires diverse yet specialized skill sets. The Afghan MoD slaughterhouse is a prime example. This organization is responsible for procuring meat products to feed the 136,000-strong Afghan National Army. Originally, a U.S. Army colonel was selected as an advisor based primarily on his knowledge of hunting—the battlefield equivalent of a meat-processing background. With the institution of the MoDA program, the Afghan army slaughterhouse now has a civilian advisor from the Defense Commissary Agency with over 20 years of experience providing safe, quality meat. This level of experience cannot be found within the uniformed ranks, and few contract agencies could provide the combination of slaughterhouse

expertise and functional knowledge of a defense ministry.

Bringing Civilian Assets to Partner Capacity-building

With the capability to leverage such specialized skill sets, the MoDA program is an example of the growing DOD capacity to play a reconstructive role in societies transitioning from war to peace. The core objective of these efforts is the development of effective

in Afghanistan, where the political landscape is still solidifying, civil-military partnership is especially important

security institutions that are accountable to civilian leadership. Putting civilians in charge of the military separates the coercive force within a nation from its political decision-making. This creates a culture in which the armed forces focus on defending the nation while remaining independent of political concerns, leaving civilian-led ministries to navigate the nuanced political landscape. The MoDA program was designed to foster such civil-military partnerships.

In Afghanistan, where the political landscape is still solidifying, civil-military partnership is especially important. Afghanistan's survival as a democracy depends largely on the ability of its army and police forces to provide security to the Afghan population, regardless of political affiliation or ethnic background. After decades of conflict, the Afghan military has considerable control over Afghanistan's nascent security institutions. Many key positions in Afghanistan's MoI and MoD are filled by former army commanders who bring with them a wealth of tactical experience. But in a country

that has not had a functioning central government for many years, their civilian credentials are understandably lacking. This is a key area where MoDA program advisors can be of use.

MoDA civilian advisors have assets that military and contract advisors lack. They deploy straight from positions within DOD and typically have years of experience in those jobs. They will remain in their positions upon their return, bringing close personal and professional relationships with their Afghan counterparts back. These links will help form an important part of the foundation of an enduring security partnership between the United States and Afghan government.

Like military advisors, MoDA advisors have the flexibility to contribute outside their original mandate. This is a benefit that cannot be provided by contract advisors, who must complete their tasks according to a specific contract. Kimberly Ekholm's experiences as an advisor illustrate this capacity for innovation. As a DOD-trained executive assistant and advisor to Enayatullah Nazari, first deputy to the Minister of Defense, Ms. Ekholm was asked to begin training Minister Nazari's staff to use email. However, she found that a ministry-wide lack of computer skills meant that other departments would be unable to access and respond to the messages that the deputy minister and his staff sent. So Mr. Nazari asked her to extend the email training course to the entire ministry. Before beginning, she surveyed staff from all departments to find out what skills they had acquired from past training programs and developed a curriculum based on their needs. Her experience as a civilian opened doors that a uniformed advisor might not have been aware of, allowing her to design and execute a computer training course in coordination with the Afghan Defense

Ministry’s Public Affairs, Communications, and Personnel Training departments.

The MoDA program complements a range of other institution-building initiatives within DOD and beyond. Defense security cooperation programs such as the Defense Institution Reform Initiative, Warsaw Initiative Fund, and Defense Institute of International Legal Studies training program help our allies undertake security sector reforms and strengthen their military capabilities. The U.S. Department of State, Department of Commerce, and other government agencies have their own advisory programs that contribute importantly to capacity-building efforts in Afghanistan and other partner states around the world.

However, the MoDA program is unique in that it builds on deployment mechanisms developed by the recently established Civilian Expeditionary Workforce to recruit the most qualified DOD civilians and provide them the support they need to be effective. Unlike other programs that place staff in U.S. field offices, the MoDA program sends civilians to work directly within a partner government, working inside the country in need. The program’s ability to draw experienced specialists from the Secretary of Defense’s own staff sends an important message of American commitment to our allies.

Putting the Right Advisors in the Right Places

A successful advisory program must address both the supply of qualified advisors and the demand for their services. The MoDA program has developed mechanisms for both, a model that will become increasingly important as the need for civilian defense advisors grows in Afghanistan and around the world.

To meet this demand, the MoDA program works closely with American and NATO forces and the Afghan government to identify the requirements within the security sector that can best be addressed by civilian expertise. Effective identification of the right person for the right advisory position requires flexibility and recognition of the critical role that personality plays in a successful advisory effort. Many MoDA program advisors have taken on unexpected tasks and responsibilities, responding to needs that were only apparent once they were on the ground in Afghanistan. One example is John Gillette, who brought a background in business development and an appreciation for innovative solutions to his role as advisor to Major General Hotak, First Deputy Minister

personal connections are central to forging an enduring partnership between DOD and Afghan ministries

of Defense for Acquisition and Training. Mr. Gillette, who was originally assigned to advise another official, impressed General Hotak with his matter-of-fact manner and dedication to finding long-term Afghan-led solutions. After turning down other advisors who could not address the kinds of problems Mr. Gillette had decades of experience solving, General Hotak specifically requested that Mr. Gillette be assigned to work with him, and the two have developed a rapport necessary to accomplish tasks together.

Personal connections such as these are central to forging an enduring partnership between DOD and Afghan ministries. The experiences of MoDA advisors, who have drawn on their individual talents and experiences to break through language and cultural barriers and form



U.S. Navy (Ernesto Hernandez Fonte)

Recruits take oath of enlistment during Afghan National Army ceremony in Regional Military Training Center-Kandahar, October 2010

lasting bonds with their Afghan counterparts, highlight the principle at the heart of DOD civilian advisory programs: people build institutions.

Ensuring a supply of talented and experienced advisors is just as important as matching their individual skills to meet specific demands. The MoDA program was designed to draw on sustainable DOD personnel resources—marking a significant evolution from previous case-by-case military and contracted advising initiatives. The program’s backfill mechanism provides funds to advisors’ parent organizations, allowing them to temporarily fill a position while their employee is overseas. Reducing the strain on the advisor’s employer serves two purposes: It helps attract the most qualified candidates for advisory positions and it ensures that they are able to resume their positions within DOD when they complete deployment. When they return home, MoDA participants bring professional connections to their counterparts in Afghanistan’s security ministries and a new wealth of knowledge and experience back with them to the Department of Defense.

The MoDA program also offers participants considerable opportunities for personal and professional development. Several advisors have asked to extend their year-long deployment to 2 years, and as the program expands, the level of interest from DOD civilians suggests that it is achieving its goal of sustainability while also helping foster a culture in which more and more civilian experts are becoming directly involved in security capacity-building overseas. As demand for DOD constructive capabilities grows, the ability to deploy civilian resources will need to develop further. The MoDA program is an important step in this direction.

Filling a Department-Wide Gap

Intensive predeployment training has helped advisors become immediately effective upon arrival in Afghanistan, and has been key to the program's success thus far. Participants receive 7 weeks of extensive, experiential training in culture, language, and advisory skills, as well as adaptability, resiliency, and personal safety training. Some of the unique aspects of this preparation include a personality inventory that measures innovation and critical thinking skills, along with training that encourages an "adaptive stance" to complex decisionmaking, risk communication, and executive "branding" techniques that provide skills that MoDA advisors can use to help Afghan officials build public confidence in the security ministries.

Although MoDA senior civilians are experts in their functional areas, the training provides some of the additional core competencies needed to be successful advisors. These competencies include mentoring and advisor skills, where participants learn to focus their advisory efforts around the program's four overarching objectives: supporting local ownership; designing projects for sustainability; demonstrating empathy, humility, and respect; and doing no harm. Advisors receive intensive language and cultural instruction, with a ratio of three students to one native speaker for an hour and a half each day for the entire course.

In the first 5-week phase of classroom training, senior-level American and Afghan officials, regional experts, and instructors from the United States Institute of Peace worked closely with the first class of MoDA program advisors.⁴ In the second phase, a 10-day immersive field exercise at the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center introduced advisors to the realities of living on a forward operating base and gave them the opportunity to test their advising

skills—in an academic, controlled environment with native Afghan role players and interpreters—before they were called upon to use these skills with their Afghan counterparts. The trainees also learned about personnel security and were introduced to the Marine Corps' "Combat Hunter" situational awareness course. Subsequent courses will include an increased focus on physical and mental preparedness, more immersive role playing and practical exercises, and an increased emphasis on assessing student progress during the course.

Harnessing Departmental Resources

The MoDA program includes a structured reachback mechanism, making it easier for advisors in the field to draw on DOD resources. This enhances the natural links that advisors have to their parent organizations. These connections are among the most valuable assets that MoDA program advisors bring to their Afghan counterparts. Ms. Ekholm, who worked for the Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA) before joining the MoDA program, was able to call her former colleagues for help when a staff member from another department in the Afghan MoD asked her for assistance in setting up an English language course. DODEA shared its English as a Second Language program curriculum and instructor training methods with her, which Ms. Ekholm was able to adapt.

Similarly, Rasheed Diallo, who advises officials in charge of audits and personnel for the Logistics Directorate at the Afghan MoI, looked to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Command Supply Discipline Program (CSDP) for a model checklist to use in conducting internal audits of departments, providing critical support to the Afghan National Police. While

the Army's CSDP checklist gave the MoI a template to work from, Mr. Diallo and his Afghan counterparts tailored the checklist for use in an Afghan environment. The fact that it was a joint effort was critical to the project's success. With Afghan buy-in and ownership, this kind of initiative is much more likely to continue to be implemented after the advisors leave.

Ultimately, the goal is to support the Afghan army and police. Mr. Diallo and the other MoDA advisors work with key leaders in the MoI and MoD to increase their capacity and capabilities to generate, train, and sustain forces. They focus on three key areas: structural changes, the crafting of policies and laws in support of Afghan Parliament, and the development of a logistics system. Less than a year into deployment, the advisors' efforts have been translated into tangible results that have a direct impact on the sustainability of Afghan forces. For example, Mr. Diallo's assistance in the development of internal audit mechanisms for the Afghan National Police will help ensure transparency and oversight of everything from the police bakery and laundry services to the explosive ordnance disposal unit. As the senior civilian advisor to the Director of Supply and Sustainment at the Afghan MoI, Rick Pollitt is training his Afghan counterparts to develop systems for weapons accountability and ammunition management—measures that are crucial to keeping weapons out of the hands of insurgents.

Looking Ahead

Ministerial capacity is clearly growing. Structurally, both the MoD and MoI have created Recruiting and Training Commands critical to developing stable systems for recruiting demographically representative personnel and establishing a common standard of training. The ministries have advanced policies and

advocated laws necessary to generating, training, and sustaining Afghan forces. Their successes include the creation of a formal document detailing the size and composition of each force, and they will soon implement a comprehensive personnel system that includes merit-based promotion, established career paths, and retirement systems. To sustain the force, the ministries have developed a regional logistics system, helping push supplies beyond the distribution points in Kabul and Kandahar.

The field of logistics is one in which MoDA advisors have been especially active. Mr. Pollitt has also worked with his Afghan counterparts to develop a transformational logistics reporting tool to track equipment and supplies distributed to police forces in over 300 districts, helping ensure that the Afghan police get needed supplies in an efficient and transparent manner. Soldiers and police in the field are consistently found to be short of food, clothing, and other necessities, making the institutionalization of these kinds of systems essential to the long-term viability of the Afghan security forces. The next step will be to create a "push" system, where logistics planners identify what should be needed at each unit and push it to them, without waiting for a request. This system gets supplies to those who need them before they would otherwise be missed. In the current "pull" system, units wait to request supplies until they have identified a need. Units fail to forecast future shortages—and so they go without. This is unacceptable in any security force, and even more so in one that is consistently in combat.

As the MoDA program prepares to deploy its second group of civilian advisors to Afghanistan in spring 2011, significant challenges remain. Expanding the program will mean addressing the administrative issues that complicate the task of sending a large number

of civilians overseas. New systems need to be designed to make civilians more deployable, and mechanisms for tracking trained specialists within the DOD workforce will become a key element of targeted recruiting.

As MoDA program administrators tackle the supply-side challenges of increased civilian deployment, the demand for defense specialists will grow. With the creation of Afghan infantry and basic police units largely completed by the end of 2010, coalition forces will be able to focus on establishing units specializing in logistics, intelligence, maintenance, and other areas that a professional, enduring force requires. More capable security ministries will be needed as these new units increase the complexity of maintaining Afghan forces. As their need for specialized knowledge increases, ministry officials will require skilled advisors to help them address these difficult issues.

Ultimately, the task of building the capacity of the ANSF is a “duel in strategic endurance,”⁵ with insurgent forces determined to wait us out, and international political support wearing thin. However, while coalition forces will be thinned out over the next few years, NTM–A, in some form or another, will have an enduring presence supporting the ANSF. Whether it evolves into an Office of Security Cooperation similar to those in U.S. Embassies across the globe, or something more robust, the United States and Afghanistan will have a significant military-to-military relationship with strong civilian support for years to come. The MoDA program is ideally positioned to support this partnership today and well into the future.

Recovery from 30 years of warfare does not occur quickly. Political patience and a large initial investment in building Afghan capacity are needed to restart the Afghan economy and provide security to a society that has suffered decades of violence. The payoff will be professional security forces that are able to protect the Afghan population, creating room for the development needed to sustain peace and stability.

No matter how the political winds may blow in the future, and regardless of the international presence remaining in Afghanistan, “we must leave the Afghan people with an enduring capability and force generation capacity” to provide for their own security.⁶ By developing the Afghan National Security Force and the ministries that will sustain it, we are ensuring that Afghanistan will be safe in the hands of its own soldiers and police—forces that Afghanistan’s enemies won’t be able to outlast. **PRISM**

The authors wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Nathan K. Finney, Adelia Saunders, Beverly Popelka, and Kelly Uribe in the preparation of this article.

Notes

¹ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “Monthly Press Briefing,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 7, 2010, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_64083.htm>.

² *2010 National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 11.

³ Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” *Foreign Affairs*, May–June 2010.

⁴ Speakers participating in the 2010 Ministry of Defense Advisor training course included counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen, Afghanistan expert Sarah Chayes, Ambassadors James Dobbins and the late

Richard Holbrooke, former Afghan Minister of the Interior Ali Jalali, and former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley.

⁵ Anthony Cordesman, *Realism in Afghanistan: Rethinking an Uncertain Case for the War* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2010).

⁶ William B. Caldwell IV, "Security Force Assistance: A Change in Mindset," *Infantry Bugler*, Spring 2010, 9.

Metrics for the Haiti Stabilization Initiative

BY DAVID C. BECKER AND ROBERT GROSSMAN-VERMAAS

Stabilization in postconflict or low-conflict situations is a growing business around the world. For the United States, stabilization efforts at the moment may seem to focus on U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the recently released Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review noted that there are 36 active conflicts and 55 fragile states in the world. In reality, the United States supports stabilization efforts from Colombia to Lebanon through a variety of programs. Using a parallel non-U.S.-centric indicator, the United Nations (UN) now supports more than 14,000 police in 17 different countries to provide police advice, law enforcement training, and a public security presence in situations where the UN has a mandate to support a government or encourage peace-building efforts.

As more is given *for* stabilization missions, more is demanded *from* stabilization missions. With the money comes responsibility to monitor and evaluate the funds and time spent. This is not just to avoid waste and fraud, but to prove that the overall investment was worthwhile and made a positive difference. Objective and accurate evaluation provides a basis to learn from experience and decide what should or should not be funded in the future. A rigorous metrics and evaluation effort should yield evidence of progress toward accomplishing project/program goals. Without evidence, there exists no rational basis for drawing any conclusions and basing future policy or program decisions.

In a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of Department of Defense (DOD)-funded stabilization programs in 28 countries, the GAO recommended that “the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and Administrator [of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)], develop and implement specific plans to monitor,

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evaluate and report on their outcomes and their impact on US strategic objectives to determine whether continued funding for these projects is appropriate.”¹

Even as there is growing interest in understanding what works in stabilization or peace-building evaluation, there is growing frustration. Several things make evaluation a hard sell:

Haiti has seen six UN interventions in the last 20 years, including the use of U.S. forces on three occasions

- ❖ People do not like to measure themselves.
- ❖ No one agrees on what to measure: “stabilization,” “conflict response,” “peace-building,” or “counterinsurgency.”
- ❖ Often programs have no clear hypotheses to measure.
- ❖ There is still a great deal of confusion about the types of monitoring and evaluation.
- ❖ There is often a concern about spending limited program dollars on something that does nothing to improve results.
- ❖ Speed kills evaluations.

Despite all these problems, there are some interesting examples of metrics in stabilization that might shed some light on what works and what does not.

The Cité Soleil Case

Haiti is one of the lesser known cases where both the United Nations and the United States are involved in stabilization efforts. Haiti has seen six UN interventions in the last 20 years,

including the use of U.S. forces on three occasions. One estimate suggests that DOD has spent more than \$1 billion intervening in and occupying Haiti on different missions. It remains a fragile state by anyone’s calculation, even with a UN force of 11,000 stationed in the country since 2004. Haiti’s weak institutions and proximity to the United States exacerbate issues of drug-trafficking, mass migration, organized crime, political manipulation, and gang violence. By 2007, one particular zone, Cité Soleil, served as a critical focal point of instability, violence, and civil unrest severe enough that it was threatening the stability of the national government, but for the presence of UN forces.

Cité Soleil is a densely populated shantytown located in Port-au-Prince. The capital’s most notorious slum is regarded as one of the Caribbean’s poorest, roughest, and most dangerous areas. It is a no-go area for anyone but gang members and a kind of lawless state within a state. There are few police, no sewers, few stores, and little or no electricity. The crime, unsanitary conditions, lack of essential services, and violence that characterize this slum have become a microcosm of Haiti’s endemic problems. The majority of the estimated 300,000 of the residents are children or young adults. Few live past the age of 50; they die from various diseases, including HIV/AIDS, or of violence. The UN Secretary General has described the human rights situation in Haiti as “catastrophic.”

The Haiti Stabilization Initiative

In response to this growing political/criminal crisis, DOD, using its new Section 1207 authority of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, provided \$20 million from its operation account to the Department of State. The mission was to try a “new approach

to reconstruction and stabilization in Haiti by modifying the way the [U.S. Government] combines all tools at the Embassy's disposal with the goal of markedly improving security, local government capacity, and economic opportunity in Cité Soleil."

The Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI) was designed by an interagency team with assistance from the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) with the goal of improving stability, security, the economy, and local essential services capacity in the most volatile area of Port-au-Prince. By defusing the most urgent drivers of conflict and concurrently increasing institutional capacity and performance, the government of Haiti hoped to buy time in Cité Soleil and to build the psychological and political support that it desperately required. A follow-on effect would be a more conducive environment for U.S. and international economic and social programs in the community to expand their operating environment. The endstate was to "open the doors" of Cité Soleil so that others (and the government) could run the same assistance programs that were offered elsewhere in the country, with no more risk and difficulty than anywhere else in Haiti.

According to the Proposal for the Use of Section 1207 Funding, Haiti Stabilization Initiative, there were a series of direct results anticipated in this \$20 million experiment line:

- ❖ HSI would integrate an expedited police training and professionalization program with a community-focused effort to improve governance, infrastructure, economic outlook, and law enforcement.
- ❖ Building on the U.S. Conflict Transformation Plan for Haiti, HSI

would support a broader stabilization effort aimed at shaping Cité Soleil by creating jobs, building local leadership, and developing programs for sustainable employment.

- ❖ Local governance would be strengthened by providing the means for civil servants and elected officials to provide regular basic services.

In summary, HSI was proposed as an urgent 2-year program intended to open the way for sustained and effective U.S. and donor-funded programs to operate unhindered in Cité Soleil, thereby creating a viable, stable environment.

Developing a Monitoring and Evaluation System for HSI

As the first DOD-funded 1207 project and as the S/CRS prototype effort, the Haiti Stabilization Initiative was carefully monitored to determine the successful achievement of its desired outcomes. Was it possible to do a successful civilian-led stabilization? Was it possible to do it with only \$20 million? If so, how would it be proven that it was the HSI program that made the difference? The HSI interagency team needed a measuring stick to evaluate the program. The original budget for the HSI project included funds for a quarterly survey of population, but it seemed obvious that a survey would not get an in-depth analysis of progress.

M&E for HSI: Innovation and Adaptation

One option for a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) effort was to use the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) system. Luckily, this system had been developed to the point in 2007–2008 where it needed a site to test the prototype system. The system

also met two key criteria: it had to be well researched, and it had to be independent of the stabilization program's management.

The MPICE system includes a framework, collection processes, and analytical tools. A variant of the MPICE prototype system was used for the HSI M&E program. This variant was codeveloped by Logos Technologies, first under contract to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and then to HSI.

The MPICE framework is structured around determining conflict drivers and state/society institutional capacity, as conceptualized by the United States Institute of Peace, Fund for Peace, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and others. The framework was introduced to the stability operations community during the Eisenhower Security Conference in 2006 and funded by the PKSOI. It was then systematically developed over 18 months with input from broad representation across the stability and reconstruction community, including State Department, USAID, DOD, United States Institute of Peace, and international partners. The premise states that if conflict stabilization and societal reconstruction is a process continuum spread between violent

(see figure). Regardless of precise terminology, the MPICE framework is intended to provide M&E teams with a capability to generate substantial insight into conflict environments and gauge progress with respect to this continuum.

To maximize its utility to many existing planning structures, MPICE divides into five traditional sectors:

- ❖ political moderation and stable governance
- ❖ safe and secure environment
- ❖ rule of law
- ❖ sustainable economy
- ❖ social well-being.


Each of these sectors divides into the two subsectors (conflict drivers and institutional performance), which flow down a hierarchy, with measures aggregating to provide indicators of progress toward the achievement of goals over time.

MPICE outcome trends are illustrated using a process in which measures are tailored to the specific stabilization environment of interest, and information is then gathered by means of several data collection methodologies. These methodologies include content analysis, expert knowledge, quantitative data, and surveys/polling data. Each of these collection methods has inherent strengths and weaknesses.

Additional methodologies can be applied depending on the environment. For example, to better assess local stakeholder perceptions of progress in Cité Soleil, Logos Technologies employed a focus group methodology to draw out coded qualitative responses to questions aligned to specific MPICE metrics, which in turn were aligned to HSI's goals. They also developed a richer, more operational version of the expert knowledge or expert elicitation methodology.

data collection methodologies include content analysis, expert knowledge, quantitative data, and surveys/polling data

conflict and sustainable security at opposite ends, viable peace should be considered the middle or “tipping point” where external intervention forces can begin to hand over driving efforts to local forces and capacities



For HSI, MPICE data were then integrated into an analytical tool suite in which Logos analyzed the data to provide three unique outputs:

- ❖ comparative trend analyses between conflict drivers and institutional performance (is one rising or falling, relative to the other over time?)
- ❖ comparative trend analyses across the methodologies (are they indicating comparable outcomes over time?)
- ❖ comparative trend analyses of progress according to sector (is one sector progressing over another over time?).

In general, MPICE can be applied as an M&E system at the national level to regions that include parts of multiple countries (such as the Mano River Union in West Africa), and to focused, tactical areas of interest (such as Cité Soleil). The tailoring aspect of the MPICE development effort allows it to function in a full spectrum of scales. A Web-enabled tailoring wizard also allows users in different physical locations to narrow down over 600 built-in measures to suit their needs for a particular environment.

Fundamental to HSI's work is the ability to monitor efforts and evaluate progress toward desired outcomes, or goals, in Cité Soleil. To support HSI's efforts, it is necessary to collect baseline

economic, geographical, and sociological data for Cité Soleil and to track how this data changes over time.

One of the strengths of its M&E process was that at the outset, Logos worked with HSI to develop a strategy for data collection that best reflected desired program goals. This strategy was then used to frame the analysis plan. Following this, the M&E team developed an analysis plan that incorporated knowledge of the environmental context, availability of data, and the relative applicability of the existing and prototype data collection methodologies, such as the expert elicitation method or expert knowledge method. This plan was developed prior to each data collection, with intense local participation, and evolved based on lessons learned from prior work.

Sorting out what we learned by doing M&E in this environment using the MPICE system, we can put the lessons into two categories. The first is the program implementer's strategic and operational perspectives, as well as recommendations and lessons about doing evaluation. Second is the analyst's explanation and lessons on using the MPICE system.

Strategic Perspectives

Some recent research and much anecdotal evidence show that successful counterinsurgency efforts are really a combination of multiple efforts on a broad socioeconomic and military front. There is no magic bullet; many different things have to work right in the field for counterinsurgency efforts to reach the tipping point. The same is true for stabilization. An advantage of the MPICE approach is that it is not tied to any one program, or any one agency, and it is broad.

What follows are a number of lessons learned from applying MPICE. Overall, the

MPICE tool was both flexible and provided well-founded results, which appeared less impressionistic than most other systems used in Haiti.

Stabilization Is Not Development. Just because a program may be using traditional development tools and approaches, people fall into the mental trap of assuming that we need these traditional M&E tools to track development indicators. Using the MPICE framework's distinction between drivers of conflict and institutional performance was one way to clarify between doing a project to make people healthier or more educated, and doing a project to make a place calmer, safer, and more governable. The stabilization program might build schools or health clinics, thus achieving the outcomes of a development program, but for a stabilization program, those are tools (outputs) only. Those outputs may not be what we want to measure. We may want to measure the change in people's attitudes to local government, or the development of local leadership in carrying out the projects. Building a school is not good in and of itself, at least for a stabilization program. Stabilization outcomes may well be harder to measure, and harder to achieve, and a planner needs to be clear about the differences.

Discipline Is Good. Part of the value of the MPICE framework is deciding which specific goals and which tied measures are to be taken from the menu of more than 600. While seemingly mindless and rigid, this discipline is a plus for the implementer because it avoids "cherry picking" (that is, measuring only what might make the project look good). Any standard evaluation setup process requires that the operator follow a logical and defensible process. With this M&E program, it meant someone else had done the hard work, and we were not reinventing and then defending the wheel.

Be Careful What You Wish For. A corollary is that we do need to find goals and indicators that are actually measurable in the terrain. At the start of HSI, we passed around the goals and indicators list to multiple agency representatives and within the team itself. We selected measures, agreed across the agencies on the final set, and then set out trying to use them. Some of them did not work—such as the measure that asked how many people had bank accounts; the number was so low it was not measurable, and it did not indicate anything about the economic state of the individual or his trust in institutions, as there were no banks in the zone. If we were to go through this process again, we would use more local advisors earlier on to help decide the important measures, and even what goals to pick.

We did not use solely local input to decide what was important to measure because it is possible to imagine situations where the local interests are different from U.S. or international interest. Witness the case of working health clinics, which the locals might see as success, and the U.S. Government could see as irrelevant to stabilization.

Evaluation Can Be a “Forcing Function.” Getting agencies to work together is difficult, even at the best of times, and in a crisis environment, with little data and a lot of conflicting opinions, it is very difficult. Prior agreement on goals and indicators can help in getting people to aim at the same target. While the interagency process produces many cleared statements of goals, they are usually not actionable (that is, they cannot be broken down into clear plans). Democracy, stabilization, economic development all mean little when on the ground. Using a strong evaluation process to force agreement on specific indicators and goals can be valuable.

The 4 to 6 Percent Solution. With an always limited budget, a planner must decide

how much can be spent on evaluation. As a rule of thumb, a planner should assume that 4 to 6 percent of the budget should go to evaluation and collecting metrics. This is not much, but if it is not fenced off, it will quickly be raided as the budget is developed. As an incentive, keep in mind that if good metrics are proven and indicate program success, it is easier to get more funds in the future. If there are merely a few anecdotes or spotty and unreliable data, another program with solid metrics is more likely to win the next grant. The depth of data paid off for the HSI program. The Cité Soleil data later contributed to refunding the program to work in another part of the city.

Operational Perspectives

In moving from strategic plans to field operations, there is always the sound of grinding gears as an implementer tries to fit plans to reality. But even in the cases where MPICE did not work as well as we thought it would, it still worked better than the alternatives.

The U.S. Government Needs an Off-the-shelf Evaluation Capability. We have previously mentioned the value of having a common U.S. interagency and even internationally accepted capability for M&E of stabilization. That said, it was still difficult to launch this evaluation of our program and continue it. Contracting and deployment of evaluation were so long and drawn out that they affected results. In a crisis intervention, there is a need for a baseline study to be done simultaneously with the deployment of the stabilization team, or even before deployment if possible. Yet the United States has no accepted standard for what is needed in evaluation (as one example, the MPICE framework is still a draft) and has no way to contract for this service quickly.

View of Cité Soleil, Port-au-Prince's most notorious slum and focus of the Haiti Stabilization Initiative

State Department (Laurence Kent Jones)



HSI had enormous difficulty contracting for the original test. The baseline data were actually 6 months into the deployment (thus missing the improvements from the start of the program). For the expansion of HSI into the Martissant gang zone in January 2010, there is still no signed contract after many months of efforts, literally hundreds of e-mails, and the involvement of contracting authorities from two agencies and three different bureaus. In other words, rather than getting easier, things actually worsened the second time around, as different agencies became involved. This situation cries out for an Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity contract done in advance and quickly available when necessary. The contract should provide a range of approved methodological tools and analysis techniques and provide skilled implementers for use in whatever part of the world is necessary.

M&E and MPICE Program Management Tools. The MPICE focus on measuring strategic or operational outcomes meant that it was primarily a strategic- or operational-level tool. In Haiti (apart from overall success measures), we also experimented with mining the data for program decisions and to measure project implementation results. It does provide detailed results at the different time slices because it uses different methodologies and allows different views of the same issues using different tools. However, it is not able to give much real-time feedback, and we could not easily separate outcome results to measure stabilization results of spending in education versus health, for instance. The major time lags made it difficult to react to new pressures or incidents using data from the M&E results. We recommend a quick and cheap spot survey mechanism for those burning questions that come up between phases.

Causality and Bang for the Buck. Another difficulty relates to the causality or firm attribution argument. Most stabilization efforts (and many development or security efforts) suffer from a



simple problem: proving that spending effort or money *here* equals a change in attitude *there*. As happens in social science, there is sometimes a demand that there be dependent and independent variables, which is sometimes an artificial way of examining intangible issues. While the MPICE framework makes it much clearer which is being measured (conflict drivers or institutions), there is still a final leap to showing that those indicators are being affected by the program. This is still better than many programs that make vague assumptions on theories of change and then cannot break down the process.

Ideally, we would have liked to have something akin to a control group and then run the same measures on one area that we were running in the project area. There were also ethical issues about repeatedly surveying a zone but not working in it. In reality, it was not easy for us to find a true equivalent area. In Haiti, we did not have a formal control group with which we could compare findings, but because the zone was essentially abandoned due to the security situation, we were fairly confident that any sectoral outcomes and impacts may have been due to the HSI effort, if only because there were no other significant actors in the zone. There were few other explanations for changes in measurements beyond the changes caused by our interventions. This would probably not be true in a national scale test, where there might be multiple international actors, not to mention nongovernmental organizations.

Exogenous Factors. For the implementer at either a local or national level, how can results be separated from background noise and how can what is happening on a national and international level be separated from what is happening in the zone? Exogenous factors played a big role in the measures in Haiti in the end. During the period when we were measuring, things visibly improved in

Cité Soleil and residents recognized the change. Unfortunately, at the same time, Haiti experienced a sharp rise in fuel prices, causing a series of national food riots in 2008 that toppled the government and left it in disarray for months. In 2009, Haiti had four tropical storms and hurricanes in 1 month. And in 2010, it suffered an earthquake that killed 300,000 people and left 1.3 million people homeless within minutes.

Apathy Toward the Overall Evaluation.

Within a multiagency team, despite the whole-of-government mantra, we found that some agencies have more interest in some things than in others. The overall program results may not be their main objective, especially if their agency measures the success of the program using a different yardstick. While not surprising, it does mean that their interest in the overall data is minimal. They just want their data to be good; the rest of it is meaningless to them. A good evaluation tool can serve a valuable “forcing function” for getting agencies to play together, but only if the agencies and actors believe they will be measured on the *overall* success, and not just, for instance, on how quickly they moved the money, or what was built, or how few crimes were reported. Combined with general resistance to being “evaluated to death,” this can be quite contentious when their part of the program is deprioritized for another part of the program.

If It Cannot Be Explained, It Never Happened. Any M&E program would benefit from the inclusion of more sophisticated analytical and visualization techniques (factor analysis, for example; video files, and so forth). In addition, as it currently stands, our analysis is good at providing cross-sector/driver to institutional analysis, but it is still relatively immature on how best to visualize or illustrate this analysis graphically. Indeed,

a picture tells a thousand stories. Our recommendation is to enhance the graphical capabilities in the MPICE tool and to increase visualization options beyond the standard bar chart and line plot functionality that currently exists. The need for pictures was made abundantly clear in the briefings in Haiti as people’s eyes glazed over while we explained the many valuable and redundant features of MPICE. There is a need to better visualize the complex analysis we provided to the U.S. Government as well.

Analytical Issues

Be Sure Everyone Is on the Same Page.

One of the most important challenges associated with the application of the MPICE framework—or even the variant of the framework that we applied—is the wide and varied understanding and definition of terms such as peace, conflict, and stabilization. Because MPICE is a multisector measures framework, its application should naturally be in a multiorganization environment, where experts and organizations with a stake in each sector of interest would participate. While the MPICE framework could be used by a single organization to do a multisector analysis of progress, the results of this application would likely be less rich and relevant than a multiorganization assessment, as no one organization can have a full appreciation of all of the sectors represented in MPICE. The challenges associated with multiorganization assessments are many, but for the purposes of MPICE, one of the most fundamental challenges will be that of agreeing on the meaning and importance of a term such as stabilization among the organizations involved in the assessment.

The MPICE framework is based on a theory that a reduction in the drivers of conflict,

combined with an equitable increase in the capacity of local institutions, eventually leads to stability. This theory, while logical, may not be applicable to all conflict situations. Furthermore, in a multiorganization assessment, there will likely be disagreement between participating organizations as to what theory or theories link to positive change in the area of interest. Development experts will likely lean toward theories based on long-term, sustainable development. Military planners will normally advocate the creation of a safe and secure environment and winning the hearts and minds of the people. Conflict experts may look to a number of different, interrelated theories regarding how to resolve conflict and bring about stability. This discussion of theories of change can have a significant impact on the application of the MPICE framework, especially given the organization of the framework around one particular theory.

How Much Is Enough? An additional challenge associated with applying the theory that a reduction in the drivers of conflict, combined with an increase in the capacity of local institutions, will eventually lead to stability is in setting thresholds of progress and/or success in relation to stabilization. How do we determine when the conflict drivers have been reduced enough to signal stabilization? How do we determine when institutional capacity has increased enough to signal stabilization? The simple diagram that is often shown during briefings about the MPICE framework depicts this theory with two arrows crossing each other on a single X–Y graph (see figure). This implies that these two different factors can be measured with the same units of measure and on the same scale, and that there are thresholds that indicate appropriate progress has been made.

Looking back over the data, we were more successful at pushing down the drivers of conflict than we were at pushing up the strength of the institutions. Again, this fits with what we observed over time. It was not that the gangs were strong; it was that the state was weak. However, at the time in the field, this was not so clear. We were making progress, but we did not really know how much further we had to go; there was no clear endstate. We did not know where the “X” was.

looking back over the data, we were more successful at pushing down the drivers of conflict than we were at pushing up the strength of the institutions

Decide What the Endstate Will Look Like and Be Sure That Everyone Else Has the Same Endstate. Several of the prototype applications of the MPICE framework that were conducted prior to and/or in tandem with the HSI M&E program arbitrarily identified progress toward stabilization without consideration of the U.S. Government mission’s own goals, processes, mandates, decisionmaking priorities, and problem-solving approaches. If any metric tool is to be formally adopted as a U.S.-wide M&E tool, this integration must take place as it was with the HSI M&E program.

A Good Datum Is Built, Not Found. The data analyzed were derived from several qualitative and quantitative data collection methodologies. By analyzing different data from different collection methodologies, we were able to build on the strength of each type of data collection and minimize the weaknesses of any

Boy watches as U.S. Sailors arrive at New Hope Mission in Bonel, Haiti, January 2010

U.S. Navy (Kristopher Wilson)



single methodology. This multimethod approach can increase both the validity and reliability of data. Quantitative and qualitative techniques provide a tradeoff between breadth and depth and between generalization capability and targeting to specific (sometimes limited) populations.

It is hardly surprising that in stabilization situations, quantitative data varies between weak and nonexistent. It was one part of the HSI three-legged data stool, but it was hard to find; a weak, underdeveloped government does not gather much data, and even less in dangerous zones. Other options to explore would be the use of microeconomic activity indicators gleaned from photographs or quick surveys.

In the case of Cité Soleil, much of the quantitative data that one might want to use is not available with the type of granularity needed when looking at just one small zone of the country. National crime statistics, for example, may not break down easily to a specific department, or school data may divide by education district, not by zone. This presented some challenges that were eventually overcome as we modified the framework and introduced greater flexibility. Similarly, across all five MPICE framework sectors, data availability, data reliability, and data accuracy problems arose and required significant adaptation of the framework and the Logos processes for data collection and analysis. These challenges led to the fact that only some of the data collection methodologies described in the framework provided good trend data over the three phases.

Ask the Community for Help in Evaluating Results. A community-based participatory approach is critical for a successful implementation of an M&E project. Ethnographic fieldwork among selected local communities combined with focus groups provided community perspectives and concerns

related to progress in Cité Soleil and the post-earthquake recovery process. Interviews were used to evaluate complex subject matter and to gather additional information in more detail from expert or high-status respondents or to discuss sensitive subject matter (such as criminal influences, corruption specifics) that is deemed inappropriate for survey/polling or even focus groups. We used interviews throughout the three phases to uncover inconsistencies between other data sources and to explore particular findings gathered from other methodologies.

How Quickly They Forget. Finally, as we went through iterations of the measures in the phases, we discovered that we were not getting the same data, or even variants of the same data. We thought we were winning, but the data did not show it. Why? In the final phase, we added a paired comparison of goals desired by both HSI and the community itself. This showed that in the first phase, security was seen as a crucial problem, and efforts to attack it were viewed positively. When security improved, it suddenly dropped off people's personal screens, and employment and education suddenly became the issues of concern. This priority change was reflective of the shifting goals of the community and the fact that these personal goals were not aligned to HSI's overall goal set.

In an ideal situation, we would have developed a separate set of questions (presented to community leaders in a controlled environment) that would have determined which goals were more critical relative to others by asking respondents to identify and rank which issues were important. This would have helped us to assign weightings that were more accurate to each measure and goal for our mission. For example, an HSI survey can ask respondents how satisfied they are with their electricity

access and the condition of their roads. In this case, let us assume that 90 percent are satisfied with the roads and that 10 percent are satisfied with their electricity access. These results will not affect how we weight the importance of each measure, but a separate questioning process or structured "pairwise" process asking key leaders or other people which was more important to their quality of life, roads or electricity, might affect how we weight our goals, and therefore the inputs we use to achieve those goals.

Assigning values or weights to measures, indicators, or goals is also a critical step in the analysis process. It allows the policymaker, decisionmaker, or analyst to designate the relative importance of one finding against another. Depending on the issues driving the conflict and the role that institutions have played in exacerbating rather than resolving conflict, some indicators may be more salient. Weightings on a scale of 0 to 1 may have security-related measures, indicators, or goals weighted heavier than economic or social well-being measures, indicators, or goals. The analyst cannot assign value; it must be assigned through a consultative process with subject matter experts, decisionmakers, and policymakers. We proposed, but did not fully execute, a technique designed to weight the M&E data responses.

Conclusions

In the same GAO review of stabilization evaluation and monitoring, the report ends with a recommendation: "We have previously reported that key practices for enhancing and sustaining interagency collaboration include developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report the results of collaborative programs."²

Applying the MPICE framework along with the multiple data collection methodologies and analytical techniques was fruitful and

provided the program implementers with the best data possible in the difficult and deteriorating environment of Haiti. Measuring progress in a conflict environment is always a challenge, and even with a serious effort using sophisticated M&E methods, analytical techniques, and tools, including the MPICE framework, our program produced almost as many questions as it answered. We improved our efforts over each phase, and presumably, if we had had more than three collection phases (or maybe just one less earthquake), we would have had far more data to analyze and use for planning.

Regardless of the results, for planners thinking of future applications, the importance of planning for evaluation from the beginning and designing the stabilization program with that in mind is crucial, and there is a clear need for continued improvements in the tools and their visualization. Even clearer is the need to improve contracting for evaluation programs so that proper baselines and ongoing data are collected. Most importantly, a good monitoring and evaluation plan, in highlighting the theory of change in core assumptions in the stabilization program, can serve to concentrate the focus of many different organizations, clarify the strategy, set objectives, and guide tactics. This is valuable even before the evaluation results are in. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), *International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs*, Report to Congressional Committees, GAO 10-431 (Washington, DC: GAO, April 15, 2010).

² Ibid.



U.S. military convoy rolls through Rift Valley, taking part in exercise that consists of military-to-military training, as well as medical, veterinary, and engineering civic affairs programs

Civil-Military Operations in Kenya's Rift Valley

Sociocultural Impacts at the Local Level

BY JESSICA LEE AND MAUREEN FARRELL

In the aftermath of Kenya's December 2007 to January 2008 postelection violence, U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs (CA) teams began a series of school rehabilitation projects in the Rift Valley. This area was still reeling from a period of significant trauma and instability. Life in the Rift Valley had been completely disrupted. Most of the residents were displaced, markets and public places were destroyed, and schools were burned to the ground. Families' lives were turned upside down. Based on tensions over land tenure, the violence was generally described as focused on particular ethnic groups, including the Kikuyu and Kalenjin.

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The U.S. and Kenyan governments recognized that getting children back into school, particularly where multiple ethnic communities attended the same schools, would provide an important step for community healing. The CA teams' school rehabilitation projects from 2008 to 2010 in Kenya's Rift Valley Province represent an interesting case study of the application of civil-military operations (CMO) in a tense environment where people had concerns for their personal security and a lack of confidence in their government to adequately respond to the crisis.

while widely reported as ethnically based, these tensions are based on issues of land tenure dating back to the early 20th century

To investigate the sociocultural impact of this series of projects, Rear Admiral Brian Losey, commander of Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), requested a qualitative study of how host communities received the CA team in their villages and what it meant to the recipients to have U.S. military-supported construction projects in the period following such instability. In late August 2010, we conducted a sociocultural impact evaluation of the schools in the Rift Valley.

Based on 71 interviews with 135 participants, this article is intended to inform those who plan, train, evaluate, design messages for, and conduct CMO. Our goal is to provide such individuals with improved sociocultural information and guidance to more effectively tailor their activities and engagements in the local context, as well as support the development of CMO policy and strategic planning.

Background

Kenya has a history of election-related violence beginning with the advent of multiparty elections in 1992. Following the contentious December 27, 2007, national elections, ethnic clashes broke out across the country. More than 1,000 people died and approximately 300,000 were displaced.¹ Rift Valley Province was the location of the majority of the deaths and displacements, though the capital of Nairobi and parts of Coast Province were also significantly affected. Kenyans and the international community watched in horror as neighboring ethnic groups fought each other with brutal tactics after the announcement of a thin margin of victory for President Mwai Kibaki over Raila Odinga.² While these clashes have been widely reported as ethnically based and catalyzed by a close election, at their core, these tensions are based on issues of land tenure dating back to the early 20th century.³

The international community, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the government of Kenya provided humanitarian assistance for internally displaced persons (IDPs), organized peace-building efforts, and began the slow work of rebuilding infrastructure. In the spring of 2008, upon the request of U.S. Ambassador to Kenya Michael Rannenberger, CJTF–HOA deployed a CA team to Eldoret town to assist in the reconstruction of destroyed schools. Rehabilitating these schools represented the synergistic efforts of multiple players—those within the U.S. Government, as well as those between the United States and its other partners, including the Kenyan government, community-based organizations, and international aid agencies. Additionally, getting children back into school helped to restore a certain modicum of normalcy to the lives of these traumatized communities. Over the

course of approximately 2 years (April 2008–July 2010), four different CA teams supported the rehabilitation or reconstruction of facilities at 14 schools, mostly in and around Burnt Forest.⁴ Particularly when these efforts were just beginning in mid-2008, the Rift Valley was still highly insecure and relations among the different communities were still tense.

Today, the communities surrounding these schools are still recovering. Estimates from community leadership interviewed for this article indicate that approximately 20 to 35 percent of the families who send their children to these schools still live in IDP camps, and on average 70 percent of the student body has returned to class. Interestingly, the student body increased at some schools, a change that locals attribute to the improvement of these facilities. Participants expect these numbers to rise since the August 4, 2010, referendum passed without additional violence, though some community members are thought to be waiting until after the 2012 elections to rebuild permanent structures for their homes.

Methods

Though land tenure issues were and are the root of tensions in Kenya's Rift Valley, on the surface, much of the focus during the post-election violence was on ethnicity. With the intention to focus interview discussions on the schools and the work of the U.S. military in the area, we deliberately did not ask about or seek information that may have been considered ethnically sensitive.

We used anthropological field research methods for data collection, including semi-structured interviews and chain referral sampling. The interview population was majority Christian, and most livelihoods revolved around farming. To balance the research

sample, the researchers selected participants from a range of geographic distances from school projects funded by CJTF–HOA; with varying relationships to the school projects; from both genders; and among a diversity of representatives of local community members, NGOs, and leadership positions.

We first notified and obtained the permission of the Provincial Administration and community leadership to carry out field interviews before engaging with local community members. We walked into villages instead of driving to provide people greater latitude in deciding whether to participate in the study. That is, because we were on foot, community members had more time to decide if they wanted to interact with us. Thus, villagers could make themselves available by sitting outside their homes, or move away into their gardens or homes to passively show their disinterest in talking. Conversely, arriving by car does not allow enough time for word to spread within the village and can catch some community members off guard. Interviews were conducted in Kiswahili or English, depending on participants' preferences, with the majority of conversations in Kiswahili. Men and women were interviewed separately to ensure maximum participation.

There were several limitations to this research plan, including seasonal rains and working in agriculture-based villages where people spend most of the daylight hours on their farms tending to crops. However, given the time and seasonal constraints, this research project resulted in a comprehensive data set of 71 interviews with 135 participants at 10 locations.

Coordination

According to U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) implementing partners, church leadership, and NGO

personnel working near and with the U.S. military, Civil Affairs efforts were well coordinated with the Provincial Administration and other local key personnel. Groups such as the Kenya Red Cross and the International Organization on Migration provided basic humanitarian assistance, including temporary housing and food. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) additionally provided education in the camps and smaller NGOs engaged in peace-building activities among communities. The first CA team to arrive in Eldoret in spring 2008 was instrumental in repairing schools in the most devastated areas of the Rift Valley, since no other group or organization had committed to support this work.

Civil Affairs efforts were well coordinated with the Provincial Administration and other local key personnel

It was widely agreed that the Kenyan government would be unable to provide in a timely manner all the support necessary for reconstruction of the numerous schools that were damaged in the postelection violence. Several participants reiterated two reasons for the prioritization of schools in the rebuilding process: there is a clear intrinsic value in education, and schools can bring multiple communities together. With large numbers of families living in IDP camps, returning children to school took precedence even over the reconstruction of new homes.

This was the situation in which the U.S. military began CMO support to school rehabilitation and reconstruction in spring 2008. Civil Affairs teams facilitated the provision of resources to build new classrooms, teachers’ quarters, administration buildings, and

secure storage for 11 school compounds.⁵ These efforts were an important step in preparing local schools—shared public institutions—to reopen. By extension, the CA teamwork also encouraged displaced persons to return to their home communities and farms and get their children back into school.

A Warm Reception

Almost unanimously, local community members, NGO personnel, and the Provincial Administration leadership welcomed the U.S. military in the Rift Valley. Our fieldwork revealed that this welcome can be attributed to several dynamics. First, the community was still recovering from trauma and had acute needs related to certain events; the military brought tangible projects in response to these issues. Second, on the whole, Americans have an existing strong, positive relationship with these communities and this region of Kenya. Third, the military represented a trusted presence in an insecure situation.

Generally, community members and NGO personnel believed that anyone is welcome if they have something to give, and this attitude was reinforced by local religious leadership. One participant mentioned that the needs were so great in their village that they did not have the luxury of turning anyone away. “We don’t care who’s helping—just need help,” a local leader stated. When asked for an example of the most positive contribution of the CA team, one NGO worker stated, “They delivered visible structures.” A community member similarly remarked that the Soldiers made things, so we (in the community) were happy. These tangible contributions from the military filled a specific gap in the support to the local community, otherwise unmet at that time by any other groups. The highly visible structures and obvious utility

Kenya Red Cross members triage children during humanitarian aid mission by U.S. military personnel, deployed with Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa.

U.S. Air Force (Carolyn Erfe)



of the schools were much appreciated. Schools were commonly described as a public good, a way to affect change in the future of Kenya, opportunities for peace-building between communities, and important steps toward stability.

In addition, due to the previous work of U.S. agencies, U.S.-funded NGOs, and other Americans working in the area, locals assumed that Americans maintain a certain level of competency; the CA teams were thus welcomed into these communities.⁶ “People just knew they were safe because they [the CA team members] were *wazungu* [Westerners or foreigners],” a woman in Ng’arua stated. The community welcomed the work of the Americans because they knew that “it would stand,” a community member explained. Not only do the Americans generally do good work, but locals additionally reasoned that because the Americans built these schools (as opposed to their own government), people would not try to destroy them.

Finally, several participants highlighted the appropriate application of U.S. military assets because some people feared for their safety. They recounted that having the military there made it safe. Additionally, in a few villages, participants said that the military was either the first or among the first to arrive. Being the first to arrive to help in an unstable situation gained credibility and trust among community members.

The U.S. military was described overwhelmingly as friendly to locals. Their interpersonal interactions with stakeholders bolstered local receptivity. Instability in the area, U.S. resources to rehabilitate damaged common property, and the existing positive relationship with America all contributed in part to the welcome of U.S. military personnel in the Rift Valley.

Communications: Verbal And Nonverbal

Through effective communication, U.S. military personnel can maintain strong relationships with stakeholders, manage expectations, and reduce friction in communities. Several participants interviewed for this study highlighted a lack of clear communication with military personnel on matters such as the status of certain projects. Given the high visibility of military personnel and community expectations, maintaining clear lines of communication with key stakeholders is crucial.

School staff and NGO personnel in particular have longstanding relationships and reputations in the villages where CA teams were operating. As it was explained to us, the person who introduces the CA team to the community becomes responsible for their subsequent work. Therefore, if a CA team leaves without concluding a discussion about a project or with a project unfinished, the community then holds that

given the high visibility of military personnel and community expectations, maintaining clear lines of communication with key stakeholders is crucial

individual who introduced them accountable for the CA team's work. For example, a headmaster of a school is responsible for updating the community on the status of school building projects. In the absence of information, such persons must make their own conclusions about why the U.S. military is behind schedule, has dropped a project, or is out of communication.

The responsibility of representing the U.S. military and its projects in an area can become

quite taxing if local individuals are without the necessary information. Two interview participants cited this issue with respect to Boror Primary School specifically. As leaders in the community, they have had to explain to locals why construction on the administration block was delayed and why no construction had begun on the bridge project that some people thought the U.S. military would support. Thus, CA teams and other CMO professionals must ensure that key stakeholders on the ground are fully informed about the status of projects and when and why there are delays.

These communities are quite accustomed to working with development organizations that provide similar project assistance. They are also accustomed to the ebb and flow of donor monies and resources. Accordingly, explanations about project funds being diverted elsewhere or a lack of funding will be understood and accepted if clearly communicated to relevant stakeholders. As a U.S.-funded NGO staff member made clear, "If a project is not viable you must communicate that to the community." Inevitably, CMO projects may occasionally fail or funding may be cut for a specific initiative. If such incidents are effectively communicated, while they may be disappointing, the community will acknowledge and seek other avenues to support those particular priorities.

Assessments. Equally as important as communications about projects, CA teams must communicate clearly with community members about assessments. CA teams and others in the U.S. military use the language of "assessments" when talking about visiting communities and project sites. When visiting project sites or areas for potential future engagement, CA teams, engineers, Navy SeaBees, and other military elements have been trained to be clear in their remarks to

local stakeholders about the intentions of the military to contribute resources. However, the mere presence of anyone affiliated with the U.S. military communicates a continued interest in that particular place, which may be misinterpreted by the host population as a commitment of sorts to continue dedicating resources to the area. In this regard, one NGO staffer outlined, “It is not enough to do ten assessments. The fourth time you visit you have to be doing something. . . . Successful projects had a few weeks of visitation and then the work started. . . . too much visiting with too little action leads to fatigue.”

Particularly in the aftermath of the post-election violence in this region of Kenya—where there were so many needs, and NGOs and aid organizations had such a visible presence—simply arriving at a location set a certain level of expectation on behalf of the community for assistance.

Uniforms. Clear verbal communications are not the only means of making a statement. Nonverbal cues can be just as effective, and the clothing U.S. military personnel don in the field is an extremely important means of communication. As an illustration, participants in this study were asked if they knew who built the schools. Nearly everyone confirmed that they knew it was Americans. However, when asked from which part of the U.S. Government or organization these came, participants had far less clarity on who these Americans really were. In communities where the CA teams were seen wearing uniforms, unsurprisingly, most participants understood they were military. In communities where the CA teams were seen in civilian clothes, their identities were more ambiguous, particularly to the average community member. Only those who worked personally with the military as construction workers or school

staff and parents knew with certainty that the “American Army” was providing this support to their schools.

Seeing Americans in uniform was not a point of concern for community members. Conversely, to a degree, the uniforms allowed a wider range of local people to know who was providing assistance.⁷ Identification of CA team members and other CMO professionals as representatives of the U.S. military may or may not be a goal of the United States in East Africa. Nonetheless, it should be understood that without better branding of U.S. military personnel, community members will continue to view them as civilians.

verbal communications are not the only means of making a statement . . . nonverbal cues can be just as effective

Role of the Kenyan Military

The Kenyan military was active in the Rift Valley during the postelection violence, most prominently by securing major roadways and supporting the local efforts of the Kenyan police.⁸ In fact, the Kenyan military was praised in the aftermath of the clashes for not becoming involved in the propagation of violence and for its professionalism in adhering to its designated roles under civilian control.⁹ Interviews revealed that there was some early collaboration between Kenyan forces and the CA team, but it seems that their partnership existed only during the initial phases of the projects and faded soon after.

Interview respondents drew clear lines between the role of the Kenyan military and what the CA teams did in terms of infrastructure rehabilitation. However, participants

were open to the idea of having Kenyan forces engage in infrastructural support projects such as the schools that were rehabilitated by the U.S. military, stating that if the Kenyan military brought needed assistance, they would be welcome. “People saw the U.S. doing these things and would like to see their military doing similar things,” a community leader stated. An NGO leader stated, “We wish that our [Kenyan] army would do these types of things.” It was a common theme in interviews that, particularly during times of such great desperation, people would accept help from anywhere.

Although no one stated that the Kenyan military would be unwelcome in their community if they were providing assistance, several participants articulated some level of discomfort about their military in general. A community member stated that the Kenyan military is “arrogant” and that people are comfortable with the U.S. but not the Kenyan military. NGO staff members and school officials talked about how the Kenyan military is feared by the general

In spite of some of these reservations, others expressed more optimism about Kenyan military work in the community, including one school teacher who stated that people generally understand that their military is not there to cause harm. Teachers and NGO staff members explained that U.S. military presence through the CA teams broadened people’s understandings about the Kenyan military, demystifying the roles of the military. One teacher explained that working with the CA team showed the community that military members are “human beings with feelings.” Based on these and the above comments, the researchers concluded that the Kenyan military would be welcomed by people in the Rift Valley to conduct CMO if they provided tangible assistance and their objectives and motives were easily understood by the local population.

Exiting

How a CA team leaves a community may be just as important as how it enters. Fieldwork for this article was completed just 1 month following the departure of the last CA team in Eldoret, so it seemed an ideal time to investigate how CA teams say good-bye to a community. In the minds of the local populace, though, the U.S. military has not left the Rift Valley because locals do not differentiate between groups inside the organization. The CA team departed the area and said good-bye to key partners at the end of July 2010. However, in late August, a Navy SeaBee detachment was working on one of the schools, engineers came to assess some of the buildings, construction had yet to begin on two of the schools, and other U.S. military personnel were in the area. To people in the Rift Valley, these groups are one and the same. Therefore, the message was conveyed that the U.S. military was still in the area.

when crafting messages for local communities, military parties must consider the total presence of Department of Defense personnel

population, while other community members expressed reservations about what the military might be bringing to their community and why. Aside from distrust or feelings of apprehension, many participants explained that their military does not do community engagements. Thus, there would have to be a significant shift in how stakeholders understood the role(s) of the Kenyan military to effectively integrate their work into local communities.

When we queried people to learn about how the CA team members communicated their good-bye, it was clear that the host community did not consider them actually gone. For example, when asked if she was aware that the CA team had left, the chairperson of an NGO responded, “No, they are there even now, rebuilding the school” (referring to the Navy SeaBees). Comments such as this are indicative of a larger trend that host communities do not distinguish between various U.S. military groups. In this case, having a CA team say farewell to communities that are still hosting military personnel is a confusing and somewhat contradictory message. It should thus be understood that it is unrealistic to expect host nation populations to distinguish among the various groups within the U.S. military, and one group leaving means little if other Servicemembers are still in a given area.

Despite efforts of the U.S. military to clearly communicate messages—articulated with the best of intentions—local expectations are developed based on visits to and engagements in a given area. Thus, saying good-bye is much less of a clean break when one factors in the constant influx of various military players in a single area. Hypothetically, if a project goes poorly or a Navy SeaBee mistakenly offends a local leader, this impacts what a CA team does and local understandings about the collective U.S. military presence. The uniformity with which host communities view all parts of the American military has implications for the design of strategic communications: When crafting messages for local communities, military parties must consider the total presence of Department of Defense personnel.

Conclusion

Eldoret, an area with recent trauma that is undergoing a slow healing process, seems to have been a constructive application of civil-military operations. The communities and other stakeholders involved welcomed and cooperated with the Civil Affairs team and, given the provision of tangible support, were left with an overwhelmingly positive impression. The team generally maintained close relationships with provincial and village leadership, as well as U.S. Government and nongovernmental organization personnel. Through these close relationships, the team had the opportunity to receive and follow the advice of those who have expertise in working in the area. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ International Crisis Group, “Kenya in Crisis,” Africa Report No. 137, February 21, 2008, available at <www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/137-kenya-in-crisis.aspx>.

² The Electoral Commission of Kenya reported that incumbent Mwai Kibaki (Party of National Unity) won 46.4 percent of the vote versus 44.1 percent for Raila Odinga (Orange Democratic Movement).

³ See Peter Hertz and Gregory Myers, remarks from “Land Tenure and Property Policies in East Africa” seminar held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, April 23, 2008, available at <www.wilsoncenter.org/ondemand/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.play&mediaid=C178B8B7-B92F-CDF7-36D29545F8A4F1AB>.

⁴ Henceforth in this article, *the schools* refer to these 14 schools supported by CJTF-HOA. Construction is still ongoing at Boror Primary School, and contract labor commenced in the fall of 2010 at Chwele Girls and Teremi Boys Secondary Schools.

⁵ This work continues at Boror, Chwele, and Teremi.

⁶ Additionally, given current geopolitics and the overwhelming majority of Christians living in the area, the sensitivities of Kenyans living in the Rift Valley to U.S. military vary from their coastal neighbors.

⁷ According to recent CA team members in Eldoret, the first of the four teams in the Rift Valley wore uniforms during their deployment. Beginning with the second team, members wore civilian clothes.

⁸ Justice Philip Waki, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence*, October 15, 2008, 53, 378–379, available at <www.standardmedia.co.ke/downloads/Waki_Report.pdf>.

⁹ Praise was bestowed on the Kenyan military by former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, the European Union, the African Union, and the East African Community.

ISAF Lessons Learned

A German Perspective

BY RAINER GLATZ

Following several largely futile attempts to gain control over Afghanistan, the British Empire granted independence to the country in 1919. Seventy years later, Russian forces withdrew having failed to establish control through a pro-Russian government. Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) struggles to establish a stable political system in order to prevent the country from again becoming a safe haven for terrorists. The question is: Will the Alliance prevail or will it join the club of losers? The answer is open, and it is up to NATO and the international community to sustain the positive momentum gained in 2010. The difficulty of nation-building in this remote, but nevertheless strategically important, part of the world can be seen in daily media coverage of the setbacks and losses, progress and success.

When Germany deployed military forces to Kabul in 2002, its limited expertise in the subject of nation-building was based on its experience in the Balkans. Nevertheless, the German-hosted Petersberg Conference showed early in the operation that only a broad approach, which encompassed diplomatic, social, economic, and military means, could pave the road to success.

Germany's military operation focuses on the northern part of Afghanistan, where it is the lead nation for Regional Command-North (RC-N). In addition, the German armed forces (*Bundeswehr*) support their partners and allies within the whole International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) area of operations by providing air reconnaissance pictures, tactical air transport and medical evacuation, staff personnel for the ISAF headquarters, ISAF Joint Command headquarters, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, and medical treatment facilities in Kabul together with communication specialists in Kandahar and Bagram. Germany's overall mandate currently permits the deployment of up to 5,350 personnel to Afghanistan.

Today, Afghanistan is Germany's top priority in its international peace-making and nation-building commitments. The guideline for the German course of action is the Comprehensive Approach in which Germany balances its efforts in the domains of security, economic aid, and social development. This article stems from a speech that I delivered in September 2010 at a NATO conference where I was asked to elaborate on ISAF lessons learned from a German perspective. The article reflects my personal opinion and is meant to give some, possibly controversial, food for thought regarding the question of

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how to commit a highly complex nation-building operation successfully.

Lessons Learned at the Strategic Level

When talking about the ISAF mission today, a key term often used is *Comprehensive Approach*. There are, of course, a variety of different philosophies, theories, and practices that lead to a diverse perception of the concept. But all these various schools return to the fundamental question: How can we assure that diplomacy, development, and defense work efficiently and effectively together toward the same endstate?

It is important to note that the German philosophy of networked security is comprised of crisis management, stabilization, and security and should ideally always be embedded in a multinational effort. The German national position and possible contributions to solve the Afghanistan conflict will always be discussed within the framework of international organizations and national contributions. Nevertheless, Germany's contribution will depend on its own interests, capabilities, and constitutional principles.

Afghanistan is Germany's top priority in its international peace-making and nation-building commitments

The ISAF mission has proven to be a tremendous challenge so far. NATO troops and their allies cope with a highly complex mission in a country that is far away from home bases and depots, far removed from our understanding of how to do politics, and far removed from our social and economic standards. Afghanistan is a country that was devastated in numerous conflicts over a period of roughly 25 years and has a population that has suffered for

generations from terror, destruction, atrocities, and uncertainty in every facet of life. Is there really a reasonable way ahead to stabilize such a country, and if so, what steps should be taken on this path?

The international community had to start from scratch when it began its job after the defeat of the Taliban. The Afghan infrastructure was largely destroyed and governmental institutions were nonexistent. However, the people were tired of fighting and struggling for life. Of course, they were cautious and hesitant, too, but they were open-minded toward fundamental changes to improve their daily lives. This leads to the following thesis: At the beginning of a stability operation, strength is decisive. This applies not only militarily, but also to the civilian side. The international community should not waste time searching for a pro forma government, but proactively establish an administration. Local governance should begin at an appropriately low level. With regard to Afghanistan, the local population decides who is trustworthy at the village and district levels. Later on, the Afghan people, with assistance from the international community, should select and elect higher political echelons.

In the beginning, security forces are immediately needed in large numbers. Quantity is more important than quality in this phase. In 2002, the Taliban and al Qaeda were on the retreat, hunted down by the coalition forces under the mandate of Operation *Enduring Freedom*. Back then, no effective military resistance existed in most parts of the country, and this provided an ideal opportunity for the international community to build up the Afghan security forces; and while these forces may not have met high standards in terms of quality, they could have filled a dangerous security vacuum. Creating and training local police forces on the village and district levels would have been the means of choice in the early stages of the mission.

The Afghan population sought an improvement in security and economic matters. What the ISAF commander tries to establish under the key phrase *unity of effort* today must be incorporated in the security structure from the beginning. Developing security and the economy are not separate steps, but two intermingled processes.

One key point in this structure is the build-up of strong host country security forces as an indispensable partner for providing security. Doing so is a prerequisite for the transition phase. However, besides security, it ensures that a sufficient number of capable civil servants and technocrats are retained. Security and the capability to govern are preconditions to build a functioning political system.

This underlines the need for bringing together all the actors from various organizations—governmental as well as nongovernmental—to create a sound and coherent plan. Winning the support of the people can only be achieved by placing the population at the center of all thoughts about how things should develop. The situation is much more complex and requires the active involvement of more actors than just the military.

One key experience relates directly to the beginning of the ISAF mission: the strategic objective reflected in the political mandate. To contribute military capabilities effectively to the overarching commitment, it is essential to formulate a clear and concise endstate. The endstate has to be specified in a way that it becomes measurable, as this defines the circumstances to be created, which in turn determine the way ahead. The international community needs to be able to develop the ISAF mission's criteria for success geared toward its endstate, as this enables measurement of progress. This also puts a scale to the effort and assistance provided.

Attempting to introduce scales and measurements or benchmarks into complex operations

such as nation-building in Afghanistan is difficult; nevertheless, it is absolutely necessary. An endstate creates distinctiveness for the military and for civil development projects alike. This also prevents overambitious political and military aims and counters effects such as mission creep.

strategic aims such as democracy and freedom need some qualifiers for the follow-on planning process and actions to be purposeful

This is a recurring symptom where the main purpose of a mission is unclear due to the fact that the endstate fails to precisely describe a desired condition. We need to be aware of the fact that strategic aims such as democracy and freedom need some qualifiers for the follow-on planning process and actions to be purposeful.

From today's perspective, the international community failed to develop the necessary benchmarks for the measurement of success when debating the endstate. Currently, we are trying to make up this default by defining benchmarks to evaluate the transition process.

The international community would perhaps have enjoyed greater success in Afghanistan had it ensured sufficient integration of the whole population and a better degree of institutional coordination and unity of effort together with a clear vision of what to achieve with increased effort on security at the start of the mission. To summarize my thoughts on the strategic-level lessons learned, I would like to ask some maybe provocative questions.

With regard to the start of the mission, was it right to exclude some Afghan key players in the Petersberg process? Would it not have been better if we had integrated the Taliban at the

Germany is part of a 42-nation military coalition assisting the government of Afghanistan in establishing and maintaining a safe and secure environment, facilitating reconstruction and stability

Bundeswehr (Dajana Mann)



outset instead of starting today—nearly 10 years later—in the attempt to foster reconciliation at the strategic and the reintegration process at the tactical level?

If we agree that success in Afghanistan cannot rely on the use of military means only, then we have to ask: Was the Comprehensive Approach—unity of effort—really established in the early stages of the ISAF mission?

Talking about the availability of intelligence at the strategic level, we can see that there is a large amount of information available. Nevertheless, we failed to develop efficient mechanisms to exchange this information among the different organizations dealing with the Afghanistan challenge.

And finally, regarding the ongoing discussion about transition in Afghanistan, I would suggest that it is crucial to develop an endstate and benchmarks as soon as possible before proceeding to timelines for withdrawal.

Lessons Learned at the Operational Level

Moving from the strategic to the operational level, this leads to the next thesis: Gain momentum by being strong and decisive and keep this momentum going.

From the German perspective, the step out of Kabul and into the provinces was made late in the process, but hopefully not too late. Improvements in living conditions, which include security, economic, social, and political developments, should not and cannot be limited to the capital for such a long time as it creates an opportunity for insurgents to reorganize and regain control over the population.

At the beginning of a mission, we gain momentum by military force. Modern armed forces are organized to operate worldwide on a wide scale and on short notice. Those who are tasked to support governance or reconstruction and development require more time to prepare themselves and to become effective in theater. However, the military can only buy time for a certain period. Thereafter, it is up to the civilian side of the mission to reinforce the joint effort as a first step and later to assume the lead role as a second step. This leads to the next thesis: The military can buy time, but only the well-timed Comprehensive Approach will lead to success.

Participation in a military operation is a tough decision for any nation. This decision requires careful evaluation of many factors in order not to overstretch the military and available financial resources, but to gain indispensable public support. NATO nations are reluctant to risk the lives of their soldiers, which at first glance appears to be a good policy. But the creation of a long list of national caveats aiming to minimize risk for the national military contribution is bound to undermine the military effectiveness in theater.

Despite the diversity of organizations and subdivision of ISAF's area of responsibility into regional commands and the individual ideas of the lead nations in charge, all players have recognized that they will have to follow a common strategy based on the same principles to win the hearts and minds of the people, to provide long-term security, and to allow Afghanistan to return to a level of self-sustainability.

To meet this goal, Germany has restructured the headquarters at Regional Command–North, which is now led by a German two-star general. With this new command and control structure, Germany is able to cope with the significant augmentation of forces in the northern region. Furthermore, Germany has established a senior

civilian representative (equivalent to the military commander) to foster the Comprehensive Approach in the north. This senior representative is a German official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is not subordinate to the RC–N commander. Indeed, he works at the same level, and both the commander and senior representative coordinate all activities in close cooperation. The task of this public official is to harmonize the efforts of all the civilian actors within RC–N, especially the governmental organizations.

Lessons Learned at the Tactical Level

Intelligence. The intelligence business in a counterinsurgency (or COIN) environment, as in Afghanistan, differs significantly from intelligence-gathering in a conventional scenario. Today, a balanced variety of intelligence assets is required to collect and analyze information at the grassroots level to provide actionable—close to real-time—intelligence to operational units on the battlefield. Next to technical assets, providing specific signal

a long list of national caveats aiming to minimize risk for the national military contribution is bound to undermine military effectiveness in theater

intelligence and imagery intelligence data, human assets have taken on a significantly greater importance in today's COIN environment.

Consequently, part of the experience is that the number of intelligence personnel available at the tactical level—from human intelligence sources and collectors and analysts to distributors—needs to be considerably strengthened. Similarly, such an augmented pool of intelligence personnel—apart from having purely military skills—needs to possess a wide array of

expertise. The requirements range from linguists to regional and sociocultural specialists, economists and development professionals, and legal and political experts.

soldiers open a window of opportunity for politics to focus on the deeper causes of the conflict to achieve a solution

Germany's current adjustments to its force posture within RC-N will result in relocation of intelligence assets—both human and technical—from brigade to battalion level. This will be an initial step toward implementing some of the lessons identified so far.

Simultaneously, such an enhanced, COIN-centric effort requires an improved and closely knit coordination among all intelligence assets, analysts, targeting, and respective operators on the battlefield. However, above all this (at the strategic level), the need for extensive intelligence-sharing, including sharing with nonmilitary actors for which mechanisms have yet to be developed—along with a reduction of national restrictions—must be acknowledged as a key to success in future missions.

Civil-military Cooperation. During the last few years, it has become apparent that a focus on the security situation was not enough to provide military leaders with a comprehensive view. The important area of civil affairs was to a large extent unexplored terrain. We have to recognize that a military focus only on tactical operations would be as wrong as the exclusive concentration on improving the civil actors to transform the political conditions. The common approach has to be directed against the further empowerment of the insurgents and extremists. Integrated and successful civil-military operations are absolutely

necessary to bring lasting security and stability, which is the base for a postconflict reconstruction.

Nevertheless, we did not know much about the people around us or the atmosphere among them. Neither did we know much about our ability to influence these factors. Hence, ISAF established institutions to foster a better understanding of the population and to improve the cooperation between military and civil actors. Fusion Centers—now being integrated in RC-N—and senior civil representatives are excellent examples of this trend toward the Comprehensive Approach. In RC-N, the Provincial Development Fund integrated Afghan communities into the development process. Moreover, the new COIN strategy accelerated these changes both in structure and mindset. Notwithstanding these excellent approaches, many problems remain, and we must consider if and how both civil and military actors can work together to succeed.

This process has to start at home. We need to educate our soldiers in advance about the cultural environment in Afghanistan and the vast implications of the civil situation. But most importantly, we have to integrate the civil situation and all the actors involved into our military decision process so as to adapt the lessons learned from ISAF. This idea is directly linked with our concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which are the core elements of the Comprehensive Approach.

PRTs. The NATO PRT concept complies with the required measures to be taken in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. The line of operations in counterinsurgency results from the analysis of an insurgency environment. Security, economic, and social development as well as governance require an interlinked approach involving capabilities and forces of which the military is but one of the key figures needed.

U.S. Army (Sean Harriman)



German soldier scans horizon while securing 4th Combat Aviation Brigade, 4th Infantry Division CH-47 Chinook in northern Afghanistan

In the two German PRTs in Kunduz and Feyzabad provinces, four of our Federal Ministries—the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior, Foreign Office, and Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development—cooperate and coordinate their measures, mainly emphasized in the security sector, but with a certain focus on economic and social development. Thus, the Bundeswehr concentrates on the security sector and supports the Afghan security forces in their efforts toward a safe environment in which reconstruction and development can take place. Although the security

situation in Afghanistan is affected by several factors, the necessity to deal with the effects of insurgency is one of the prime challenges because it is a major threat to stability and security.

To be effective, counterinsurgency requires comprehensive measures and adherence to some fundamental guidelines:

- ❖ legitimacy
- ❖ unity of effort
- ❖ political factors
- ❖ understanding of environments
- ❖ intelligence-driven operations
- ❖ isolation of insurgents from their cause and support
- ❖ establishment of security under the rule of law
- ❖ preparation for a long-term commitment.

The key to success in a counterinsurgency is the population, as the people are the environment and every action affects this environment directly. The ultimate need for connecting military and civil measures is therefore obvious.

The ISAF PRTs have brought much improvement to the overall situation in the provinces. Local ownership and small steps in the direction of self-sustainability often had a longer lasting effect than big and highly visible projects.

Conclusion

Unity of effort in the ISAF mission requires military, governmental, and nongovernmental efforts in a synchronized manner.

The military alone cannot solve conflicts. Soldiers open a window of opportunity for politics to additionally employ mainly political, diplomatic, and economic means that focus on the deeper causes of the conflict to achieve a solution. Nevertheless, each stability operation has to have a strong military footprint at the beginning to restore security nationwide. By defining a clear endstate, one is able to identify milestones and to communicate these to the people. Thereafter, it should be much easier to gain their support, which is the indispensable prerequisite to preventing the insurgency's reemergence.

The challenge to restore a stable and politically reliable Afghanistan was underestimated at the beginning. Too little effort was spent on building up the legal system or security forces. These shortfalls provided the insurgents in Afghanistan with an opportunity to reorganize, and, due to a fundamental lack of trust in the Afghan government, the insurgency was able to spread again. Today, the Alliance has clearly analyzed what went wrong in recent years and has taken adequate measures to bring the ISAF mission to a successful conclusion. Therefore, I am confident that NATO will prevail. **PRISM**

An Interview with William E. Ward



U.S. Africa Command

As the first combatant command to embed the 3D [diplomacy, defense, development] concept in your structure, what would you say are the impediments to better integration between civilian and military agencies?

General Ward: I don't know if *impediment* is the right word. As our experience continues with respect to planning and understanding the various cultures in the planning process, we are getting better; and the integration will continue to improve. Once you get things

going on the ground, the integration at the tactical level tends to be very good. The diplomatic, defense, and development professionals want to make it work. So our planning effort to get to effective integration is what we need to continually reinforce. It's a function of how the various organizations do that work; the culture of planning that the military brings is from a unique perspective, as is the planning culture of USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development]. How we bring those distinct cultures closer together at the initial stages of planning is where we need continued improvement.

Do you have adequate civilian personnel at U.S. Africa Command [AFRICOM] to achieve that improved 3D integration?

General Ward: At AFRICOM headquarters we would like as much 3D integration as possible, but because of resourcing constraints and staffing levels, we don't have the civilian complement we need to do that as effectively as I would like. For example, we have a very thin layer of USAID professionals who can be made available to us at AFRICOM. But Secretary of Defense [Robert] Gates, [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] Admiral [Mike] Mullen, other geographic commanders, and I are actively supporting increased civilian capacity with our interagency partners so that those additional

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resources for personnel, for manning, and for staffing become available in the future.

How would you characterize the differences between military planning culture and development planning culture as you've experienced it?

General Ward: I'm not very familiar with the development planning process, though working together with development professionals is helping the military to better understand those processes. The military planning cycle is very deliberate. The military decisionmaking process is a very deliberate step-by-step process that in a crisis mode has to be compressed and accelerated. When you compress and accelerate [the process], a lot of assumptions are made, and under duress many things have to be done that may not have been anticipated. Those assumptions and decisions must be socialized throughout the interagency, but often at very high speed. Increasingly important to the military is how our activities are affecting the overall environment, and how we understand that environment. We need to improve in this area. The more we work together, the more our deliberate processes will become accessible to our partners; and at the same time we will increasingly have the flexibility to bring into our military processes awareness of our partners' planning cultures because we know they have an impact on what we do. We haven't been doing this together very long, but the good news is the more we work together, the better we will get at it.

One of the things you hear quite a bit about at AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart is Phase Zero planning. Would you elaborate a bit on AFRICOM's experience with Phase Zero?

General Ward: Phase Zero operations are not totally new; the concept has been around for a while in a formal way. This is the business of doing things day to day that are designed to promote stability in a proactive way as opposed to having to react to a crisis. Phase Zero might seem to imply the first step toward Phase One, Two, and so on—the first step in a process that will continually move forward. In my mind, we should always be doing Phase Zero work, even in the midst of more kinetic activity as in Phase Two; we should still be doing the sorts of activities that put in place and support the elements of stability. The constant application of these soft power tools to reinforce success and to help maintain stability is crucial.

Could you describe some AFRICOM activities that you would describe as Phase Zero?

General Ward: I would include our multiple engagement activities with our partner nations to build increased capacity and professionalism in the military through officer development. I also include those things we are doing in conjunction with our other governmental partners in the developmental area—things that the local population view as clearly to their benefit. For example, I would include those activities where we play a supporting role in humanitarian projects or medical civic action projects, or veterinary civic action projects done in conjunction with local authorities. These types of activities combined with teacher education, professional medical training, and building of appropriate facilities are Phase Zero activities that help create conditions to reduce the local population's susceptibility to outside agitators. We also support agricultural development, not as the lead agency, but in a way

that is supportive of others' efforts. That's why understanding the full picture of what's being done is so important—so that we can be inside the planning process of those activities we can add value to.

Those are some examples of Phase Zero activities. It's those steady state military-to-military engagement activities that we consistently engage in—helping to build stable security structures so that the partner nations can provide for their people's security. But it's also those broader developmental activities where our participation can add value and help achieve the objectives or complement what's being done by our interagency partners.

Have you encountered any resistance from civilian agencies when AFRICOM has engaged in these kinds of activities?

General Ward: Yes, but it's less and less the case. Because once we sit down and communicate clearly our understanding that we don't see the military in the primary role, but in a complementary or support one, and we find ways to work together, the resistance ends. It could be simply transportation—you need to get from point A to point B. Maybe we can provide that assistance. So as you have dialogue about your programs and you find ways where we might be able to support, that angst, that suspicion goes away. Where there is a reluctance to engage with the military, it's often because of a lack of understanding. So you establish a relationship, you establish a dialogue, you find where there are common lines of operation, if you will, supporting lines of operation, and we fill those in. This is even increasingly the case with the NGOs [nongovernmental organizations].

As to USAID, I can't say our relationship gets better every day, but it's improving

through working together, and there are fewer skeptics who want nothing to do with the military. We are day by day reducing that anxiety, reducing that misunderstanding, reducing that suspicion, reducing that reluctance to work together. We at AFRICOM certainly are respectful of our USAID and other nongovernmental partners. We understand that in certain environments if you are seen as working with the military, your security might be at risk. I think NGOs and civilian partners increasingly see themselves being threatened regardless of that and are beginning to see the advantages of working together. Yet understanding those who might have that concern, or where we can't find ways to be supportive, we'll certainly not push, not impose, not dictate, and not direct. I believe there is a growing comfort and desire to work together because there is growing understanding that there are things we can do to assist them as they carry out their jobs. And that is what we want to be able to do, to work as partners.

Do you think that the Soldiers who join up thinking “we're here to fight and win wars” accept these nontraditional roles, such as conflict prevention, as opposed to warfighting?

General Ward: Oh, absolutely. The thing about today's force—the young men and women we have the privilege of serving with today—they get it like no other. This is a flexible, versatile, agile force. They understand the difference; they also understand the positive role that they can play in both the warfighting and conflict prevention arenas.

In the 2 years since AFRICOM was formally established, would you say the

quality of military-to-military relationships has improved?

General Ward: Our partners traditionally think of themselves as the dedicated combat and command force that's there solely to engage in military activities. As a result of our increased mil-to-mil activities, we've been able to devote attention and time to them, listening to them, determining what sorts of things are important to them. They seem to want to become more capable of providing for their security, protecting their borders, working in regional cooperation with their neighbors. And as we have exhibited our interests transparently, and they have seen a benefit to them from this association, there are requests for more mil-to-mil engagement and coordination. In fact, I met with several African ambassadors just the other day, here in Washington, DC, and got absolutely no questions about why AFRICOM exists or why we're doing what we're doing. It was all about what more can we do. Now there's clearly a desire for engagement with us—with AFRICOM and with the United States more substantially. And that desire to work with us is evident around the continent, including the island nations. Our ability to engage is only impacted by our foreign policy objectives for the various countries, the regions that are there, and the availability of resources given where we are in today's global situation with the employment of forces in other parts of the world. As those things change and partner nations come to us with additional requests for interaction and engagement, given resources being available and a foreign policy that supports engagement, I think we will see continued activity in the mil-to-mil engagement area.

And you see AFRICOM's role as having been a major catalyst for this increase in interest in African countries in interacting with the United States?

General Ward: I think so, yes. I think the message has been that the United States is serious about partnering with you as a partner—as an *equal* partner—listening to your thoughts, listening to your desires, listening to your objectives, and then integrating those as best we can; and having a command that is focused only on Africa provides that type of clarity, vision, and purpose. AFRICOM is not distracted by other things that in past times were prioritized by the three commands covering Africa at the expense of Africa.

How do you mitigate the risk that the African militaries that AFRICOM supports and assists might turn on their own civilian leaderships, or worse, their own people?

General Ward: That's why the integration of the 3Ds is so important. Military-to-military work can't be done in a vacuum. That's why it's a part of the totality of our engagement, along with the diplomatic and development pieces. I don't control or command those military forces. That's where the diplomatic work comes in; the political leaders of our partner nations are working with our diplomatic and political leaders. State intent, state purpose . . . the sorts of things that are important from a civilian control of the military perspective help ensure that the work we do is in fact being used in ways commensurate with legitimate military activity. Therefore the integration of the defense business with development and diplomacy is critical. And when this integration is effective, you help achieve the position that you have trained

forces that support order and good governance in a society. That's why it has to be done hand in hand. That's why the integration of all 3Ds is so critical.

Have you seen signals from any African militaries of an interest in helping to develop their own countries economically?

General Ward: Sure, absolutely. In fact, all our civic action projects seek to reinforce that; for example, whenever we do Civil Affairs projects, we always encourage the partner nation's military to be side by side with our military so that the people see their militaries working on their behalf and for their benefit. Many of the nations see their military institutions as a substantial element in their development projects. Engineering comes up quite often—they help with some of the infrastructure work that needs to be done in the countries. That is an increasingly important consideration being taken by the partner nations as they look at what their militaries are and the role that their militaries play in their societies.

Are there specific country cases where this is actually taking place, where the local military is getting involved in the national development program?

General Ward: Liberia is one case. There are clearly cases where some of the East African armies—Kenya and Uganda, for example—play significant roles in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. These are clearly roles that these countries see as appropriate for their militaries. More African leaders than not see such roles as appropriate for their militaries. There is very little hesitation for the countries to call upon and use their militaries when it comes to disaster

relief and humanitarian assistance, but also in some cases more routine developmental activities as well. Engineering units getting involved in agricultural projects is pretty widespread throughout the continent.

Again, that is one of the goals of our Civil Affairs program: to let partner militaries know that these are appropriate roles and doing so in ways that support overall country objectives. When they see our guys doing Civil Affairs work, and especially when we are partnering side by side, their populations see it as well. This reinforces the notion that their militaries are there to be their protector as opposed to being their oppressor, which has been the situation in many of the nations of Africa for many years. The military was seen as predators of the people as opposed to being there to protect them.

If not officially AFRICOM's headquarters on the continent, the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa [CJTF–HOA] is certainly the command's biggest presence on the continent. How would you characterize its evolution since its early days as a capture and kill operation?

General Ward: Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa is still focused on countering violent extremism and still focused on helping to create the conditions that reduce the potential for extremism to take hold. It's working through our various civil action programs and delivering the sort of benefits to the people—to the local populations—by the work being done with the Country Teams and USAID. Our efforts are supporting an environment that is less hospitable to outside negative influence. The people see things being done on their behalf by their legitimate government and by others who also care for them. So you have

the CJTF–HOA doing this in their operational area, predominantly the area in East Africa, that’s focused on these mil-to-mil engagements that are helping to reinforce the positive contributions being made by those nations’ militaries to provide for their security, to secure their borders, and to protect their populations.

What do you see as the emerging national security threats to the United States on the continent of Africa right now? What’s on the horizon?

General Ward: The thing that we are most concerned about is stability across the continent and the potential threat from undergoverned or ungoverned spaces that create opportunities for those who would seek to do us harm to come in and exploit for training and recruitment. Some of our programs in East Africa and in North Africa are designed to address just that; where you have internal instability governmental transitions can cause more instability. In this age of global society high levels of instability have indirect and sometimes direct impact on us. When we see upcoming elections in unstable countries, we recognize the possibility of violence that could negatively impact us. Here again is an example of the importance of the integration of the 3Ds. We are involved in elections but we rely on our diplomats to help create the conditions for successful elections. AFRICOM certainly encourages the militaries in those countries to behave appropriately, to stay apolitical, not to get involved in political competition. Our training reinforces that as the proper role of a military in a democratic society—not being involved in political competition. We do things to address the potential threats from transitions in unstable environments and from ungoverned spaces.

I also see environmental issues as potentially threatening to stability, and thus to us. Energy and water shortages and natural disasters where huge populations are impacted all have the potential to contribute to instability. There is also the connectivity between Africa and South America with respect to drug trafficking. The drug trade often comes from South America, through Africa, up into Europe, and back to the United States. All of these are things that I see as threats. How we work with our various partners to help counter those threats is the work not just of my command but also other parts of our government, as well as the international community.

Can you foresee any realistic scenario that might result in significant U.S. combat forces on the ground in Africa?

General Ward: Not that I can envision today. We have some partnerships such that some great humanitarian disaster could result in requests for U.S. military help and assistance. That is certainly a possibility. The President is the one who makes that decision based on the circumstances. If huge innocent populations were threatened with violence, international powers could decide that we won’t allow that harm to occur—then some kind of intervention could take place. I don’t see anything on the horizon, but should something like that occur and the President or other decisionmakers decide to intervene, we would clearly be in a position to do our part and react accordingly.

How do you assess the risk to U.S. interests posed by China’s growing involvement in Africa?

General Ward: China is clearly in Africa pursuing its national interests in ways that are

typical of how China does business. We're there as well in a way that makes sense to us—hopefully in ways that will promote long-term stability in Africa from a security point of view, as well as from a developmental point of view and diplomatic point of view. Where we have common purposes with China, such as stability, good governance, professional security forces, and effective police, borders, customs, and judicial systems, working with anyone who shares those purposes makes sense. I've heard many policymakers say that. We're not in Africa competing with China or any other nation; we're in Africa to do what we can in pursuit of our national interest in a more stable continent. We pursue our national interest in an African stability that enhances our stability at home and helps to protect our people both at home and abroad from threats that might emanate from the continent of Africa. And so to the degree we can work with China or any other country in pursuit of those common goals or objectives, we would seek to do that.

But do you think we might be losing influence in Africa, relative to China, in terms of major power politics, grand strategy?

General Ward: I don't see it that way. I think that the nations of Africa pursue their own interests. They will partner with whoever is partnering in ways that are conducive to their interests. We need to continue our activities and partner with them because we are still welcome across the continent by and large in most places. Our economic and development support activities such as the Millennium Challenge Account, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and various other projects and programs are still welcome and deeply appreciated. Our security assistance, engagement, and

involvement are still welcome, and we just need to do our best to participate when we're asked, where we're asked. Given the resources to do that, we will continue to be a country that African countries will seek to partner with. I believe that's the case today, and will be the case in the future as well.

How can the forces assigned to AFRICOM, both civilian and military, prepare better for the assignments that they're going to take on, both at headquarters and in the field?

General Ward: Actually, AFRICOM doesn't have any assigned forces. We have components—an Army component, naval component, air component, and a Marine component. Special Operations is a subunified command. We talked about the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa. Our men and women, both military and civilian, come to work either at headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, in one of the components or the subunified command, or go to work on the continent as a part of some exercise, some program, or multilateral engagement. We want them to enter those contexts with a better understanding of culture, the environment, the history, so that our activities are informed of and by the local environment and cognizant of the traditions in the local area. Language skills and appropriate cultural orientation are important so that our men and women who work with our African partners approach them from a perspective that reflects more than just our own perspective. One of our objectives is to ensure that anyone who goes to the continent and works with our African partners has some background, some understanding in who they are working with. We will continue to focus on that, and we will continue to put programs in place that build that capacity.

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At AFRICOM headquarters, for instance, we have routine programs bringing in speakers, authors, and scholars to help give us the understanding that we need. We use cultural anthropologists to help us better understand the environment and the culture, so that when we go to a particular place on the continent we know specifically about that place. It's a big continent with 53 nations, and vast subcontinental regions. Each is different, and so in each case, having specific orientation and cultural insight helps us better understand the context and do things that are in keeping with the traditions, the norms of that location, as opposed to our own purely, uniquely American point of view.

What advice will you give your successor? What is the biggest challenge he is going to face, what to look out for or what to prioritize?

General Ward: I don't think I will tell my successor anything different than any commander would say to those who follow. Obviously it's a dynamic environment. Have your senses about you, build relationships so that you understand better where you are operating. Be sensitive to those things we talked about earlier—the potential sources of instability and how you work to mitigate or contain them. How to bring resources to bear to help achieve our objectives are things we will have to always pay attention to. I think building on where we are is important because as I mentioned, the command has done some pretty substantial work helping to create an environment where our African partners know that we can be trusted and that they can rely on us. That's because we've listened to them. Maintaining that as we go down the road is important. Let's not start over from scratch, but build upon what we've accomplished in this regard.

Obviously the specific programs and activities will reflect the crisis of the day. Yet while there will always be a crisis of the day, we have to keep our eye on the long term. We have to keep our eye on the 20-, 40-, 50-year timeframes, and provide the sustained engagement needed to create the environment our African partners have told us they want to create—a more stable environment where peace and development can occur. In the end, it is that development that produces enduring stability in these societies: determining how we the military can continue to be a contributing factor, working with the other parts of our government and the international community and our host nations to move toward this objective. These are the sorts of things my successor will be faced with, and bringing all of that together is the job that the Nation asks of the commander. **PRISM**

Book Review

Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety

By Gideon Rachman
Simon & Schuster, 2011
280 pp. \$27.00
ISBN: 978-1-43917-661-0

REVIEWED BY MICHAEL J. MAZARR

Gideon Rachman has an intriguing notion. The broad assumptions of most analyses of world politics since 1989—that the major and middle powers of the world are agreed on a set of shared interests, that globalization has created a positive-sum context in which all can benefit at the same time, that a sort of modern alliance of like-minded states opposed to major conflict and other annoyances such as terrorism and environmental degradation will work to preserve stability—may be breaking down. The “international political system has . . . entered a period of dangerous instability and profound change,” he writes, which will fracture the foundations of the positive-sum, like-minded-powers world.

There is growing evidence for such a proposition, and a persuasive case for it ought to be laid out. Unfortunately, this book is not that case. It is, instead, a series of frustratingly brief nuggets that try to encapsulate everything about the post-Cold War world, from neoconservative philosophy to the Thatcherite revolution in Britain to the Gulf War to Islamic terrorism.

These chapters, generally 7 to 10 pages each, represent a sort of “pop history” and read as if Rachman read the relevant chapters from a few popular historical treatments, sat down at his keyboard, and summarized the fundamental themes for a high school-level audience. He disposes of the rise of China in seven and a half pages. There is no depth of analysis, no new insight, and no particular argumentation that connects these brief summaries to his overall argument—that the positive-sum, “end of history” moment is ending.

The result can also be misleadingly simplistic. He refers in some places to the “democratic peace” thesis as the idea that “capitalism, democracy, and technology would advance simultaneously—and global peace would be the end product” (p. 5). This sounds like an interesting and persuasive notion, but it is *not* the democratic peace thesis. This limits its explanatory variable to political democracy, and says nothing about capitalism or technology. He later writes that “The theory of the ‘democratic peace’ looked less persuasive as Russia flexed its military muscles” (p. 168), when in fact a more authoritarian Russia would, by this theory, have been expected to become more aggressive.

The pop-history approach—apparently an effort to appeal to a broad audience—results in many loose, vague claims and statements. Rachman refers to problems in global governance on key issues (a very real problem), and then immediately conflates it with “world government,” a totally different notion, weighted with political significance. He claims that “American conservatives fell prey to their own form of technological euphoria” (p. 120), arguing that “they became firm believers that the technology-driven ‘revolution in military affairs’

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had created a new era of unanswerable American dominance.” I know at least a number of “conservatives” who believed no such thing; this is a broad and generic claim that cannot be true—it is just lazy writing. He equates globalization with the rise of “an enticing vision of a ‘new world order’” that emerged after 1989, when in fact students of globalization would make no such parallel—globalization as a phenomenon has been emerging for centuries.

The real problem with the book, however, is that, after laying out a provocative and potentially important thesis—that world politics may be making a U-turn, or at least a left hook—Rachman then himself veers off into an unsatisfying tour of the last couple of decades, ground that has been amply covered in hundreds of books and thousands of articles. He had a compelling thesis to support; he ought to have spent 150 of his pages supporting it. Instead he throws many of his eight-page summaries at the reader, which tell us nothing we do not already know, leaving him precious little space to make his true argument: that a combination of nationalism, zero-sum rivalry, and most of all the legacy of the 2008 financial crisis is creating an “Age of Anxiety” in which rivalry between states will become much more pronounced than it has been. In theory, this section begins on page 167 of a 280-page book, but even then some of the chapters that follow remain devoted to background throat-clearing.

There are suggestive nuggets that point to analysis that could have been broadened considerably. Rachman quotes an American professor at a Chinese university who is astonished at how many of his students “have been taught that war with America is inevitable” (p. 179). There is the description of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, apparently ultramodern and Westernized—yet a man who carries a “tough and nationalistic” message—who believes that “the West had taken advantage of a period of Russian weakness in the 1990s,” who insisted that Russia was “not going to be pushed around anymore.” There is Rachman’s argument that Russian and Chinese governments are turning to nationalism as a chief source of legitimacy.

These and other glimpses of an emerging world of proud, nationalistic, mutually suspicious states with self-interest at the top of their list of priorities, followed by . . . self-interest, and then self-interest, and several notches below that, some vague notion of the sort of collective responsibilities celebrated during what Rachman terms the “Age of Optimism” that began in 1989—these point to the sort of book that could have been written: deeply researched, strong on reporting from the ground in these countries, less about the past and more about the future, giving the reader an intimate sense of the mindsets of emerging leadership generations, not only in China and Russia, but also in places (which, to be fair, Rachman certainly mentions, and emphasizes) such as India, Brazil, Turkey, and Pakistan. But again, that is not this book. **PRISM**

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